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Abstract
This thesis consists of three chapters in applied microeconomics. Two chapters fall into the
field of family economics and one into the field of the economics of religion.
The first chapter asks if anticipated future fertility affects educational investment. Theory
suggests that the number of children planned in the future can affect the returns to education,
the resources available for family consumption and the incentives to find a partner. This chapter
uses varying eligibility criteria for second child permits during the One-Child Policy in China as a
natural experiment, which provides plausible exogenous variation in the cost of the second child. I
use second child permits that are conditional on time-invariant individual characteristics and show
that they have a strong positive effect on the likelihood of having a second child between 1990
and 2005. They are therefore expected to change anticipated fertility among compliers. I find that
fulfilling an eligibility criterion at secondary school age increases the time invested in education and
the likelihood of continuing schooling after middle school. The effect appears concentrated in the
subset of compliers: individuals who increase their anticipated number of children as a response to
eligibility. It can be explained by the high cost of raising children, by the second child having no
or only a short-term effect on parental labour supply and by concerns about finding a spouse.
The second chapter, co-authored with Weiwei Ren, Jeanne Bovet, Paul Seabright and Charlotte
Wang, investigates marriage patterns and underlying preferences in China. We estimate mate pref-
erences based on the evaluation of a series of randomly created profiles and connect our results to
recent marriage patterns in the general population. Data is collected on parents (or other relatives)
who search for a spouse on behalf of their unmarried adult child and on unmarried students. We
confirm that male profiles with a high income and real estate ownership have a higher probability of
being selected by parents than profiles with low income and no real estate, but not female profiles.
We find that parents dislike profiles with less education than their son or daughter, but we do not
find evidence for a dislike of female profiles with high education. However, some parents may have
excessively high expectations about the educational level of their son-in-law. Parents mostly prefer
male profiles with a similar age to their daughter and female profiles that are younger than their
son. Yet, when their son is in his twenties, parents also accept women who are slightly older. If
marriages formed according to parents’ preferences, the most common case would be the husband
being 2 or 3 years older. Yet, in the general population, the most common case for recent marriages
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is spouses having the same age. This would be the case if marriages formed according to students’
preferences. Both parents’ and students’ preferences predict a high degree of assortativeness on
education, which we observe in recently married couples in the overall population.
The third chapter, co-authored with Emmanuelle Auriol, Julie Lasse´bie, Amma Panin and Paul
Seabright, provides experimental support for the hypothesis that insurance can be a motive for
religious donations by members of a Pentecostal church in Ghana. We randomize enrolment into a
commercial funeral insurance policy, then church members allocate money between themselves and
a set of religious goods in a series of dictator games with significant stakes. Members enrolled in
insurance give significantly less money to their own church compared to a control group of members
that only receive information about the insurance. Enrolment also reduces giving towards other
spiritual goods. We set up a model exploring different channels of religiously based insurance.
The implications of the model and the results from the dictator games suggest that adherents
perceive the church as a source of insurance and that this insurance is derived from beliefs in an
interventionist God. Survey results suggest that material insurance from the church community is
also important and we hypothesize that these two insurance channels exist in parallel.
iv
Re´sume´
Cette dissertation est compose´e de trois chapitres en microe´conomie applique´e. Deux chapitres
s’inscrivent dans le champ de l’e´conomie de la famille et un chapitre dans le champ de l’e´conomie
de la religion.
Le premier chapitre pose la question de savoir si la fertilite´ future anticipe´e a un effet sur
l’investissement dans l’e´ducation. Un mode`le the´orique sugge`re que le nombre des enfants planifie´
dans le futur peut affecter les rendements de l’e´ducation, les ressources disponibles pour la con-
sommation familiale et la motivation pour chercher un conjoint. Ce chapitre utilise l’expe´rience
naturelle constitue´e par les variations dans les crite`res d’e´ligibilite´ pour le permi d’avoir un deuxie`me
enfant pendant la politique d’enfant unique en Chine, laquelle fournit une variation plausiblement
exoge`ne dans le couˆt d’avoir un deuxie`me enfant. J’utilise les permis d’avoir un deuxie`me enfant
conditionne´s par des caracte´ristiques individuelles invariables dans le temps et je montre que ces
permis ont un fort effet positif sur la probabilite´ d’avoir un deuxie`me enfant entre 1990 et 2005. Ils
sont donc susceptibles de changer la fertilite´ anticipe´e parmi les compliers (conformistes). J’observe
que satisfaire a` un crite`re d’e´ligibilite´ a` l’aˆge de l’e´cole secondaire augmente le temps investi en
e´ducation et la probabilite´ de poursuive les e´tudes apre`s l’e´ducation interme´diaire. L’effet paraˆıt
concentre´ dans le groupe des compliers - les individus qui augmentent leur nombre d’enfants an-
ticipe´ en re´ponse a` leur e´ligibilite´. Ce re´sultat peut eˆtre explique´ par un couˆt e´leve´ d’e´ducation
des enfants, par le fait que le deuxie`me enfant n’ait qu’un effet de court terme sur l’offre de travail
parental, et par le souci de trouver une conjointe.
Le deuxie`me chapitre, coe´crit avec Weiwei Ren, Jeanne Bovet, Paul Seabright et Charlotte
Wang, examine les sche´mas matrimoniaux et les pre´fe´rences sous-jacentes en Chine. Nous estimons
les pre´fe´rences conjugales par l’e´valuation d’une se´rie de profils cre´e´s ale´atoirement et nous relions
les re´sultats aux sche´mas matrimoniaux re´cents dans la population ge´ne´rale. Les donne´es sont
recueillies aupre`s des parents (ou d’autres membres de famille) qui cherchent un ou une partenaire
pour leur enfant adulte non marie´, ainsi qu’aupre`s des e´tudiants non marie´s. Nous confirmons que
les profils masculins avec un haut revenu et une proprie´te´ immobilie`re ont une probabilite´ plus
e´leve´e d’eˆtre se´lectionne´s par les parents que les profils avec un faible revenu et sans proprie´te´ im-
mobilie`re. Mais il n’en va pas de meˆme pour les profils fe´minins. Nous constatons que les parents
n’aiment pas les profils avec un niveau d’e´ducation infe´rieure que celui de leur fils ou leur fille, mais
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nous ne trouvons aucune preuve que les parents seraient de´favorables a` des profils fe´minins avec un
niveau d’e´ducation plus e´leve´. En revanche, certains parents peuvent avoir des attentes excessive-
ment exigeantes quant au niveau d’e´ducation de leur beau-fils. Les parents pre´fe`rent ge´ne´ralement
les profils masculins avec un aˆge similaire a` celui de leur fille et les profils fe´minins qui sont plus
jeunes que leur fils. Toutefois, lorsque leur fils a la vingtaine, les parents acceptent aussi des femmes
le´ge`rement plus aˆge´es. Si les mariages se formaient selon les pre´fe´rences des parents, le cas le plus
courant serait celui d’un mari avec deux ou trois ans de plus que sa femme. Cependant, dans la pop-
ulation ge´ne´rale, le cas le plus courant parmi les mariages re´cents est celui des conjoints du meˆme
aˆge. Ce serait le cas si les mariages se forment selon les pre´fe´rences des e´tudiants. Les pre´fe´rences
des parents et celles des e´tudiants pre´disent un degre´ e´leve´ d’appariement assortatif selon le niveau
d’e´ducation, ce que nous observons chez les couples re´cemment marie´s dans la population ge´ne´rale.
Le troisie`me chapitre, coe´crit avec Emmanuelle Auriol, Julie Lasse´bie, Amma Panin et Paul
Seabright, e´tudie dans un cadre expe´rimental l’hypothe`se selon laquelle les dons religieux des mem-
bres d’une e´glise pentecoˆtiste au Ghana auraient un roˆle d’assurance contre les chocs ne´gatifs. Nous
offrons ale´atoirement a` certains membres de la communaute´ religieuse une souscription a` une as-
surance fune´raire disponible sur le marche´, et nous mesurons en laboratoire comment les individus
choisissent de re´partir une somme d’argent entre eux-meˆmes et un ensemble de be´ne´ficiaires religieux
et spirituels. Les membres ayant rec¸u l’assurance donnent significativement moins d’argent a` leur
propre e´glise par rapport au groupe de controˆl des membres qui ont seulement rec¸u des information
a` propos de l’assurance. Les premiers re´duisent e´galement leurs dons aux autres be´ne´ficiaires spir-
ituels. Nous de´veloppons un mode`le qui explore les diffe´rents me´canismes d’assurance fonde´s sur
les dons religieux. Les re´sultats the´oriques et expe´rimentaux sugge`rent que les participants a` notre
e´tude perc¸oivent l’e´glise comme une source d’assurance et que cette assurance est de´rive´e de croy-
ances dans un Dieu interventionniste. Les participants a` l’e´tude de´clarent e´galement qu’une assur-
ance mate´rielle e´manant de la communaute´ est e´galement importante et nous e´mettons l’hypothe`se
que ces deux me´canismes d’assurance existent en paralle`le.
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Introduction
1
Before I started the graduate program in Toulouse, I did an internship at a small public policy
company in India. At one point, my colleague explained to me that once she felt ready to get
married, her parents would preselect potential suitors. She would then meet him and his family
and make the decision together with her family. Marriage is one of the most decisive steps for many
women in the world: it is what mostly determines her socioeconomic, psychological and physical
well-being. For such an important decision, why would anyone not take into account the advice of
their parents who have marriage experience?
Not every parent-child discussion about marriage is as harmonious and collaborative. In many
marriages in South Asia, the bride and the groom meet at their wedding for their first time. An-
other example is my grandmother who had to wait until the age of 21 to get married because her
father would not give her his consent. I asked myself, when do parents and children cooperate and
when is there a conflict? If there is a conflict, is it over which spousal characteristics are important?
In any case, I became interested in the economics of marriage.
While on the search for a topic for my job market paper, my thesis advisor urged me to look
at marriages in China. As I describe in section 2.2.1, China used to have a tradition of arranged
marriages which was outlawed when the Communist Party came to power. Yet, this does not
mean that parents are not involved in the search for a marriage partner. On the contrary, parental
involvement might become more important again with the increase in financial inequality: a “good
match” might become again more important and worth serious search efforts.
It is impossible to study marriages and families in China without stumbling across the One-
Child Policy. This policy is certainly the most invasive large-scale fertility policy to date. As I
describe in section 1.1.1, it has not only affected fertility outcomes but also marriage outcomes and
ethnic identity. While thinking through how the One-Child Policy would affect marriages, I realized
that it could also affect premarital investment, in particular, investment in education. The more
general question is if the number of children someone plans to have in the future affects educational
investment decision. Chapter 1 addresses this question.
When motivating the relevance of this question, I often think about my parents. My parents
met when they were quite young and both wanted a big family. The strategy of my father, at least
partially to this effect, was to get as much education as possible. So he got a PhD. The strategy
of my mother was to get a university education but in an area where she could exit and enter the
labour market relatively easily and where there was a flat earning profile. In chapter 1 I find that
in China, men who are allowed to have two children receive more education than men who are
allowed to have only one child. The effect on women is less clear, possibly due to heterogeneity in
how women’s labour supply changes with the birth of a child.
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The original project for which I went to China worked out thanks to the amazing work of my
coauthors. We were able to interview parents who are actively looking for a potential spouse for
their adult child at a designated area in a public park during weekends. Parents with unmarried
children meet, chat and exchange information. As a comparison sample, we interviewed unmarried
students at the local university. Our findings are described in chapter 2. Part of the project is
published in Bovet et al. (2018). Generally, we find that parents see themselves as agents for their
children, however, their preferences do not seem to perfectly overlap. The parent-child dynamics,
in particular when they do not fully agree on the preferred characteristics, are an interesting avenue
of future research.
The third chapter at first seems a bit at odds with the first two chapters. It was the first project
I was involved in when I started my PhD and falls within the field of the economics of religion. Yet,
it has very important connections with the other two chapters. While the family is the most impor-
tant network in many countries, for many, religious networks are a close second. For the empirical
analysis in chapter 3, we interviewed members of a Pentecostal church. When asked about who they
would ask for counsel if they had personal or family issues nearly 70% indicated that they would ask
their pastor and nearly 40% would turn to a family member (multiple answers were possible). When
they would need financial help, 51% would turn to their family and 24% to their church community.
The starting point for chapter 3 was the question why religious organisations play such an
important role in people lives, in particular in developing countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, where
many give between 10 to 15% of their available income to them. We focus on two services that
religious organisations potentially provide: financial and “spiritual” insurance, the latter being de-
rived from a belief in a higher power. Yet, the network function of religion is undeniable for other
services as well. In our survey, 40% of respondents state that they have found or believe they are
most likely to find their spouse in the church community. Nearly 40% say that they do business
with other members of the church. While teaching about God is the most important reason they
state why they are a member of this particular church, respondents also indicate moral guidance
(53%), the atmosphere of the services (38%) and the welcoming community (21%).
In the Pentecostal church that we worked with individuals that have the same concern would
meet and pray together. As their children’s marriage is apparently a major concern for many
parents, particularly mothers, they would meet for specific prayer groups. Here they are able to
exchange and this is essentially what Chinese parents are doing in public parks.
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Chapter 1
Anticipated Fertility and Educational
Investment: Evidence from the
One-Child Policy in China1
Eva Raiber
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ABSTRACT
Does anticipated future fertility affect educational investment? Theory suggests that the number
of children planned in the future can affect the returns to education, the resources available for
family consumption and the incentives to find a partner. This chapter uses varying eligibility
criteria for second child permits during the One-Child Policy in China as a natural experiment,
which provides plausible exogenous variation in the cost of the second child. I use second child
permits that are conditional on time-invariant individual characteristics and show that they have a
strong positive effect on the likelihood of having a second child between 1990 and 2005. They are
therefore expected to change anticipated fertility among compliers. I find that fulfilling an eligibility
criterion at secondary school age increases the time invested in education and the likelihood of
continuing schooling after middle school. The effect appears concentrated in the subset of compliers:
individuals who increase their anticipated number of children as a response to eligibility. It can
be explained by the high cost of raising children, by the second child having at most a short-term
effect on parental labour supply and by concerns about finding a spouse.
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1.1 Introduction
Educational and fertility choices are major life decisions that are deeply interconnected. The
microeconomics literature has largely focused on the effect of parental education on fertility (e.g.
McCrary and Royer (2011), Osili and Long (2008), Duflo et al. (2015), Lavy and Zablotsky (2015)).
The reverse question has rarely been addressed: Do individuals who anticipate having more children
receive more or less educational investment than those who anticipate none or fewer? Answering
this question is challenging because the number of children one plans to have in the future is usu-
ally unobserved. Even if observed, it is correlated with other variables that affect the demand for
education.
Faced with ageing societies, policy-makers in many high-income countries are eager to encourage
childbearing. Child benefits, free childcare and paid parental leave are policies implemented or dis-
cussed in most low fertility countries. They incentivize childbirth by reducing the costs associated
with having children. How do such reforms influence educational investment? Do they have the
side effect of keeping future parents from investing in education? Theory suggests that children can
affect parental labour supply and the income available for family consumption. The desire to have
children can also strengthen the incentives to find a partner. Therefore, the anticipated number of
children can have an effect on the returns to education and the marginal utility of income. The
sign of the overall effect is ambiguous and needs to be evaluated empirically.
This chapter uses variation in the strictness of the One-Child Policy in China to estimate the
effect of anticipated fertility on educational investment. While one child per family was the norm,
having another child was allowed with a “second child permit”. The eligibility criteria for these
permits were set on the provincial level. Policy changes provide plausible exogenous variation in
the costs of having a second child. Several criteria were conditional on observable characteristics
that are time-invariant. These include ethnicity, household registration status and being an only
child. It allowed their families to predict if their teenage child would be eligible in the future. If
second child permits have a strong effect on fertility outcomes, they are expected to have an effect
on anticipated fertility.
The criteria for second child permits varied over time and between provinces. They are not
directly related with provincial educational policies. This allows the use of difference-in-differences
(DID) and double DID identification strategies (also called triple differences approach). I calcu-
late whether individuals fulfil a second child permit criterion at the age when they usually finish
mandatory secondary school. At this point, they and probably mostly their family must decide
whether to continue with voluntary senior high school. I find that fulfilling a second child permit
criterion significantly increases schooling. Between 1990 and 2005, eligible individuals spend on
average around 0.9 years more on education. The likelihood of enrolment into higher secondary
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school is around 9 percentage points higher. The effect is stronger for men (but not significantly
so); the effect for women is positive but insignificant at around 0.6 years of education.
To affect anticipated fertility, permits need to have an actual impact on fertility outcomes. I use
the same second child permit criteria as before and calculate the eligibility status at the mean age
when individuals decide to have a second child, for an older sample. I find that eligibility increases
the likelihood of having a second child by around 14 percentage points. This is an important effect,
yet it shows that not all individuals change their fertility decision with eligibility.
Individuals and their families might plan two children independent of their eligibility status.
Yet, they still benefit from not having to pay monetary fines once they are eligible. I use those
not eligible in the older sample as the training sample for a random forest estimation. It predicts
if individuals would have a second child even when they are not eligible. As expected, the fertility
outcome of those predicted to have a second child without permits is not influenced by eligibility.
I also find that for them the effect of eligibility on enrolment into higher secondary school is signif-
icantly lower. This suggests that the positive effect on schooling comes from compliers: those who
increase their anticipated fertility from one child to two as a response to becoming eligible. Further
treatment heterogeneity analysis shows that men in provinces with a skewed sex ratio are the most
affected.
Primary and secondary schooling decisions are typically made before individuals have children.
However, individuals, together with their own parents, might take into account how many children
they plan to have in the future. In the context of secondary school decisions, parents are probably
the main decision-makers. They might also be more forward-looking and aware of the consequences
of having children. First, children can be an important cost factor that decreases the monetary
resources available for family consumption. To prepare for this cost in the future, families can use
educational investment to smooth consumption over time (intertemporal consumption smoothing
effect). This channel is particularly important when individuals have to financially support their
own parents at the same time as raising their children. Second, children can also affect the time
their parents spend working in the labour market. The income loss increases in the parents’ ed-
ucational level and has an effect on lifetime returns to education. The less time the parent can
spend in the labour market, the lower are the pay-offs from education (labour supply effect). Third,
individuals who want to have children in the future might have a higher incentive to find a partner.
If the sex ratio is skewed, individuals of the more frequent sex compete for partners. They can
use education to increase their chances (marriage market effect). In section 1.3, I use a two-period
model to demonstrate these channels and highlight the assumptions needed.
The empirical findings suggest that higher anticipated fertility can increase educational in-
vestment. Thus, policies that encourage childbearing can have positive side effects on education.
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However, labour market conditions are important. I show that if there are not labour supply con-
sequences of children, higher costs of raising children increases the effect of anticipated fertility on
education. Wanting children does not have a negative effect on education if parents can quickly
return to the labour market after childbirth. It is important that they do not have to fear lower
returns to education than their childless co-workers. I show that the effect of anticipated fertility
on education is decreasing in the loss of working time due to childcare.2
Finally, I provide descriptive statistics about the cost of children and the parental labour supply
in China. Nowadays, raising children is considered very costly. For a family with two children,
educational expenditure accounts for up to 30% of available family income. Yet, parental labour
supply and income are not affected in the long-run by having a second child. Women with a second
child work and earn less than women with only one child for at most 3 years and then catch up.
Other studies find no or little evidence on the negative effects of fertility on parental labour supply
(Guo et al. (2017), He and Zhu (2016)).
1.1.1 Links with the Literature
Theoretical growth models and country level empirical work usually connect low fertility rates
and high human capital investment (Becker et al. (1990), Rosenzweig (1990), Kalemli-Ozcan
(2003)). Within a given setting, having many children is often correlated with lower levels of
parental education. Several papers focus on identifying the causal effect of education on fertility
outcome. They usually use shocks to the supply of education to address the issue of unobserved
variables being correlated with both fertility and education and the decisions about them being
taken simultaneously (e.g. Duflo et al. (2017), Osili and Long (2008), Fort et al. (2016)). In this
chapter, I use a shock to the cost of children to look at the reverse question.
Female education is often associated with lower fertility rates (Osili and Long (2008), Lam
and Duryea (1999), Schultz (1997), Duflo et al. (2015), Duflo et al. (2017), Lavy and Zablotsky
(2015)). The main economic argument is that the opportunity costs of having a child for an
educated woman are higher than for a non-educated woman (Becker (1981)). Education can also
increase the knowledge of contraception methods (Rosenzweig and Schultz (1989)) and the bargain-
ing power of women who want fewer children than men (Manser and Brown (1980)). By raising
women’s income, education can shift the fertility choice toward fewer children of higher quality
(Becker (1960), Becker and Lewis (1973), Willis (1973)). This result, however, does not necessarily
hold for developed countries (Fort et al. (2016), McCrary and Royer (2011), Monstad et al. (2008)).
An important share of papers in the fertility and education literature focus on the quality-
quantity trade-off. In the theoretical framework based on Becker and Lewis (1973), parents trade-
off between the number of children and how much they invest in each child. The One-Child Policy
2This is shown under constant absolute risk aversion.
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in China has been used to evaluate this trade-off empirically (Qin et al. (2016), Li and Zhang
(2016), Rosenzweig and Zhang (2009), Qian (2009)). This chapter goes one step further. Given
the number of children, parents take into account the number of grand-children when they make
investment decisions.3
Recent work by Huang et al. (2016b) is the most closely related. However, they only use regional
variation in monetary fines that I find has no effect on either schooling investment or on fertility
choice. They also assume that an increase in monetary fines decreases anticipated fertility and
do not discuss that it might increase the cost of a second child while keeping anticipated fertility
constant.
The exemptions for ethnic minorities have been used to study inter-ethnic marriages (Huang
and Zhou (2015)) and ethnic identity (Jia and Persson (2017)). This implies that on top of having
fertility consequences, the One-Child Policy shaped many other socioeconomic decisions. This
chapter strengthens this conclusion.
1.2 Context: The One-Child Policy, second child permits and ed-
ucation in China
Empirical identification relies on exogenous variation in the cost of having another child. The
One-Child Policy (OCP) in China between 1979 and 2015 was based on the goal of one child per
family, setting out fines and penalties for the birth of a second child. At the same time, provincial
governments could issue permits for the second child and in rare cases for the third. The criteria
under which one could apply for such a permit changed over time. This section describes the policy
and its regulations, as well as the functioning, motivation and implications of second child permits.
Family planning has been of particular importance to the Chinese government for the past
decades. After the Great Famine (1959-1961), the central government promoted ambitious family
planning policies. These include the “Later, Longer, Fewer” campaign from 1971-1979, the OCP
from 1979-2015 and the recent Two-children policy. During the “Later, Longer, Fewer” campaign,
the government promoted later marriage, longer birth intervals and fewer children. One child per
family was optimal and two was acceptable for urban couples, three for rural couples. Penalties
were introduced for those who did not comply (Whyte et al. (2015)). Birth control and abortion
were promoted. The campaign also included a strong element of coercion. Women, mainly in rural
areas, were pressured to abort out-of-quota children and to get sterilized after the birth of the third
3I assume that individuals can plan their fertility outcome and the timing of their pregnancies. This is an
appropriate assumption for many high and middle-income countries, including China. A distinct but connected
strand of literature looks fertility uncertainty. Contraceptive methods give women certainty over the pregnancy
consequences of sex and thus decrease the risk of tertiary schooling investment (Goldin and Katz (2002), Ananat and
Hungerman (2012), Miller (2010)).
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Source: World Bank. It uses the World Bank definition of Total Fertility Rate. It is calculated as
the average number of children that would be born to a woman if she were to experience the
exact current age-specific fertility rates through her life.
Figure 1.1: Fertility rate in China, 1960 - 2014
child (Whyte et al. (2015)). Fertility rates in China fell sharply during this period (see figure 1.1),
though there is no consensus about how much of the fall was due to measures specifically targeting
fertility. The OCP was introduced after the sharp drop in fertility rates.
Between 1978 and 1980, the central government introduced the goal of one child per family.
Provinces were to implement this goal by setting fines for the birth of a second child and by pro-
viding birth control measures. Between 1979, the policy was rolled out on a county-to-county
basis (Qian (2009), Almond et al. (2019)). However, in rural areas where the one-child limit met
significant resistance, implementation was delayed (Baochang et al. (2007)). In 1983, the OCP
precipitated a huge large wave of abortions and sterilizations (Whyte et al. (2015))4.
Between 1982 and 1984, provincial governments started to issue more or less formal guide-
lines under which conditions married or remarried couples could apply for a second child permit.
Thereby, they relaxed the one child per family limit significantly (Scharping (2013)). Between 1986
and 1991, provincial governments produced official family planning regulations which outlaid in
detail the different criteria. Most of them were revised at least once in the 1990s and again after
2001. While transparency about family policies increased, the use of coercive measures such as
forced abortion and sterilization dropped substantially (Whyte et al. (2015)).
The 1980s represent the time of introduction and adjustment of the policy, whereas the 1990s
and 2000s represent a time of stability from a family policy perspective. Transparency of the policy
measures is important to form adequate fertility expectations. This motivates using the time frame
of 1990 to 2005 for the empirical evaluation. Furthermore, the 1980s coincide with the implementa-
414.4 million abortions, 20.7 million sterilizations and 17.8 million IUD insertions (Whyte et al. (2015))
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tion of the Law on Nine-Year Compulsory Education. The law was introduced to attain universal
education for nine years: six years at primary school (from age 6/7 to 12/13) and three years at
junior high school (from age 12/13 to 15/16). After junior high school, students can voluntarily
continue with general or vocational senior high school. Therefore, the first and most relevant edu-
cational investment decision is taken when the child is around 16 years old.
During the OCP, couples that wanted to have a child had to apply for a permit allowing them
to do so and only married couples were able to apply. Couples that had a second child without
a second child permit officially had to pay monetary fines. These were set as a function of the
couple’s income (Scharping (2013)). Couples with higher income thus had to pay higher fines in
absolute terms. Additionally, parents potentially faced non-monetary penalties. These included
losing their job or having their career opportunities restricted. There is no accessible data on the
enforcement of monetary fine and how frequent other social penalties were. Couples officially had
to obtain the second child permit before having the second child. However, this posed a significant
financial burden to local rural governments. Second child permits were presumably given out after
the birth if the couple fell into an exemption category (Scharping (2013)).
Eligibility criteria for second child permits varied on the provincial level and between rural
and urban areas. The household registration status (hukou) was an important determinant for
eligibility. It is either agriculture/rural or non-agricultural/urban. Couples could only apply for a
child permit at their place of household registration. This restricted strategic between-province and
urban-rural migration. Most exemptions also required that the applicant respect late childbirth
(birth of the first child after age 24 for women) and an acceptable birth interval (between 4 and 7
years).
Provinces introduced several different exemptions over time for different reasons. The most
known is the policy that allowed couples in rural areas whose first-born was a girl to have a second
child. In five provinces, couples living in rural areas were always allowed to have two children
(Baochang et al. (2007))5. These exemptions were introduced to appease the rural population and
to ensure sufficient labour in the agricultural sector.
Couples from ethnic minorities were often allowed to have two children or were even completely
exempted from the policy. However, this depended on the province, if the couple lived in a ru-
ral or specific minority area and sometimes on the size of the minority population. The fertility
policies for ethnic minorities depended on the strategy the province uses toward those minorities.
Autonomous regions generally had more lenient fertility constraints for minority couples. Most
autonomous regions are not included in this study as the individual data set does not cover those
5The provinces are Hainan, Yunnan, Qinghai, Ningxia and Xinjiang. In the province of Guangdong, couples with
a rural household status were also allowed to have two children until 1998 (Scharping (2013)).
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regions.
Following a statement from the central government, all provinces at some point introduced
the criterion that if one or both spouses were an only child they were eligible. This policy was
motivated by the idea that the one-child-per-family policy should only hold for one generation.
Provinces implemented this criterion over the course of the 1990s to early 2000.
There were specific exemptions for certain occupational groups such as fishermen and mine
workers, as well as for veterans. Some provinces also had rules for couples who already adopted a
child or that had their first child overseas. These policies are not taken into account here because
they are not observable or can be anticipated at the age of 16. The category of couples with “real
difficulties” is the vaguest and potentially flexible one. This makes an evaluation impossible with-
out governmental application and acceptance data.
To summarize, I use the following criteria for the empirical analysis:6
1. In five provinces, couples in rural areas were allowed to have two children. In the province of
Guangdong, second child permits were given to couples in rural areas until 1998.
2. Couples living in rural areas whose first child is a girl can anticipate being eligible with a
likelihood of 50%.7
3. Couples in which one or both spouses belong to a national minority can have two children.
This can apply to the whole province, the rural area or a specific minority area.
4. Couples in which one or both spouses are an only child can have two children.
1.3 Model
The motivation of the theoretical part is two-fold: First, it illustrates different channels through
which anticipated fertility can affect educational investment in the most traceable form. Second, the
model shows how different types of individuals react differently to a change in the cost of another
child. Some anticipate to have another child, some do not change the number of children planned
but benefit from not having to pay the fine. I use the results to guide the empirical investigation
which aims at isolating group-specific effects. These two goals are achieved with a simple two-stage
model, which can be extended for additional questions.
6Specific exemptions I also use: In Jiangsu province, men can have a second child if the first born is a girl and
they do not have a brother. In Jilin province, in rural areas, if one spouse is an only child and the first born is a girl,
the can have a second child.
750% is an approximation. However, there are no reports of couples falling into that exemption that tried to avoid
having a son as the first child. The main simplification is that I ignore sex differences in the cost-benefit analysis of
parents.
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1.3.1 Set-up
In the model, a representative family consists of two parents and their child, the individual
who is a teenager at the beginning. They must decide how much to invest in the education of the
teenager in the present (period 1). In the future (period 2), the individual is grown up, married,
earns income together with their spouse. The newly formed couple can have children themselves.
The parents in period 1 are potential grand-parents. The family has to pay a fine for the second
child if they are not eligible for a second child permit. The fine depends on the educational level
of the now grown-up individual.
The educational decision and fertility decision are modeled as made by the family. There are
some argument for this is a simplifying assumption. For one, the teenager can influence educational
investment by making more or less effort and by persuading the parents of their school choice. Par-
ents can influence the teenager’s fertility decision by passing on their own fertility preferences and
by offering their help raising their grand-children. This is particularly persuasive in China where
the family is still the most important social unit for many individuals. Also, grand-parents draw
important benefits from having grand-children. They are invested in the continuation of their fam-
ily line, besides other biological, social and altruistic motivations. However, they may see having
grand-children as being particularly costly. While the the grown-up teenager raises the children,
less resources are available for the then grandparents. This can overlap with the time when they
are retired and have financial and care needs.
In the model, the educational investment stage and the reproductive stage do not overlap. This
is realistic with regard to primary and secondary education in China, which are usually finished
before starting the reproductive stage. In China, the minimum age for marriage is 20 for women
and 22 for men and individuals are strongly discouraged from having children without being mar-
ried.
Period 1 “the present”
In period 1, the family consumes c1. The income Y of the family is given exogenously and is used
for consumption, investment in education I or saving s. Utility in period 1 is given by
u(c1) = u(Y − ηI − s) (1.1)
where u(.) is the utility of consumption, assumed to be strictly increasing and concave. η > 0 is
the constant cost of education, Y the exogenous income, I the educational level of the teenager
and s the level of savings. I assume that families are credit constrained such that s ≥ 0.
Period 2 “the future”
In period 2, the teenager is grown up and married. The income earned is consumed by the family
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and spent on the n children the newly formed couple has. The family gets utility from having
children which is I assume is additively separable from the utility of consumption.
Utility in period 2 is given by:
u(c2) + αih(n) = u(y(I, J, n) +Rs− p(I, n, Z)− f(n)) + αh(n) (1.2)
where p(I, n, Z) indicates the fine that the family has to pay with Z ∈ {0, 1} indicating eligibility
status. The fine is dependent on the educational level of the teenager I. This reflects the fact
that monetary fines are dependent on the household income and that the family might have to pay
non-monetary fines such as losing the job or not being promoted. The fine is 0 for the first child
and only has to be paid when the family is not eligible for a second child permit (i.e Z = 0):
p(I, n, Z) =


0 if n = 1
0 if n = 2 & Z = 1
ρ(I)(n− 1) if n ≥ 2 & Z = 0
ρ(I)(n− 2) if n ≥ 2 & Z = 1
(1.3)
f(n) is the cost of raising n children (strictly increasing and concave), αh(n) represents the utility
of having children (strictly increasing and concave), with α being an individual fertility prefer-
ence parameter drawn from a given distribution. y(I, J, n) is the household income, assumed
to be strictly increasing and concave in the educational level I, the spouse’s educational level J
and decreasing in the number of children n. For now, we assume that the educational level of
the spouse J is exogenous. J is endogenized in section 1.3.4. An example is an income genera-
tion function that remunerates individuals for each hour worked multiplied by their productivity :
y(I, n) = (T − µn)P (I). Productivity P (I) is a concave function of education and T is the maxi-
mum time an individual can work. Working hours decrease µ for each child. One can interpret T
as the number of years an individual works in their life where the number of children decreases the
years of working.
Given their fertility preferences and eligibility status, family i solves:
max
I,s,n
u(Y − ηI − s) + δ[u(y(I, J, n) +Rs− p(I, n, Z)− f(n)) + αh(n)] (1.4)
with δ as the discount factor.
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1.3.2 Optimal educational level and optimal number of children
Maximising with respect to education gives the optimal level of education as a function of the
number of children n:
u′(c2)
[
∂y(I∗, J, n)
∂I∗
−
∂p(I, n, Z)
∂I∗
]
=
η
δ
u′(c1) (1.5)
The number of children affects educational investment by decreasing family consumption in the sec-
ond period, by affecting the returns to education directly through ∂y(I
∗,J,n)
∂I∗ and indirectly through
∂p(I,n,Z)
∂I∗ when the number of children is higher than 1.
Maximising utility with respect to n gives us the optimal number of children as a function of
education:
u′(c2)
[
∂p(I, n∗, Z)
∂n∗
+
∂f(n∗)
∂n∗
−
∂y(I, J, n∗)
∂n∗
]
= α
∂h(n∗)
∂n∗
(1.6)
On the left-hand side is the marginal (opportunity) cost of having n∗ children. It consists of the
marginal cost of raising and educating n∗ children (∂f(n
∗)
∂n∗ ), the fine if the family has more than
one child and a decrease in income due to shorter working hours. On the right-hand side is the
marginal benefits of having n∗ children. The effect of education on the optimal number of children
reflects standard results: Education increases income and thus makes having children less costly.
However, education also increases the opportunity cost of having children through ∂y(I,J,n
∗)
∂n∗ . Higher
education also implies having to pay a higher fine for the second child, increasing the cost of having
another one.
Maximising with respect to savings adds the following constraint:
R =
u′(c1)
δu′(c2)
(1.7)
1.3.3 Effect of 2nd child permits
I focus my attention to the choice set for the number of children being either one or two
(n ∈ [1, 2]). This encompasses the choice set of the majority of Chinese (the theoretical discussion
easily extends to an unrestricted choice set). The number of children is a discrete variable and there
is no fine for the first one. Therefore, eligibility does not necessarily change the optimal number
of children given by equation 1.6. The effect of the exemption depends on if eligibility changes
anticipated fertility or not. There are three cases (with the standard policy evaluation names in
brackets):
1. Always one child (never-takers): n∗(Z = 0) = 1 and n∗(Z = 1) = 1
The optimal number of children with eligibility or without is the same. The family is unaf-
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fected by the exemption.
2. Always two children (always-takers): n∗(Z = 0) = 2 and n∗(Z = 1) = 2
The fertility decision is not altered by the eligibility status because the family always wanted
two children. But the family benefits from not having to pay the fine for the second child.
3. Increasers (compliers): n∗(Z = 0) = 1 and n∗(Z = 1) = 2
Becoming eligible, the optimal number of children increases by one child.
The model disregards any level of uncertainty and assumes full information. To illustrate the
basic mechanisms, this model suffices. As the model does not have uncertainty, it is known in which
category the family will fall.8
Second child permits affect the educational investment of Increasers and Always-2-children as
followed:
Always 2 children:
Optimal education with Z = 0:
u′(y(I∗, J, 2) +Rs− ρ(I∗)− f(2))
[
∂y(I∗, J, 2)
∂I∗
−
∂ρ(I∗)
∂I∗
]
=
η
δ
u′(Y − ηI∗ − s) (1.8)
Optimal education with Z = 1:
u′(Y (I∗, J, 2) +Rs− f(2))
[
∂y(I∗, J, 2)
∂I∗
]
=
η
δ
u′(Y − ηI∗ − s) (1.9)
Being eligible has two opposing effects:
Intertemporal consumption smoothing: Eligibility decreases the marginal utility of consump-
tion in period 2 (u′(c2)) because the fine ρ(I) does not have to be paid any more. This decreases
education because the family responds with higher consumption and lower educational investment
in period 1.
Returns to education: Eligibility increases the returns to education by ∂ρ(I
∗)
∂I∗ because the fine
is dependent on income which increases in education.
Since there are two potential opposing effects, the total effect can be negative or positive.
Increasers:
8One could easily include for example uncertainty in the income gained in period 2 by adding a random shock to
the income term. Given the distribution of this term, one knows the distribution in the type of family. For example,
a family with a given α could an increaser with 80% likelihood and always-2 with 20% likelihood.
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Optimal education with Z = 0:
u′(y(I∗, J, 1) +Rs− f(1))
[
∂y(I∗, J, 1)
∂I∗
]
=
η
δ
u′(Y − ηI∗ − s) (1.10)
Optimal education with Z = 1:
u′(y(I∗, J, 2) +Rs− f(2))
[
∂y(I∗, J, 2)
∂I∗
]
=
s
δ
u′(Y − ηI∗ − s) (1.11)
Again, eligibility has two effects:
Intertemporal consumption smoothing: Eligibility increases the marginal utility of consump-
tion in period 2 (u′(c2)) by increasing spending on children by f(2) − f(1). Also, the individual
earns less due to having to care for two children (when y(I∗, J, 1) > y(I∗, J, 2)). Marginal utility
of additional earning in the future increases and the family uses education as a way to shift con-
sumption from period 1 to period 2, such that equation 1.5 holds.
Labour supply and returns to education: Eligibility decreases the returns to education if the
individual has to cut productive working hours (∂y(I
∗,J,2)
∂I∗ <
∂y(I∗,J,1)
∂I∗ ). This decreases returns to
education and thus decreases the incentives to invest in education.
The sign of the overall effect is discussed in the appendix in section 1.9.3.1 using as an example
the income generation function y(I, n) = (T − µn)P (I). The effect is positive if the intertemporal
consumption smoothing effect is stronger than the labour supply effect.
When the cost of children increases, this strengthens the income smoothing channel. However,
it also enforces the labour supply effect as the lost income due to a reduction in working hours is
more painful. If there is no labour supply channel, higher cost of raising children unambiguously
increases the effect of anticipate fertility on education. Also, if we assume constant absolute risk
aversion (CARA), higher costs of raising children always increases the effect.
I also discuss the effect of the loss in working time due to child care in the appendix (section
1.9.3.3). A higher loss in working time increases the labour supply channel and has an ambiguous
effect on the income channel. If we assume CARA, less working time lost due to a child (i.e. a the
smaller µ) increases the effect of anticipated fertility on education.
These factors are summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 1 Assuming, CARA, the overall effect of anticipating another child on education:
1. increases in the cost of raising a child f(n),
2. decreases in the loss of working time due to childcare δ.
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Proofs are in the appendix in section 1.9.3.3 and 1.9.3.2.9
1.3.3.1 The type of family according to fertility preferences α
The effect of the policy depends on if the family is behaving as an always-2, always-1, or in-
creaser. It depends on the exogenous parameters α and gives the following comparative statics:
For given cost and fine levels, families with a low fertility preference α are always-1, those with a
medium α are increasers and those with a high α are always-2. This is illustrated in figure 1.4 in the
appendix. Define the threshold α
¯
as the α at which for Z = 1, equation 1.6 is equal for n = 1 and
n = 2. Define the threshold α¯ as the α at which at Z = 0, equation 1.6 is equal for n = 1 and n = 2.
Proposition 2 If
1. α < α
¯
: the family has 1 child independent of eligibility (always-1).
2. α > α
¯
and α < α¯: the family has one child if not eligible and two children if eligible (in-
creaser).
3. α > α¯: the family has two children in any case (always-2).
This follows from the fact that the number of children n∗ is increasing in α and by the definition
of the thresholds. More interestingly, how do these threshold change according to other variables?
Proposition 3 The threshold α¯, above which the family is an always-2,
• increases in the cost of raising a child f(.),
• increases in fines ρ(.).
The threshold α
¯
, above which the family is an increaser
• increases in the cost of raising a child f(.),
• is unaffected by the fines ρ(.).
In section 1.9.3.5 in the appendix, the the equations for α
¯
and α¯ are derived. α
¯
does not depend
on the fines, while α¯ does. The cost of raising children f(.) increases the total cost of children and
decreases the number of children for a given α.10 Being indifferent between having 1 or 2 children,
9Furthermore, assume the hourly wage depends on productivity P (I) multiplied by a factor τ which captures
technology or labour market conditions. Assuming CARA, the the effect of anticipated fertility on education increases
with τ . This is shown in section 1.9.3.4.
10Let’s reformulate f(n) as a concave function f(n) scaled by the parameter ψ. Equation 1.6 is rewritten as
u′(c2)
[
∂p(I,n∗,Z)
∂n∗
+ ψ∂f(n
∗)
∂n∗
−
∂y(I,J,n∗)
∂n∗
]
= α ∂h(n
∗)
∂n∗
. Taking total derivatives of the left hand side for ψ gives:
u′(c2)ψ + u′′(c2)(−1) ∂f(n
∗)
∂n∗
ψ∂f(n∗)
∂n∗
> 0.
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conditioned on eligibility (Z = 1) implies higher fertility preferences when the cost of raising chil-
dren is higher. The same hold for being indifferent between having 1 or 2 children conditioned on
not being eligible (Z = 0). As fines are essentially an increase in the cost of having another child,
α¯ increases in the level of the fines.
Second child permits should not have any effect on the always-1. A positive or negative overall
effect can be driven by families that are benefiters, or always-2, or both of them. Proposition 2
helps to empirically disentangle the overall effect of second child permits on schooling investment,
by differentiating between the effect it has on individuals that are increasers and always-2.
1.3.3.2 Effect on saving
In this model, saving and educational investment are both tools to smooth consumption. Denote
EI the net returns to education
1
η
[
∂y(I∗,J,n)
∂I∗ −
∂p(I,n,Z)
∂I∗
]
, such that the first order condition 1.5 can
be rewritten as:
EI∗ =
u′(c1)
δu′(c2)
(1.12)
The family uses only education if at I = I∗ given by equation 1.5 EI∗ > R (case i). It uses only
savings if at s = s∗ given by equation 1.7 EI∗ < R (case ii). It uses both if at I = I
∗ and s = s∗
EI∗ = R (case iii).
Intertemporal consumption smoothing: If with anticipated fertility the need for intertem-
poral consumption smoothing increases, in case i, the family uses educational investment for
smoothing until either EI∗ =
u′(c1)
δu′(c2)
or EI∗ = R. In case ii and iii, because the returns to savings
are linear and the returns to education are decreasing, the family only uses savings to smooth.
However, under certain assumptions, the family increases investment in education and savings as a
reaction to increased anticipated fertility. For example, when educational investment is considered
safe and savings are considered risky (or the other way around).
Labour supply effect: Higher anticipated fertility decreases the expected labour supply and
thus the returns to education. This can tilt the favour towards using savings rather than educational
investment for consumption smoothing.
1.3.4 Gender differences and marriage
In this section, I distinguished between families with male or female teenager. I also consider
marriage market returns to education. First, I assume that spouses match positive-assortatively on
educational levels. The spouse’s educational level J is a function of own education I: J(I) = σI
with 0 < σ ≤ 1. This captures the correlation between the educational levels. Furthermore, I
assume that only women reduce their working hours when they have a child and that the spouses’
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incomes enter additively. Both assumptions are in line with descriptive statistics (see section 3.5.4).
The maximisation problem of a family with a daughter is:
max
I,s,n
u(Y − ηI − s) + δ[u(y(I, n) + y(J(I)) +Rs− p(I, n, Z)− f(n)) + αh(n)] (1.13)
u′(c2)
[
∂y(I∗, n)
∂I∗
+
∂y(J(I∗))
∂J(I∗)
σ −
∂p(I, n, Z)
∂I∗
]
=
η
δ
u′(c1) (1.14)
Families with a daughter who anticipates a reduction in working hours expect to experience the
labour supply effect. However, this effect gets mitigates by the returns to education in the marriage
market ∂y(J(I
∗))
∂J(I∗) σ. While the labour market returns to education
∂y(I∗,n)
∂I∗ depend on the number
of children, the marriage market returns do not. The stronger the correlation of educational lev-
els, the better the daughter’s educational investment can be used for intertemporal consumption
smoothing. For families with sons, it is the opposite. Though the marriage market returns to
education are also positive, they decrease in the anticipated number of children.
However, for men, there might be another factor, relevant in this context. So far, I assume that
everyone marries. I now introduce the possibility of staying single. If a person stays single in period
2, he/she ears income and does not have children: u(c2s) = y˜(I). Denote c
2
m the consumption in
period 1 when being married and c2s the consumption when staying single. Denote ω the probability
of marrying in period 2 and τ the ratio of men to women. I assume that the marriage surplus,
defined as the utility of being married minus the utility of staying single, is positive independent
of the educational level of the individual and the potential spouse and the number of children:
u(y(I) + y(J(I), n) + Rs − p(I, n, Z) − f(n)) + αh(n)) − u(y˜(I)) > 0, ∀I, n. As a consequence,
if there are as many men as women, then everyone gets married in period 2. If the sex ratio is
skewed, all of those of the scarce sex get married and some of those of the abundant sex stay single.
I assume that the likelihood of marriage for the abundant sex is a function of the sex ratio and
the individual’s education: ω(I, τ).11 We focus on the situation where there are more men than
women, which is the relevant case for China: τ > 1. The utility of a man is then given by (FOC in
section 1.9.3.6 in the appendix):
max
I,s,n
u(Y − ηI − s)+
δ[ω(I, τ)u(y(I) + y(J(I), n) +Rs− p(I, n, Z)− f(n)) + αh(n)︸ ︷︷ ︸
married
) + (1− ω(I, τ))u(y˜(I))︸ ︷︷ ︸
single
]
(1.15)
11The assumptions is related to assuming non-transferable utility. In the transferable utility case, families could
compensate a lack of education with monetary transfers. By restricting monetary transfers, through transaction cost,
limited commitment or simply social norms, families have to use pre-marital investment such as education in order
to make their child attractive in the marriage market.
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Marriage market effect: An increase in the number of anticipated children implies a (weak)
increase in the marriage surplus, because it increases the utility of being married but not the utility
of being single. For always-2-children, it increases the utility of marriage as it takes away the
monetary fines. For increasers, it (weakly) increases the utility of being married as they choose to
have two children over one child because it given them higher utility. It increases the incentives
to invest in education to increase the odds of finding a spouse to make the now more beneficial
situation more likely. The marriage market effect are thus be positive for increasers and always-2,
but not necessarily of the same magnitude.
Proposition 4 An increase in anticipated fertility increases the incentives to invest in education
to improve the odds of finding a spouse, given that the sex ratio is skewed.
As in the previous sections, the general equilibrium effects are not taken into account. The
likelihood of finding a spouse is not only dependent on own education but also the distribution of
educational levels within the same marriage market. If several individuals within the same marriage
market become eligible, this can change the educational distribution of the abundant sex.
1.3.5 The effect of fines on education
How does the amount of fines change the incentives to educate? Second child permits can be
interpreted as a reduction in the cost of having a second child, and the size of the cost reduction
depends on p(I). The effect of these monetary fines is again different for different types of indi-
viduals. For increasers, defined as those that anticipate a second child only if they are eligible for
a second child permit, the size of the fine does not matter. However, as mentioned in proposition
2, how many increasers there are in the population depends on the size of fine. The higher the
monetary fines, the higher the cost reduction due to 2nd child permits, thus the more people react
to it.
On top of changing the composition in the population between increaser and always-2, the
amount of the fines change the incentives to educate for always-2. Higher fines, as a function
of household income, increase the need to smooth consumption intertemporally, but also have a
stronger negative effect on education. Higher fines also strengthen the marriage market effect: not
having to pay high fines increases the marriage surplus more than not having to pay low fines.
1.4 Data
1.4.1 Individual Data
For the empirical analysis, I use individual survey data from the 2010 China Family Panel Study
(CFPS). It was designed by a Peking University research team, supported by Peking University
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985 funds and carried out by the Institute of Social Science Survey of the Peking University. The
dataset is available online in English and Chinese. Not all provinces are represented in the sam-
ple. In particular, the sample does not cover the autonomous regions of China except for Guangxi
Zhuang. The main population is sampled from Gansu (12%), Henan (11%), Guangdong (9%),
Shanghai (8.5%) and Liaoning (8.4%).
For the main sample, I use individuals that turned 16 between 1990 and 2005 which leads to a
sample of 7840 observations of which 53% are female. Summary statistics are displayed in table 1.6
in the appendix. The sample is predominantly rural: 70% hold an agricultural household status
and 30% hold a non-agricultural household status. 89% of the sample indicate that they are of
majority Han ethnicity. The main ethnic minorities in the sample are Miao (2.1%), Yi(2.3%) and
Man (1.5%). On average, individuals stayed in school for 7.6 years (women: 7.1, men: 8.2). Those
with a non-agricultural household status spend nearly twice as many years at school as those with
agricultural household status (11.4 compared to 6.1).
Empirical identification relies on geographical and temporal variation in the eligibility criteria.
Figure 1.2 illustrates the share of individuals that fulfilled an eligibility criterion at the age of 16.
I differentiate between two categories: those that fulfil a criterion to have another child, and those
that fulfil the criterion to have a second child if the first child is a girl (i.e. being eligible with a
likelihood of approximately 50%). There was high variation at the beginning of the OCP between
1982 and 1990 when provinces introduced criteria for the first time. However, the variation is too
high to allow individuals to form adequate expectations. In the time span between 1990 and 2005,
there are some policy reforms are provinces update their criteria catalogues, but the policy setting
is mostly stable.
Those in the main sample are too young to have finished their reproductive stage at the time of
the survey. I am thus unable to use the number of children allowed at secondary school age as an
instrument for the actual number of children. I, therefore, use individuals that turned 16 between
1980 and 1995 as the older sample because they have already finished their main reproductive
stage. With the older sample, I can investigate the effect of second child permits on the likelihood
of having a second child and the treatment heterogeneity. Summary statistics for the older sample
are also displayed in table 1.6. As expected, educational levels are lower but other characteristics are
the same (sex, ethnicity). There are more individuals with an agricultural household registration
status.
1.4.2 Policy exemptions
The information about province level policies is compiled from Scharping (2013), Baochang
et al. (2007) and official family planning regulation documents. The documents were accessed
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Data Source for individual data: CFPS 2010. Figure shows if an individual qualifies for a second
child permit the year they turn 16. Includes individuals that turn 16 between 1980 and 2010.
Frequency of reform changes is based on province level data. Source: Scharping (2013), Baochang
et al. (2007) and family planning regulations. One reform is defined as a change for one sub-group.
Figure 1.2: Share of population qualifying for 2nd child permit and incidences of second child
permit reforms.
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online in Mandarin Chinese and translated into English.12 An excerpt of the data is displayed
in table 1.5 in the appendix. Based on this information, I calculate if at the time of educational
decision-making an individual fulfils a second child permit criterion. The main educational decision
is made around the age of 16. At this time, students on average must decide whether to continue
with senior general or vocational high school after completing compulsory junior high school.
For the main analysis, I use those who turned 16 between 1990 and 2005. This has several
reasons: First, only after 1990 Chinese citizens had official legal documents that they could rely
on. Before, conditions for second child permits were only presented as guideline. It is debatable
whether implementation and knowledge of exemptions were comparable between provinces. Sec-
ond, I do not want to mix up the effects of the policy with the implementation time of the 1986
compulsory secondary school reform. To assure that in the year of the survey (2010), basic edu-
cational investment is finished, the upper threshold is set at 2005. Also, as previously mentioned,
in this time span there are several reforms in different provinces but not at the same time. Yet,
the policy framework is sufficiently stable so that fertility anticipations can be formed based on the
current policy situation.
1.5 Empirical methodology
The goal of this study is to isolate the effect of anticipated fertility on education. I denote I
the educational outcome and N˜ anticipated fertility. Furthermore, denote with P the cost of an
out-of-quota child. Ideally, one would want to estimate:
Ii = θ1N˜i + θ2Pi + µi (1.16)
using anticipated eligibility Z˜ ∈ {0, 0.5, 1} as an instrument for N˜ . The first stage would take
the following form:
N˜i = βZ˜i +Xi + ǫi (1.17)
where X indicated individual-level characteristics that determine eligibility status, province
fixed effects and time fixed effects. Conditioned onX, the anticipated eligibility status Z˜ is assumed
to be uncorrelated with the error term ǫ.
1.5.1 Effect of eligibility on education
However, N˜ and P are unobserved. Instead, only the actual fertility outcome N is observed
in the older sample for which the actual eligibility status Z ∈ {0, 1} is know after the birth of
the first child. So what can be identified? Denote I(Z˜)|X the educational level dependent on
anticipated eligibility at the age of 16 given characteristics X. I can identify the intention-to-treat
12This collection of policy information collected by Wanying Zhao is available upon request in English.
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effect E(I(1)|X)−E(I(0)|X) which compares the educational level of individuals that fulfil a second
child permit criterion at secondary school age with those that are not, with the following regression:
Ii = θ˜Z˜i +Xi + µ˜ (1.18)
The intention-to-treat effect θ˜, estimated in section 1.6.1, is a policy-relevant parameter. From
theory we know that is is a weighted average of the effect of the policy on the three different groups
always-1, increasers and always-2, which correspond to never-takers, compliers and always-takers
(Angrist et al. (1996)). Other fertility policies, such as child benefits or paid parental leave, that
change the costs of a child, would also affect compliers and always-takers. The intention-to-treat
effect is thus a parameter of interest, as it indicates how the policy overall affects education. How-
ever, it is also of interest to understand how the two different groups react, in order to be able to
make policy recommendations for other settings where the composition of the population is different.
In order to interpret the coefficient as the effect of the policy on compliers, one has to assume
that the behaviour of the other groups is unaffected (exclusion restriction). In this context, it is
easy to do for the group of always-1, but it is restrictive in the case of always-2 since, as we have
seen in the theory section, they benefit from not having to pay income-dependent fines.
The intention-to-treat effect can be decomposed into the effect on increasers which goes through
anticipated fertility N˜ and on always-2 whose effect goes through the fine for an out-of-quota child.
By definition, increasers are those that change anticipated fertility from 1 to 2 as a response to
eligibility, thus β is the share of increasers in the population. Denote π the share of always-2 in
the population and ρ the average amount of fines. The average effect of eligibility on out-of-quote
fines then defined as: E(P (1)|X) − E(P (0)|X) = πρ. Thus, the intention-to-treat effect can be
decomposed into:
E(I1|X)− E(I(0)|X) = θ1[E(N˜(1)|X)− E(N˜(0)|X)] + θ2[E(P (1)|X)− E(P (0)|X)] (1.19)
= βθ1 + πρθ2 (1.20)
In the standard LATE case, the exclusion restriction implies that πρθ2 = 0: either there are
no always-takers or always-takers are unaffected by the instrument Z. Furthermore, if anticipated
fertility N˜ was observed, one can estimate β, the “take-up rate”. Even if the take-up rate is
unobserved, by assuming a non-negative effect of the instrument on take-up together with the
exclusion restriction, one is able to identify the sign of the effect. Yet, without the exclusion
restriction, this is not possible.
1.5.2 Effect of eligibility on fertility outcome
Since anticipated fertility is unobserved, β cannot be estimated. However, it is reasonable to
assume that the anticipated eligibility status can only affect anticipated fertility when eligibility
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affects the fertility outcome. Fertility outcome N is observed in the older sample, as is eligibility
status Z ∈ {0, 1} after the birth of the first child, so that we can estimate:
N = β˜Z +X + ǫ (1.21)
This regression provides an estimator of the take-up rate of the 2nd child permit categories
included in Z. Results are discussed in section 1.6.2. One should keep in mind that there are
criteria for 2nd child permits that are not included in Z because they are not observable or because
they rely on the realization of the first birth or occupational choice. Therefore, β˜ is not the take-up
rate of all 2nd child permits criteria. However, β˜ measures the effect of categories important for
forming fertility anticipations.
1.5.3 Isolating the effect on increasers
In the older sample, we observe individuals that have a second child without being eligible.
Keeping in mind the caveat that some of those were eligible for different 2nd child permits, we can
nonetheless use the information gained from this sample to decompose the overall intention-to-treat
effect, under some assumptions, guided by the theoretical model.
In the theoretical model, fertility preferences determine if the individual is an always-1, in-
creaser, or always-2. The share of always-2 is denoted with π. I use the fertility proxies W to
predict if an individual in the main sample will be a always-2 or not. For this, those not eligible
in the older sample are used to estimate the effect of W on the likelihood of having a second child:
Prob(Ni = 2|Zi = 0, X) = f(αWi|Zi = 0, X) (1.22)
The purpose of this exercise is prediction and not inference, thus, the values of α are not of
interest and only capture correlation, not necessarily causality. To get the highest predictive power
and to account for potential non-linearities, I use a classification random forest with 1000 trees,
where the prediction is determined by majority rule at the respective node. The number of predic-
tors used for each tree is determined by minimising the out-of-bag error rate.
The effect of the fertility predictors, based on the training set of those in the older sample who
are not eligible, is then extrapolated to the whole older sample and the main sample. Denote the
prediction status of an observation L which can be either 0 (not predicted to be an always-2 ) or
1 (predicted to be an always-2 ). Regressions 1.26 and 1.18 are then run with L as an interaction
term. We therefore observe the coefficients θ˜(L) = E(Y (1)− Y (0)|L).
Denote the share of always-2 in the sample of those predicted to be always-2 π¯ and the share
in the sample of those predicted to not be always-2 π
¯
. If the prediction is informative about the
underlying distribution of always-2, then π¯ > π > π
¯
. Under the assumption that the prediction
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is informative, the decomposition allows to make statements about the signs of the coefficients θ1
and θ2.
It is again useful to draw comparisons to the standard case in which N˜ is observed. In this
case, we could estimate the share of always-2 (π) and increasers (β). Once they are known this
decomposition allows to estimate θ1 and θ2 separately (as shown in Hull (2018)).
1.6 Results
1.6.1 Effect of second child permits on education
The first and most relevant educational choice for most families is made when the teenage child
is 16 years old. This is the age at which I calculate anticipated eligibility. Educational attainment is
first measured in years of education (Iip in 2010). It is then replaced by a dummy variable indicating
enrolment into senior high school and college or university. I estimate 3 different specifications.
Each specification relaxes an assumption but also includes more control variables and thus puts
more burden on the model. Specification 1 is a DID estimation that assumes a national trend
(equation 1.23). It includes year fixed effects (now denoted γ), province-specific effects (denoted
κ), characteristics defining potential eligibility groups and additional controls (X). It assumes that
annual effects are the same for each province and each population.
Iip in 2010 = θ˜Zip age(16) +X
′
iκp + γt + κp + ǫipt (1.23)
Specification 2 is a DID estimation with province-specific trends (equation 1.24). It relaxes the
assumption that the annual effects are the same for each province. It still assumes that the annual
effects are the same for each population within the province.
Iip in 2010 = θ˜Zip age(16) +X
′
iκp + γ
′
tκp + ǫipt (1.24)
The third specification is a Differences-in-Differences-in-Differences (Double DID or Triple Dif-
ferences approach, equation 1.25). It relaxes the assumption that the potentially eligible populations
and the general population have the same trend.
Iip in 2010 = θ˜Zip age(16) +X
′
iκp +X
′
iκ
′
pγt ++γ
′
tκp + ǫipt (1.25)
In specification 1 and 2, I compare the difference between those that were and those that were
not eligible at age 16 within the same population in a province with a population were no change
in eligibility occurs. In specification 3, I compare this difference-in-difference with the same com-
parison in another province where in the same time span no reform change for these populations
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happened.
Identification comes from the geographical and time variation in the introduction and scope
of second child permits. The double DID approach allows controlling for population-specific time
trends. It thus relaxing the standard common trend assumption. The identifying assumption is
that, conditioned on province trends, the sub-groups that become eligible have the same educa-
tional trend as the sub-groups in other provinces that do not change eligibility status (conditional
group-specific common trend assumption). To support this identifying assumption, I run a pre-OCP
placebo test. Identification also implies that provincial family planning policies are independent of
educational measures that target the same group. For instance, if provinces that allow second child
permits for ethnic minority couple these measures with an increase in the educational budget for
ethnic minorities areas, the policy measure captures both. So far, I have not encountered evidence
in the literature for such behaviour. I run additional robustness checks to verify that the results
are not driven by a specific easily targeted group.
One might be concerned about potential spill-over through migration. However, the Chinese
household registration system restricts the possibility to migrate particularly between provinces
and between urban and rural areas. Applications for the second child permit can only be submit-
ted at the place of registration. Moving the place of registration is difficult.13 Recent reforms are
supposed to loosen these restrictions.
The results for the effect of second child permits on schooling investment are shown in table
1.1 with the specification 1, 2 and 3 in column 1, 2 and 3. Fulfilling a second child permit criterion
at the age of 16 increases the years of education by around 0.9 years on average. The coefficient
does not change significantly between the three specifications. Yet, standard errors increase. For
the double Difference-in-Differences approach the coefficient is significant at 10% level with a p-
value of 0.06. The coefficient is robust to controlling for the local fertility rate and the local sex ratio.
In table 1.2, I include the interaction with a female indicator and look at the effect on men
and women separately. The effect is higher for men but not significantly so (see column 1). The
coefficient for women alone lies at 0.6 years of education and is not significant. This empirical result
suggests that men and to a smaller extent women who expect to be allowed to have two children
increase their educational investment.
At which stage of the educational career does eligibility play a role? Instead of years of ed-
ucation, I now use indicator variables for finishing junior high school and enrolment into senior
high school, technical college and university as outcomes. Results are displayed in table 1.7 in the
13Within the main sample, only 1.2% indicated a different provincial code as place of residence at the age of 12
than at the age of 3 while 5.4% indicated a different county or district code (within-province migration).
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Dependent variable:
Years of education
DID DID Double Double Double
national trend province trends DID DID DID
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Anticipated Eligibility at Age 16 0.829∗∗ 0.911∗∗ 0.895∗ 0.834∗ 0.895∗
(0.385) (0.440) (0.467) (0.442) (0.467)
Local Fertility rate -1.961∗∗∗
(0.217)
Local sex ratio (std) 0.0314
(0.186)
Female Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Eligibility Indicators Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Eligibility Controls x Province FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Eligibility Controls x Year FE No No Yes Yes Yes
Year FE x Province FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 7840 7840 7840 7840 7840
R2 0.432 0.461 0.467 0.467 0.474
Note: Sample includes individuals that turned 16 between 1990 and 2005. The dependent variable is the
years of education the individual completed in 2010. Standard OLS regression with standard errors
clustered on provinces-times-urban-area levels in parenthesis. Significance levels: * 0.10; ** 0.05; *** 0.01.
Anticipated eligibility at age 16 is calculated on the basis of the province, eligibility characteristics and
time. Eligibility controls include dummies for being an only child, having a rural household status and
ethnic minority status. Data source: China Family Panel Survey 2010.
Table 1.1: Effect of eligibility at age 16 on the years of education.
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Dependent variable:
Years of education
Double Double Double
DID DID DID
All Women Only Men only
(1) (2) (3)
Anticip. Eligibility at 16 0.978∗ 0.603 0.866∗
(0.494) (0.582) (0.474)
Female -0.495
(0.539)
Female X Anticip. Eligibility at 16 -0.194
(0.250)
Double DID controls Yes Yes Yes
Female X Double DID controls Yes No No
Observations 7840 4184 3656
R2 0.477 0.523 0.475
Note: Double difference controls: year fixed effects, province fixed effect, province times year fixed effects,
eligibility controls, eligibility controls times year fixed effects and eligibility times province fixed effects.
Sample includes individuals that turned 16 between 1990 and 2005. Column (2) includes only women,
column (3) only men. The dependent variable is the years of education the individual completed in 2010.
Standard OLS regression with standard errors clustered on provinces-times-urban-area levels in
parenthesis. Significance levels: * 0.10; ** 0.05; *** 0.01. Anticipated eligibility at age 16 is calculated on
the basis of the province, eligibility characteristics and time. Eligibility controls include dummies for being
an only child, having a rural household status and ethnic minority status. Local sex ration: Sex ratio in
the same district for those being born the same year plus and minus 3 years. Local fertility rate: Number
of children individuals have in the same district that are between 30 and 35 years old in the year the
individual turns 16. Data source: China Family Panel Survey 2010.
Table 1.2: Sex difference in the effect of eligibility at age 16 on the years of education.
30
Note: Displays 95% confidence intervals of marginal effects of eligibility. Cased on DID estimates
with province specific trends (table 1.7). Estimates for not eligible and eligible (0.5 - eligible
category is omitted)
Figure 1.3: Effect of anticipated eligibility on finishing junior high school, enrollment into senior
high school and enrollment into college or university
appendix and graphically shown in figure 1.3. First, there is no effect of eligibility on junior high
school completion (column 1 and 2). This is expected and can be regarded as a falsification test.
At the age of 16, individuals have completed or are about to complete their mandatory junior high
school degree. Second, enrolment into senior high school increases by around 9 percentage points
(column 3 and 4). The effect carries on. Enrolment into at least college (vocational or university
studies - column 5 and 6) increases significantly by around the same size. Enrolment into university
increases by 6 percentage points (column 7 and 8).
Following, I run a placebo test to argue that the exclusion restriction is not violated (table 1.8
in the appendix). I map the eligibility status of those in my main sample to those that turned 16
before the introduction of any second child exemptions. I find that the placebo variable does not
have any effect on the educational level of those that turned 16 between 1972 and 1982.14
As another robustness test, I check the effect of eligibility on the likelihood of senior high school
enrollment at different age thresholds. If eligibility was simply correlated with provincial educa-
tional investment or local educational demand factors, there is no reason why the age cut-off of
16 should be relevant. We would expect similar results at the age of 17 or 18. However, if it is
the second child permit reforms that drive the results, we should not see any effect on those who
become eligible at the age of 17 or 18, because the decision to continue schooling or not has already
been taken. Those that become eligible before the age of 16, should also be affected, but the effect
14Results do not change if I choose one year later or earlier.
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should be smaller because those who become eligible at 16 would fall into the control group. The
result are graphically displayed in figure 1.5 in the appensix. They are in line the predictions if
the effect was indeed driven by second child permit reforms. At age 17 and 18, the effects are
insignificant and close to 0. At age 14 and 15, the effect size is only half as much as at the age of
16 and insignificant for the age of 14.
Furthermore, I investigate which group drives the results (see table 1.9 in the appendix). First,
the coefficient for eligibility with 50% likelihood is not significantly different from zero. However,
it is positive and within the expected range (column 1). I then include interaction terms for the
different eligibility groups. The effect is the same for the minority and agricultural sub-groups (col-
umn 2 and 4). It is only significantly different for those who are an only child (column 3). It seems
that anticipated eligibility does not have a significant effect on an only child. This can have several
reasons. For one, those who are an only child might have low fertility preferences and thus fall into
the category of always-1. Furthermore, the policy that allows only children to have two children was
announced by the central government and slowly implemented in all province. It is possible that
only children who were not eligible when they were 16 anticipated to be eligible once they were older.
Some criteria have to be fulfilled by both spouses. I check if this makes a difference to the effect
of eligibility in table 1.10 in the appendix. Most criteria for rural household are conditioned on
both spouses having a rural household status, nearly half of all eligible minority fall into a spouse
dependent group and all of the only children. There is not significant difference between those that
fulfil a spouse-dependent criterion and those that fulfil a spouse-independent criterion. The fact
that all the only children have to find a spouse who is also an only child to be able to have two
children offers another explanation why there is no effect on only children. They might not expect
to find a partner who is an only child as well, as at this time only children still make up a small
share of the population. On the contrary, it might not pose a burden to those of ethnic minorities
or with a rural household status as the likelihood that they marry someone with the same status
is high.
There are other variables that might have an effect on the impact of the policy. I check if
individuals with a highly educated father have a different intensity of the effect. The idea is that
the father’s education is a proxy for household income. However, I do not find any significant
difference. On the one hand, individuals with an educated father are more likely to have the
means to pay the fines. But they are also more likely to have lower fertility preferences. As an
interesting addition, I find that individuals whose father is a member of the Communist party are
not significantly affected by eligibility. It is plausible that they have already internalized the rule of
one child per family and thus their fertility expectations are not affected by a change in eligibility
rules.15
15It is also possible that they always plan with two children.
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1.6.2 Effect of eligibility on fertility outcome
I use the older sample to estimate the effect of actual eligibility on fertility outcome. Ni is
measured as having a second child in 2010 or not. The analysis is restricted to married individuals
that had one child before 2003. This is to make sure they have enough time to have a second child
while conforming with promoted birth intervals and do not have more than two children. Eligibility
is measured at the age of 27 for women and 28 for men which is the year before the average age of
the birth of the second child.
In specification 1, the indicator variable of having a second child in 2010 or not is regressed
on the eligibility status at the age of 27/28. I control for individual characteristics that determine
eligibility, as well as birth year and province fixed effects, and the sex of the first child:
Ni in 2010 = β˜Zip age(27/27) +Xi + γt + κp + ǫipt (1.26)
Equation 1.26 can be estimated by a logit regression. However, the underlying assumptions such
that E(ǫiZi|Xi) = 0 are strong. The effect of the characteristics that make someone eligible such
as belong to an ethnic minority or having an agricultural household status are assumed to be the
same in each province. Also, year fixed effects are assumed to be the same for all provinces and for
all population groups. To relax these assumptions, I also run a DID and double DID specification
as in the previous section using a OLS regression due to the high number of fixed effects.
The results are displayed in table 1.3. Eligibility for a second child permit at the age of 27/28
has a highly significant effect in all specifications (columns 1 to 3). On average, being eligible
increases the likelihood to have a second child by 14 percentage points, based on the DID specifi-
cation. Effects are similar for men and women (columns 5 and 6).
The official number of children allowed at age 27/28 thus influences real fertility decisions.
However, an increase of approximately 14 percentage points implies that there is a share of the
population that does not significantly change their fertility outcomes due to the policy. This might
be because they want only one child or because they were planning to have two children and to
pay the fine.
The coefficient measures only the impact of eligibility based on criteria that are observable at
the age of 16. There are several criteria that are based on unobservable and (for the econometrician)
not predictable characteristics. These include the first child being disabled and the family being in
“poor economic conditions”. Furthermore, eligibility is only measured at 27/28 which is the year
before the average age of the birth of a second child. This implies that individuals who become
eligible at the age of 28/29 fall into the control group. The same applies to those who become
non-eligible at age 27/28 but might have already had a second child or had gotten a second child
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Dependent variable:
Indicator: Having a second child
OLS Logit OLS OLS OLS-DID OLS-DID
DID Double DID Double DID Women Men
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Eligibility at age 0.143∗∗∗ 0.110∗∗∗ 0.152∗∗∗ 0.144∗∗∗ 0.153∗∗∗ 0.139∗∗∗
27(women)/28(men) (0.0438) (0.0284) (0.0449) (0.0447) (0.0483) (0.0477)
Eligibility Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Additional Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Local Fertility Rate No No No Yes No No
Province FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Elig. Controls x Province FE Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province FE x Year FE Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Elig. Controls x Time FE No No Yes Yes No No
Observations 8423 8423 8192 8423 4554 3869
R2 0.420 0.447 0.434 0.457 0.442
Note: Dependent variable = 1 if the individual had a second child. Coefficients are average marginal
effects. Sample includes individuals that turned 16 between 1977 and 1992, are married, had their first
child before 2003 and have no more than two children. Logit or OLS regressions with standard errors in
parenthesis. Standard errors are clustered on the province interacted with an urban dummy which
indicated that in 2010, the area is defined as an urban area. Eligibility at age 27/28 is calculated on the
basis of the province, eligibility characteristics, sex of the first child and time. Eligibility controls:
Household status, only child status, minority status. Additional controls: sex, sex of the first child. Data
source: China Family Panel Survey 2010.
Table 1.3: Effect of eligibility status at age 27/28 on the likelihood of having a second child.
permits before the change. Therefore, the coefficient does not measure the complete impact of 2nd
child permits and probably underestimates even the effect of the criteria included.
1.6.3 Isolating the effect on increasers
To decompose the effect of eligibility on education, I want to split the sample into two groups:
those that are expected to be always-2 and those that are not. I use the subsample of those not
eligible in the older sample as a training set for a random forest estimation. It predicts if someone
has a second child without being eligible. Only those that turn 16 before 1990 are included so that
the training sample and the main sample do not overlap. Motivated by proposition 2 in the theory
section, I include potential fertility proxies on top of eligibility characteristics, province indicators
and a trend variable. The local, district-level fertility rate is calculated as the average number of
children of those between 30 and 35 (when the individual turns 16). I also include the number of
siblings and an indicator if the mother has finished at least junior high school. Also included are
if the individual grew up in an urban area (independent of hukou status) and if the father is a
member of the Communist party.
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The random forest grows 1000 classification trees. For each tree 3 predictors are used which
are randomly selected from all predictors. The number of predictors is chosen to minimize the
out-of-bag error rate. Prediction is made based on the average of those trees. An observation is
predicted to be an always-2 if more than half of the observation that falls into the same category
have a second child (majority rule). Figure 1.7 shows the importance of the different predictors.
Unsurprisingly, the province and the local fertility rate are the most important predictors. The
trend, number of siblings, and the household registration status are important as well.
The random forest is then used to predict if an individual in the older sample and the main
sample would be an always-2. This variable is then interacted with the eligibility status. Results
are displayed in table 1.4. The first two columns (1 and 2) show the effect of eligibility at age 27/28
on the indicator of having a second child. As expected, the take-up rate among those that are not
predicted to be always-2 is significantly higher than among those predicted always-2. For those
predicted to be always-2 second child permits have an effect close to zero.
The effect of anticipated eligibility on educution is still positive and significant for those that
are not predicted to be always-2 (column 3 and 4). The interaction has a negative sign but is not
significant. YET, thee effect of eligibility on senior high school enrollment is significantly higher
for those that are not predicted to be always-2 (columns 5 and 6). These results suggest that
the positive effect of eligibility on educational investment is driven by those that increase their
anticipated fertility as a response to eligibility status.
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Dependent variable:
Having a 2nd child Years of Education Enrollment into SHS
Sample 1977-1992 1977-1992 1990-2005 1990-2005 1990-2005 1990-2005
DID Double DID DID Double DID DID Double DID
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Eligibility at age 27/28 0.180∗∗∗ 0.183∗∗∗
(0.0511) (0.0512)
Eligibility at age 27/28 X Predicted Always-2 -0.125∗∗ -0.129∗∗
(0.0535) (0.0545)
(Anticip.) eligibility at age 16 1.048∗ 1.212∗∗∗ 0.134∗∗ 0.120∗
(0.537) (0.440) (0.0651) (0.0652)
Predicted Always-2 X (Anticip.) eligibility at age 16 -0.511 -0.475 -0.0914∗∗∗ -0.0942∗∗∗
(0.384) (0.375) (0.0323) (0.0309)
Predicted Always-2 0.793∗∗∗ 0.794∗∗∗ -0.836∗∗ -0.929∗∗∗ -0.0485 -0.0448
(0.0176) (0.0180) (0.347) (0.329) (0.0304) (0.0298)
Observations 8104 8104 7528 7528 7528 7528
R2 0.631 0.633 0.472 0.466 0.423 0.428
Note: Includes eligibility characteristics, province and time fixed effects, province X time fixed effects, eligibility characteristics X province fixed effects, female
dummy. Anticipated eligibility at age 16 is calculated on the basis of the province, eligibility characteristics and time. Eligibility controls include dummies for
being an only child, having a rural household status and ethnic minority status. Column 1 and 2 include sex of first child, column 2, 4 and 6 include eligibility
characteristics X time fixed effects. Standard OLS regression with standard errors clustered on provinces-times-urban-area levels in parenthesis. Significance
levels: * 0.10; ** 0.05; *** 0.01. Data source: China Family Panel Survey 2010.
Table 1.4: Decomposing the effect of eligibility
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1.6.4 Effect of eligibility and the sex ratio
The theoretical model predicts heterogeneity in the cost of raising children, in the change in
labour supply and in the sex ratio. I investigate the latter, as the sample sex ratio is observable
and plausibly exogenous on the individual level.16 I use the 2000 Census to calculate the share
of women for each birth year.17 For the 1977-1992 sample, the average share of women is 0.495,
for the 1990-2005 sample the average share is 0.488. The geographical variation of the 1990-2005
sample is displayed in figure 1.6.
At first, I check if the sex ratio has an effect on the take-up rate of second child permits (see
table 1.11, column 1). I find that the interaction between eligibility and sex ratio is insignificant. I
still include the sex ratio in the random forest prediction for always-2. It is less important than the
local fertility rate, province fixed effects or the household status, but as important as the number
of siblings and the trend variable (see figure 1.8).
I find that the sex ratio has a significant effect on the impact of second child permits. The
interaction term between sex ratio and anticipated eligibility status at age 16 is negative and
significant (see table 1.11 column 2). Thus, the fewer women compared to men are in the cohort,
the stronger the effect of second child permits. This is indeed driven by the more frequent sex
(men). In columns 3 and 4 where I look at men and women separately, the coefficient is significant
(and also lager in size) for men. If the effect is driven by always-2 or not is verified in columns 5
to 7. Splitting up the sample further decreases power. However, the size of the coefficient for men
that are not predicted always-2 stays the same (though it is not significant) in column 7 (p-value
= 0.22).
1.7 Discussion: Why would those that expect more children edu-
cate more?
The theoretical model provides different mechanisms of how anticipated fertility can affect ed-
ucational investment. It can have an effect on family consumption, the labour supply and the
incentives to find a partner. In this section, I provide descriptive statistics to discuss the in-
tertemporal consumption smoothing and labour supply channels. Looking at expenditure data and
parental labour supply helps to put the results into context.
The cost of raising children not only depends on how much money is spent on the need of
the children but also on the available income at that moment. If parents also have to financially
support their own parents while raising their children, it makes the financial burden of children more
16Expenditures for the second child are not observed and endogenous, as are labour market conditions.
17The census, having more observations than the CFPS, gives a cleaner measure.
relevant. It is also more important for the grandparents that have a strong say in the educational
decision making. Therefore, I also look at the financial and living situation of the elderly.
1.7.1 Cost of raising children
The fertility literature in developing countries has treated children as an investment for parents
that pay off quickly because children are productive from an early stage on. The idea of children
as productive household members relies on children being able to work from an early stage on. In
developed countries, children are often seen as expensive. Children have to be financially supported
until the end of the educational stage. Furthermore, retirement schemes and health insurance mit-
igate the need to rely on children during sickness or old age.
In China, education is mandatory until age 16 and children are not allowed to work. If families
abide by these rules, they have additional expenses for at least 16 years per child. Indeed, gross
enrolment rates for primary school have constantly been above 100% for the past years. At the
secondary school level, they have increased from around 70% to over 90% between 2007 and 2015
and for tertiary education from 20% to 45% (UNICEF). At the same time, child labour is not
prevalent. Tang et al. (2016) estimate that in 2010, only about 7.74% of children aged from 10 to
15 were working. Most of them combined education with their economic activity.
Expenditure on the education of their children is an important cost for parents in many coun-
tries. Figure 1.9 in the appendix shows total expenditure on education as a share of family income
for families with one child. Though educational expenditure is low in the first four years, 10 to
20% of family income is spent on education afterwards. Figure 1.10 shows the different expenditure
items as a share of family expenditure. Expenditure increases at the age of 5, probably driven by
tuition fees for pre-school. Tuition drops at age 6 or 7 when children start primary school. At the
same time families spend more on extracurricular activities and home tutoring. Tuition becomes
more important again at the age of 17 when students enter senior high school, then college or
university.
Figure 1.11 in the appendix contrasts the educational expenditures of a family with two children
with a family with only one child. To compare these families, I use a nearest-neighbour matching
technique.18 Families with two children pay more for education than families with one child starting
when the second child is around 5 years old. When the second child is around 15/16 years old,
educational expenditure accounts for more than 20% of family income.
18First, the likelihood of having a second child is regressed on age, agricultural household status, educational level
and age at the birth of the first child and the propensity score is predicted. Each individual is then matched with
their nearest neighbour (of the same sex) without replacement based on the propensity score. The matched control
individual “adopts” the birth year of the second child from their neighbour.
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This descriptive result is replicated in a regression analysis displayed in table 1.12 in the ap-
pendix. Using standard OLS regression, I find that families with a second child spend twice as
much on education than families with only one child. I instrument the number of children with
eligibility at age 27/28 to address the endogeneity issue. The result stays the same (column 3).
The IV approach is only suggestive. Eligibility potentially affects other variables that influence
educational expenditure that I cannot control for, such as savings.
A recent report estimates that Chinese parents pay around $42,892 for their child’s education
(HSBC (2017)). Though this is less than in the USA ($58,464) where college attendance is higher,
it is more than in other countries such as the UK ($24,862), Canada ($22,602) or France ($16,708)
(HSBC (2017)). Furthermore, the report revealed that 93% of Chinese parents have paid for a
private tutor. Chinese parents seemed to have expected these expenses. Out of the countries that
were surveyed, China had the highest rate of parents (around 55%) indicating that they can fund
their child’s education through savings or investment.
The suggestive evidence and the additional literature indicate that raising children in China is
indeed costly. In particular, families spend an important share of their income on the education of
their children.
1.7.2 Old-age support and the double burden of parents
The effect of anticipated fertility also depends on the importance of children’s financial support
to parents. It makes children more costly when investment in children and financial support for
the grand-parents are paid at the same time. Children are still an important source for old age
support in China. According to the CFPS, in 2010, 45% of individuals over 60 live with at least
one of their children, 69% of those with a son and 31% with a daughter. For families with an agri-
cultural household status and at least one person older than 60, social security/pensions transfers
accumulate to on average 2068 Yuan (approx. 218e)19, making up less than 10% of family income.
For families with a non-agricultural household status, it accumulates to on average 20353 Yuan
(2137e, around 47% of family income). 33% of individuals over 60 states having received economic
support from at least one of their children.
Families with both spouses born between 1964 and 1979 give 4% of their annual income to
relatives. They increase family member support by 1 percentage point for each grandparent that
does not live with them (see table 1.14 in the appendix). Using OLS, there is no significant difference
in the amount given to relatives between families with one child and two children. Once having a
second child is instrumented (column 3), I find that families with one child give around 3 per cent of
family income to a grandparent who does not live with them. This is not the case for families with
two children. The expenses for the second child seem to impact the ability to financially support
19Based on the conversion rate of 0.105, the approximate average exchange rate at the beginning of 2010.
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grandparents.
1.7.3 Parental labour supply and earnings
Do parents work more or less when they have a second child? The CFPS includes data on how
much the individual worked on average per month in 2010. Figure 1.12 in the appendix shows the
average log working hours of men and women as a function of how many years have passed since the
birth of the second child. It is displayed for parents that have exactly two children and a matched
control group with one child. If at all, men work significantly less only at the year of birth of the
second child but not afterwards.20 Women work significantly less in the first four years following
the birth of the second child. Then they work the same hours or potentially even more from year 5
onward. Figure 1.13 in the appendix displays parents’ monthly income. In line with the previous
results, men earn less in the year of birth and there is no evidence for a lasting effect. Women’s
earnings are less in the first four years after the birth of the second child. Long-run earning patterns
are noisy: there is no clear trend for either higher or lower earnings.
Again, the descriptive results are replicated in a regression analysis (see table 1.13 in the ap-
pendix). Using standard OLS, I find that having a second child is negatively associated with
working hours for men and women in 2010 (columns 1, 2, 4 and 5). When having a second child is
instrumented, the coefficient for women is no longer significant but still negative (column 3). The
effect of having a second child for men is insignificant with a positive sign (column 6).
Guo et al. (2017) and He and Zhu (2016) address the endogeneity between childbirth and labour
market conditions by using twinning as a natural experiment. Guo et al. (2017) do not find ev-
idence on the negative effects of fertility on parental labour supply. He and Zhu (2016) find a
small negative effect on women’s labour force participation in the 1990s and an insignificant effect
in 2000s. Angrist and Evans (1996), Jacobsen et al. (1999) and Lundborg et al. (2017) show for
other countries that one more child has no or only a small effect on labor market earnings of women.
Overall, the descriptive statistics, suggestive IV results and the related literature suggests that
in the Chinese context having a second child does not have a long-run effect on parental labour
supply and earnings. Therefore, the positive effect of an increase in anticipated fertility on education
is not surprising.
1.8 Conclusion
In this chapter, I use a novel empirical approach to address the question of how anticipated
fertility affects educational decisions. This question has not been in the focus of the fertility litera-
ture. I use the One-Child Policy in China and the existence of second child permits for a subset of
20There are other years where they work significantly less at 10% but the difference is not systematic.
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individuals. I find that individuals invest more in education when they fulfil an eligibility criterion
for a second child permit. Treatment heterogeneity analysis suggests that the effect is driven by
compliers: those who increase their anticipated fertility once eligible.
In the theory section, I sketch economic channels of how anticipated fertility can positively
influence educational investment. Because children are expensive one wants to ensure earning suf-
ficient income in the future. The positive effect also depends on the relationship between lifetime
returns to education and fertility outcomes. If men and women can stay in or re-enter the labour
market without loss of their skills one does not expect a negative effect. The policy implication is
thus to ensure the availability of flexible childcare, to fight potential discrimination of parents in
the labour market and to support parents who want to re-enter the labour market.
There are other channels of how anticipated fertility can affect education. For one, individuals
who plan to have more than one child in the future might also plan to take over important childcare
tasks. They invest more in education to be well prepared for it. Also, one parent might want to
increase their bargaining power when they count on having to secure sufficient resources for more
than one child. Since bargaining power within the household and education are supposedly posi-
tively correlated, increasing education can be a way to increase bargaining power. There is also a
potential psychological effect. For example, being allowed to have two children in a society where
children are seen as essential can give one a more positive attitude towards the future and more
motivation at school.
Similarly, there are many other variables that anticipated fertility could have an effect on. Do
men and women who anticipate several children choose certain types of jobs or avoid certain sec-
tors? Do saving patterns change? Do they look for different types of partners? These questions
are important to ensure that individuals have the same opportunities independent of their desire
to have children. They can also help understand saving, investment and marriage patterns.
China is one specific social and economic environment that has been perturbed by strict policies.
Comparing individuals who plan to have two children instead of one (intensive margin) is not the
same as comparing individuals who do not plan to have any children with those that do (extensive
margin). Studies from developed countries find that having one more child has at most a weak
effect on the mother’s long-run (Angrist and Evans (1996), Jacobsen et al. (1999), Lundborg et al.
(2017)). However, the first child has a significant effect. This suggests that the effect of having a
child compared to not having any on education can also be different.
China announced a Two-children policy in 2015, which allows everyone to apply for a second
child permit. There is an ongoing discussion about the effect of the OCP on fertility rates and
thus the effect of the new policy. The results of this chapter suggest that the Two-children policy
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has an effect on fertility, but it is expected to be small. The policy is also predicted to increase
educational investment.
The findings of this chapter are a result of the Chinese social and economic environment.
However, low fertility is a concern in many medium and high-income countries. This finding is
a positive sign for policymakers who want to promote fertility and education at the same time.
Identification relies on a setting with an exogenous, predictable and important variation in the cost
of a child. This will make replication in other countries difficult. Panel studies can be used which
ask for fertility goals and when they can be coupled with changes in fertility policies. A dynamic
and structural framework can be applied in this context. This chapter is one of the first empirical
papers that address the identification issue of the relationship between anticipated fertility and
educational investment. Further research will hopefully follow.
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1.9 Appendix
1.9.1 Figures
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Note: Optimal number of children n∗ on the y axsis and fertility preferences α on the x axsis. The
red (blue) lines demonstrate the optimal number of children as a function of fertility preferences
when the individual is eligble (not eligible). The thresholds α¯ and α
¯
are determined by the FOC.
Figure 1.4: The effect of fertility preferences on the number of children.
Note: Effect size in percentage points of anticipated fertility at the different age thresholds 14, 15,
16, 17 and 18. Based on DID specification with province level trends, standards errors clustered
on province times urban level. 90% Confidence intervals.
Figure 1.5: Effect size of anticipated eligibility on likelihood of senior high school enrolment at
different age thresholds.
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Note: Sex ratio based on the 2000 Census.
Figure 1.6: Average sex ratio for those who turned 16 between 1990 and 2000.
Note: Displays the importance of predictors in the random forest estimation. Importance is
measured as how much the predictor decreases the GINI coefficient within each node. If all
observations at one node are either 0 or 1, GINI is 0. If the observations are mixed, the GINI
coefficient is high. The GINI is a measure of node purity.
Figure 1.7: Importance of predictors in random forrest estimation
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Note: Displays the importance of predictors in the random forest estimation. See figure 1.7
Figure 1.8: Importance of predictors including the cohort sex ratio (from 2000 census) on the top
and monetary fines on the bottom
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Note: Share of family income allocated to education for families that have an only child. Data is
based on the family questionnaire and the question of how much was spend on education last
year. Source: CFPS 2010.
Figure 1.9: Total educational expenditure as share of family expenditure
Note: Share of family expenditure allocated to education for families that have an only child.
Data is based on the child questionnaire until the age of 15 and the adult questionnaire from age
16 onward. Includes families with an only child where the child lives with at least one parent.
Excludes families that do not pays all the educational cost (28 observations). The question is
asked for each educational item. Source: CFPS 2010.
Figure 1.10: Different items of educational expenditure as share of family expenditure.
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Note: Share of family expenditure allocated to education comparing those with two children with
a matched comparison group. The comparison group is matched 1 to 1 without replacement
based on the propensity score taking into account age, education, household registration status
and the age at the birth of the first child. The matched control observation adopts the year of
birth of the second child. Data is based on the family questionnaire of the CFPS 2010.
Figure 1.11: Expenditure on education for families with two children and a matched control group
with one child
Note: Log of monthly working hours for men and women with 90% confidence intervals. Blue is
the average of those who have two children. Red is a matched control group with one child. The
comparison group is matched 1 to 1 without replacement based on the propensity scores taking
into account age, education, household registration status and the age at the birth of the first
child. The matched control observation adopts the year of birth of the second child. Data source:
CFPS 2010.
Figure 1.12: Log monthly working hours in 2010 according to the year of birth of the second child
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Log of monthly income for men and women with 90% confidence intervals. Blue is the average of
those who have two children. Red is a matched control group with one child. The comparison
group is matched 1 to 1 without replacement based on the propensity scores taking into account
age, education, household registration status and the age at the birth of the first child. The
matched control observation adopts the year of birth of the second child. Data source: CFPS
2010.
Figure 1.13: Log monthly income in 2010 according to the year of birth of the second child
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1.9.2 Tables
Hebei Chongqing Hubei Zhejiang Jiangsu
Family only has girl (rural area) 1989 1997 1987 1995 200221
Ethnic minorities 1982 2002 2002 1990 -
Spouses are only child 1982 1997 2002 1989 1990
Note: Provinces have several other eligibility criteria such as for couples who had their first child
outside of China, remarried couples, couples with a disabled first child etc. that I do not regard.
Based on Scharping (2013) and family planning documents.
Table 1.5: Example of when provinces formalized eligibility criteria.
21Only if husband does not have a brother.
22Truncated at 7
23Taking into account the sex of the first child.
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Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Main Sample (turning 16 between 1990 and 2005)
Years of education completed (in 2010) 8.681 4.631 0 22
Female 0.534 0.499 0 1
Han ethnicity 0.893 0.309 0 1
Rural/agricultural household registration status 0.689 0.463 0 1
Year born 1981.291 4.738 1974 1989
Nb children allowed: 2 (at age 16) 0.275 0.446 0 1
Nb children allowed: 1.5 (at age 16) 0.376 0.484 0 1
N 7840
Older Sample: (turning 16 between 1977 and 1992)
Years of education completed (in 2010) 6.527 4.664 0 22
Female 0.529 0.499 0 1
Han ethnicity 0.915 0.278 0 1
Rural/agricultural household registration status 0.732 0.443 0 1
Year born 1968.208 4.346 1961 1976
Nb children allowed: 2 (at age 16) 0.137 0.343 0 1
Nb children allowed: 1.5 (at age 16) 0.11 0.309 0 1
Number of children22 1.673 0.821 0 7
Allowed to have 2nd child23 0.36 0.48 0 1
N 11626
Note: Data source China Family Panel Study 2010. Only those with information on the main
variables (education, year of birth etc).
Table 1.6: Summary statistics
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Dependent variable: Indicator of enrollment/completion in (at least)
Junior High School Senior High School College or University University
Completion Enrollment Enrollment Enrollment
DID Double DID DID Double DID DID Double DID DID Double DID
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Anticip. eligibility at age 16 0.0272 0.0254 0.106∗ 0.0898+ 0.0967∗∗ 0.0981∗∗ 0.0611∗∗ 0.0658∗∗
(0.0368) (0.0376) (0.0601) (0.0610) (0.0399) (0.0398) (0.0280) (0.0291)
Female dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Eligibility controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Eligib. controls x Province FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE x Province FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Eligibility controls x Year FE No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 7840 7840 7840 7840 7840 7840 7840 7840
R2 0.312 0.318 0.418 0.424 0.324 0.340 0.167 0.184
Note: Sample includes individuals that turned 16 between 1990 and 2005. Dependent variable is the likelihood of completing junior high school
(columns 1 and 2), enrolling into senior high school (columns 3 and 4) enrolling into (technical) college or university (columns 4 and 5) and university
(columns 7 and 8). OLS regressions with standard errors in parenthesis. Standard errors are clustered on the province times urban level. Anticipated
eligibility at age 16 is calculated on the basis of the province, eligibility characteristics and time. Eligibility controls include dummies for being an
only child, having a rural household status and ethnic minority status. Significance levels: * 0.10; ** 0.05; *** 0.01. Data source: CFPS 2010.
Table 1.7: The effect of the eligibility on the likelihood of completing a degree.
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Dependent variable:
Years of Education
(1) (2)
Anticipated eligibility at age 16 -0.112 -0.791
(0.592) (0.616)
Female dummy Yes Yes
Eligibility controls Yes Yes
Province FE Yes Yes
Eligibility controls x Province FE Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes
Year FE x Province FE Yes Yes
Eligibility controls x Year FE No Yes
Observations 6705 6903
R2 0.332 0.321
Note: Sample includes individuals that turned 16 between 1970 and 1980. Placebo eligibility is calculated
as if the individuals were born 20 years later (between 1990 and 2000). Dependent variable is the years of
education the individual completed. Standard OLS regression with robust standard errors in parenthesis.
Significance levels: * 0.10; ** 0.05; *** 0.01 Data source: China Family Panel Survey 2010.
Table 1.8: Placebo test.
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Dependent variable:
Years of Education
(1) (2) (3) (4)
(Anticip.) Eligibility at age 16 = 0.5 0.258
(0.263)
(Anticip.) Eligibility at age 16 = 1 0.961∗∗
(0.382)
(Anticip.) Eligibility at age 16 0.815∗∗ 1.110∗∗∗ 1.337∗
(0.381) (0.385) (0.693)
Agri. household status X (Anticip.) Eligibility age 16 0.277
(0.318)
Only Child X (Anticip.) Eligibility (Anticip.) age 16 -1.469∗∗
(0.723)
Han ethnicity X (Anticip.) Eligibility age 16 -0.545
(0.690)
Female dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
Eligibility controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Eligibility controls x Province FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE x Province FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Eligibility controls x Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 7840 7840 7840 7840
R2 0.467 0.467 0.468 0.467
Note: Sample includes individuals that turned 16 between 1990 and 2000. Dependent variable is the years
of education the individual completed. Standard OLS regression with robust standard errors in
parenthesis. Double DID specification. Significance levels: * 0.10; ** 0.05; *** 0.01 Data source: China
Family Panel Survey 2010.
Table 1.9: Effect of anticipated eligibility on the years of education - Robustness Checks.
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Dependent variable:
Years of education
Double DID Double DID
(1) (2)
Anticip. Eligibility at 16 1.129∗∗ 1.099∗∗
(0.454) (0.532)
Criteria dependent on spouse -0.295 -0.283
(0.312) (0.307)
Double DID controls Yes Yes
Observations 7840 7840
R2 0.462 0.467
Note: Double difference controls: year fixed effects, province fixed effect, province times year fixed effects, eligibility
controls, eligibility controls times year fixed effects and eligibility times province fixed effects. Sample includes
individuals that turned 16 between 1990 and 2005.The dependent variable is the years of education the individual
completed in 2010. Standard OLS regression with standard errors clustered on provinces-times-urban-area levels in
parenthesis. Significance levels: * 0.10; ** 0.05; *** 0.01. Anticipated eligibility at age 16 is calculated on the basis
of the province, eligibility characteristics and time. Eligibility controls include dummies for being an only child,
having a rural household status and ethnic minority status. Data source: CFPS 2010.
Table 1.10: Spouse dependence in the eligibility criteria.
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Dependent variable:
Having 2nd child Enrollment in Senior High School
Sample 1977-1992 1977-1992 1990-2005 1990-2005 1990-2005 1990-2005
all all Women Men all Women Men
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Eligibility at age 27/28 0.124∗∗∗
(0.0460)
Eligibility at age 27/28 X Sex ratio (std) 0.0369
(0.0294)
(Anticip.) eligibility at age 16 0.112∗ 0.0793 0.127∗ 0.136∗∗ 0.107 0.133∗
(0.0643) (0.0776) (0.0699) (0.0619) (0.0745) (0.0718)
(Anticip.) eligibility at age 16 X Sex ratio (std) -0.0219∗ -0.0105 -0.0355∗∗∗ -0.0177 0.00260 -0.0367
(0.0124) (0.0176) (0.0127) (0.0207) (0.0279) (0.0296)
Predicted Always-2 X (Anticip.) eligibility at age 16 -0.0787∗ -0.0755 -0.0723
(0.0395) (0.0508) (0.0548)
Predicted Always-2 X Sex ratio (std) -0.0142 0.00130 -0.0333∗
(0.0167) (0.0262) (0.0180)
Predicted Always-2 X (Anticip.) eligibility at age 16 X 0.00270 -0.0225 0.0206
Sex ratio (std) (0.0264) (0.0366) (0.0371)
Predicted Always-2 -0.0750∗∗ -0.0741∗∗∗ -0.0645
(0.0300) (0.0264) (0.0408)
Observations 8423 7840 4184 3656 7528 4015 3513
R2 0.421 0.419 0.480 0.428 0.424 0.485 0.435
Note: All regressions are OLS Difference-in-Difference specification with province level times fixed effects, control for eligibility characteristics times
province fixed effects and gender. Column 1 controls for sex of the first child, includes only those that are married and had their first child before
2003. Anticipated eligibility at age 16 is calculated on the basis of the province, eligibility characteristics and time. Eligibility at age 27/28 is
calculated on the basis of province, eligibility characteristics, sex of the first child and time. Eligibility controls include dummies for being an only
child, having a rural household status and ethnic minority status. Cohort sex ratio is calculated as the sex ratio of those born up to 2 years before
and after the individual in the same province, based on the 2000 Census. Sex ratio is standardized. Clustered standard errors on province X urban
level in parenthesis. Significance levels: * 0.10; ** 0.05; *** 0.01 Data source: CFPS 2010.
Table 1.11: Sex ratio and eligibility.
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Dependent variable:
Log(expenses on education)
OLS OLS IV
Sample (years they turn 16) 1980 -1995 1980 -1995 1980 -1995
(1) (2) (3)
Indicator: Having a second child 1.020∗∗∗ 1.057∗∗∗ 0.975∗∗
(0.0876) (0.0892) (0.405)
Eligibility Controls Yes Yes Yes
Additional Controls Yes Yes Yes
Province FE Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Province FE X Eligibility controls No Yes No
Province FE x Year FE No Yes No
Year FE x Eligibility controls No Yes No
Observations 8471 8471 8471
R2 0.112 0.185 0.112
Note: Sample includes individuals that turned 16 between 1980 and 1995. Robust standard errors in
parenthesis. Additional controls: Sex, educational level, educational level of spouse, age at marriage, age at
first birth, house ownership, number of adults in the household, if partner has a job, sex of the first child.
In column 3: First stage run by logit regression, instrument: eligibility at age 27/28. T-stat: 5.57; F-stat:
69.18). Data source: China Family Panel Survey 2010.
Table 1.12: Effect of the second child policy on educational expenditure.
Dependent variable:
Women: Log working hours Men: Log working hours
OLS OLS IV OLS OLS IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Indicator: Having a 2nd child -0.259∗∗∗ -0.258∗∗ -0.139 -0.237∗∗ -0.183∗ 0.333
(0.0973) (0.106) (0.420) (0.0950) (0.102) (0.289)
Eligibility Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Additional Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province FE X Eligibility controls No Yes No No Yes No
Province FE x Year FE No Yes No No Yes No
Year FE x Eligibility controls No Yes No No Yes No
Observations 4424 4424 4424 3892 3892 8316
R2 0.080 0.169 0.080 0.096 0.211 0.064
Note: Sample includes individuals that turned 16 between 1980 and 1995. Robust standard errors in parenthesis.
Additional controls: Sex, educational level, educational level of spouse, age at marriage, age at first birth, house
ownership, number of adults in the household, if partner has a job, sex of the first child. In column 3 and 6: First
stage run by logit regression, instrument: eligibility at age27/28. T-stat: 3.96/4.03; Chi-stat: 15.65/16.28). Data
source: China Family Panel Survey 2010.
Table 1.13: Effect of a second child on parental working hours.
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Dependent variable:
Share of family income spend to support relatives
OLS OLS IV
Sample (years they turn 16) 1980 -1995 1980 -1995 1980 -1995
(1) (2) (3)
Indicator: Having 2nd child -0.00313 0.000427 0.0218
(0.00636) (0.0240) (0.0221)
Nb of individual’s grandparents living somewhere else 0.0105∗∗∗ 0.0113∗∗∗ 0.0321∗∗∗
(0.00353) (0.00373) (0.0116)
Indicator: Having 2nd child X -0.000790 -0.00209 -0.0450∗∗
Nb of individual’s grandparents living somewhere else (0.00514) (0.00497) (0.0204)
Eligibility Controls Yes Yes Yes
Additional Controls Yes Yes Yes
Province FE Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Province FE X Eligibility controls No Yes No
Province FE x Year FE No Yes No
Year FE x Eligibility controls No Yes No
Observations 8104 8104 8104
R2 0.028 0.076 0.021
Note: Sample includes the individuals that turned 16 between 1980 and 1995. Robust standard errors in
parenthesis. Additional controls: Sex, educational level, educational level of spouse, age at marriage, age at
first birth, house ownership, number of adults in the household, if partner has a job, sex of the first child.
In column 3: First stage run by logit regression, 1. instrument: eligibility at age 27/28, first stage run by
logit regression: T-stat: 5.62; Chi2-stat: 31.64; 2.instrument: Nb of individual’s grandparents living
somewhere else x eligibility at age 27/28. First stage run by OLS: T-stat: 8.42; F-stat: 70.91. Data source:
China Family Panel Survey 2010.
Table 1.14: Effect of the second child policy on household balance.
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1.9.3 Model appendix
1.9.3.1 The effect of another child on optimal education
Child care generally is time-intensive and parents might forgo earnings because they have to reduce
working hours. Let us use the example income-generation function from the model section: Y (I, n) =
(T − δn)ρP (I), where T is the maximum working hours and for every child the parents has to spend δ hours
on child care. Each working hour is remunerated with ρP (I) where P (I) is the productivity, which is a
function of human capital, and ρ is a scaling parameter which can be interpreted as technology or labour
market conditions. So parents that have one more child, have a reduction in income:
∂Y (I, n)
n
= −δρP (I) (1.27)
We also define f(n) as µF (n) where µ captures difference in the cost, and F (n) is an increasing, concave
function in n. In this section, we ignore savings.
We can see that given the example income-generation function, the cost of having to care for a child is
a function of human capital. Looking at the optimal educational level (disregarding penalties for the second
child):
u′(y(I∗, n)− µF (n))
[
∂y(I∗, n)
∂I∗
]
=
η
δ
u′(Y − ηI∗) (1.28)
We now look at how the optimal educational level changes with n:
u′′[y(I∗, n)− µF (n)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
(−)
[
∂y(I∗, n)
∂n
− µf ′(n)
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
(−)
∂y(I∗, n)
∂I∗︸ ︷︷ ︸
(+)
+u′(y(I∗, n)− µF (n))︸ ︷︷ ︸
(+)
∂2y(I∗, n)
∂I∗∂n︸ ︷︷ ︸
(−)
(1.29)
The first part is positive: u′′() is negative; ∂y(I
∗,n)
∂n
is negative, as well as −µF ′(n) while ∂y(I
∗,n)
∂I∗
is
positive. This is the consumption smoothing effect: The cost of raising children directly though f(n) as well
as indirectly through the forgone income ∂y(I
∗,n)
∂n
decrease income available for consumption and thereby
increase the marginal utility of additional earning.
The sign of the second part depends on the sign of ∂
2y(I∗,n)
∂I∗∂n
. Using our income generation function from
before:
∂2y(I∗, n)
∂I∗∂n
= −δP ′(I) (1.30)
Since hourly wage/productivity is increasing in human capital, returns to education decrease in the num-
ber of children. The less time the individual can spend working, the less payoff the individual received from
investment in education. This is the labour supply effect: reducing working hours due to children decreases
the payoffs of educational investment.
The overall effect is positive when the consumption smoothing effect is larger than the labour supply
effect:
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u′′(y(I∗, n)− µF (n))
[
∂y(I∗, n)
∂n
− µF ′(n)
]
∂y(I∗, n)
∂I∗
> −u′[y(I∗, n)− µF (n)]
∂2y(I∗, n)
∂I∗∂n
(1.31)
If we assume constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) with a the coefficient of absolute risk aversion, we
get:
a
∂y(I∗, n)
∂I∗
[
µF ′(n)−
∂y(I∗, n)
∂n
]
> −
∂2y(I∗, n)
∂I∗∂n
(1.32)
1.9.3.2 How does the overall effect change with the cost of raising children µ?
We first take the total derivative of the left hand side of equation 1.31 (consumption smoothing effect)
in terms of the cost parameter µ:
u′′′(y(I∗, n)− µF (n))︸ ︷︷ ︸
(+)
∂y(I∗, n)
∂I∗︸ ︷︷ ︸
(+)
[
µF ′(n)−
∂y(I∗, n)
∂n
µF (n)
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
−u′′(y(I∗, n)− µF (n))︸ ︷︷ ︸
(−)
∂y(I∗, n)
∂I∗︸ ︷︷ ︸
(+)
F ′(n)︸ ︷︷ ︸
(+)
(1.33)
Under the assumption of prudence (u′′′(.) > 0), higher costs of raising children strengthens the consumption
smoothing channel. This implies that if there is no labour supply effect of children, i.e. ∂
2y(I∗,n)
∂I∗∂n
= 0 and
∂y(I∗,n)
∂n
= 0, then the effect of anticipated fertility on education increases with the cost of raising children
(Proposition 1, part 1).
We now take the total derivative of the right hand side of equation 1.31 (labour supply effect) in terms
of µ:
u′′[y(I∗, n)− µF (n)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
(−)
∂2y(I∗, n)
∂I∗∂n︸ ︷︷ ︸
(−)
µF (n)︸ ︷︷ ︸
(+)
(1.34)
We can see that the cost of raising children also strengthens also the labour supply channel.
If we assume CARA, as in equation (1.32), the cost of raising children increases the left-hand side, but
has no effect of the right-hand side, such that the overall effect is:
a
∂y(I∗, n)
∂I∗
F ′(n) (1.35)
of which all parts are positive.
1.9.3.3 How does the overall effect change with the loss in working time δ?
In order to investigate the effect of a working time reduction, we assume for simplicity that f(n) = 0:
u′′(y(I∗, n))
∂y(I∗, n)
∂n
∂y(I∗, n)
∂I∗
+ u′(y(I∗, n))
∂2y(I∗, n)
∂I∗∂n
(1.36)
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Using our example income generation function:
u′′((T − δn)P (I∗))(−δP (I∗))(T − δn)P ′(I∗)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Income smoothing channel
−u′((T − δn)P (I∗))(δP ′(I∗))︸ ︷︷ ︸
Labour supply channel
(1.37)
Taking total derivatives of the label supply channel in terms of δ:
u′(c2)P ′(I) + u′′(c2)δnP ′(I)(−nP (I)) (1.38)
of which both terms are positive. The labour supply effect is increasing in the loss of working time.
Taking total derivatives of the income smoothing channel in terms of δ:
u′′(c2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
(−)
P (I)P ′(I)︸ ︷︷ ︸
(+)
[2δn− T ]︸ ︷︷ ︸
?
+u′′′(c2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
(+)
nP (I)δP (I)(T − δn)P ′(I)︸ ︷︷ ︸
(+)
(1.39)
While the second term is positive under the assumption of prudence, the sign of the first term depends
on the sign of 2δn−T . If T > 2δn, the loss in working hours increases the income smoothing channel (while
the reverse is not necessarily true).
We again use at the case of constant absolute risk aversion. Rewrite equation 1.32 without cost of raising
a child and using the income generation function:
a(T − δn)P ′(I)δP (I) > δP ′(I) (1.40)
which reduces to:
a(T − δn)P (I) > 1 (1.41)
As an increase in δ decreases the left hand side, it decreases the effect of anticipated fertility on education.
1.9.3.4 How does the overall effect change with income?
Suppose the income generation function is Y (I, n) = (T − δn)τP (I) where τ captures some technology
factor or labour market conditions. By plugging it into equation 1.41, under CARA higher wages lead to a
higher effect of anticipated fertility on education.
a(T − δn)τP (I) > 1 (1.42)
If we do not make the assumption of CARA, the effect is as ambiguous.
1.9.3.5 Thresholds α¯ and α
¯
α
¯
is defined as, at Z = 1, equation 1.6 being the same for n∗ = 1 and n∗ = 2:
u′(c2(n = 1))
[
∂p(I, n, Z = 1)
∂n
∣∣∣
n=1
+
∂f(n)
∂n
∣∣∣
n=1
−
∂y(I, J, n)
∂n
∣∣∣
n=1
]
− α
¯
∂h(n)
∂n
∣∣∣
n=1
=
u′(c2(n = 2))
[
∂p(I, n, Z = 1)
∂n
∣∣∣
n=2
+
∂f(n)
∂n
∣∣∣
n=2
−
∂y(I, J, n)
∂n
∣∣∣
n=2
]
− α
¯
∂h(n)
∂n
∣∣∣
n=2
(1.43)
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If Z = 1, the fines are 0 for the first and the second child (n = 1 and n = 2). Using this information and
rearranging, gives:
α
¯
=
[
∂h(n)
∂n
∣∣∣
n=2
−
∂h(n)
∂n
∣∣∣
n=1
]
−1
u′(c2(n = 2))
[
∂f(n)
∂n
∣∣∣
n=2
−
∂y(I, J, n)
∂n
∣∣∣
n=2
]
− u′(c2(n = 1))
[
∂f(n)
∂n
∣∣∣
n=1
−
∂y(I, J, n)
∂n
∣∣∣
n=1
] (1.44)
α
¯
does not depend on the fines.
α¯ is defined as, at Z = 0, equation 1.6 being the same for n∗ = 1 and n∗ = 2:
u′(c2(n = 1))
[
∂p(I, n, Z = 0)
∂n
∣∣∣
n=1
+
∂f(n)
∂n
∣∣∣
n=1
−
∂y(I, J, n)
∂n
∣∣∣
n=1
]
− α¯
∂h(n)
∂n
∣∣∣
n=1
=
u′(c2(n = 2))
[
∂p(I, n, Z = 0)
∂n
∣∣∣
n=2
+
∂f(n)
∂n
∣∣∣
n=2
−
∂y(I, J, n)
∂n
∣∣∣
n=2
]
− α¯
∂h(n)
∂n
∣∣∣
n=2
(1.45)
While ∂p(I,n,Z=0)
∂n
∣∣∣
n=1
= 0, ∂p(I,n,Z=0)
∂n
∣∣∣
n=2
= ρ. Therefore, we can reformulate:
α¯ =
[
∂h(n)
∂n
∣∣∣
n=2
−
∂h(n)
∂n
∣∣∣
n=1
]
−1
u′(c2(n = 2))
[
ρ+
∂f(n)
∂n
∣∣∣
n=2
−
∂y(I, J, n)
∂n
∣∣∣
n=2
]
− u′(c2(n = 1))
[
∂f(n)
∂n
∣∣∣
n=1
−
∂y(I, J, n)
∂n
∣∣∣
n=1
] (1.46)
1.9.3.6 Gender Difference and Marriage Markets
The first order condition for equation 1.15:
∂ω(I∗, τ)
∂I∗
(
u′(c2m)
[
∂y(I∗)
∂I∗
+
∂y(J(I∗), n)
∂J(I∗)
σ −
∂p(I, n, Z)
∂I∗
]
+ αh(n)
)
+
u′(c2s)
∂y˜(I∗)
∂I∗
(
1−
∂ω(I∗, τ)
∂I∗
)
=
η
δ
u′(c1)
(1.47)
1.9.4 Further empirical results
1.9.4.1 Effect of fines on education
Denote P the official provincial fines. Once the full set of controls X is included, the effect of P
is captured in the province times year fixed effects. However, we can look at the differential effect
of fines for those that are eligible. Eligibility for a second child permit means an anticipated cost
reduction in the monetary cost of the second child, and this cost reduction is a function of the fines.
The cost reduction is essentially an interaction between eligibility and the monetary fine levels:
Ii = δZ˜
′
iPi +Xi + µ˜ (1.48)
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Monetary fines can also be used to test predictions derived from the theoretical model: First, mon-
etary fines should change the distribution of always-2 in the population. For this, I first check if
eligibility has a higher effect on fertility outcome when fines are high. I also verify if monetary fines
are important in making predictions in the prediction status L. Second, monetary fines do not have
an effect for those that are either increasers and always-1. Third, monetary fines potentially have
an effect on always-2, though it is unclear in which direction.
In order to investigate the effect of fines on education, I use the fine data set from Ebenstein
(2010) which is based on Scharping (2013) and includes the official monetary fines (as well as
bonuses) that are set on the province level. Unfortunately, the fines are only available until 2000,
so that only 2/3 of the main sample can be used.24 The fines are set as a multiple of the previous
year’s household annual income and ranged between 0.15 and 5 between 1990 and 2000. These
official monetary fines measure the true costs of an out-of-quota child imperfectly: We do not know
if these fines where actually implemented, and there were other penalties such as losing one’s job
that are important. Furthermore, there were several costly avoidance strategies whose employment
probably correlated with the official fines.
The results are displayed in table 1.15. Second child permits can be interpreted as a cost re-
duction which equals eligibility status times the fine amounts. This definition of cost reduction
is included in column 1 and 3 and the coefficients are interpreted as followed: a cost reduction
of one time the annual income increases the likelihood of having a second child by 9.4 percentage
points but does note have a significantly positive effect on education. Differentiating between those
predicted to be always-2 and those not (column 3), we find that those that are not predicted to be
always-2 react positively to a cost reduction while those that are predicted to be always-2 do not.
Here, the prediction process for always-2 includes the fine levels as a possible predictor (see figure
1.8 on the bottom).
However, the amount of monetary fines does not add explanatory power over just using an
eligibility dummy (see column 2 and columns 5 to 8). Being eligible in a province with higher fines
does not have a higher effect on the likelihood of having a second child than being in a province
with lower fines. Fines are also not important in predicting always-2. This is probably due to these
official fines measuring the real cost of an out-of-quote child very noisily.
24The previous results hold for this subsample.
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Dependent variable:
Having 2nd child Enrollment in Senior High School
Sample 1977-1987 1977-1987 1990-2000 1990-2000 1990-2000 1990-2000
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Cost reduction 0.0941∗∗∗ 0.0182 0.0276∗
(0.0249) (0.0129) (0.0138)
Eligibility at age 27/28 0.148∗∗∗
(0.0433)
Eligibility at age 27/28 X Monetary fine (std) 0.0114
(0.0110)
Predicted Always-2 X cost reduction -0.0249∗∗
(0.0108)
(Anticip.) eligibility at age 16 0.0929∗∗ 0.129∗∗∗
(0.0431) (0.0397)
(Anticip.) eligibility at age 16 X Monetary fine (std) -0.000107 -0.00487
(0.0239) (0.0269)
Predicted Always-2 X (Anticip.) eligibility at age 16 -0.0712
(0.0429)
Predicted Always-2 X Monetary fine (std) -0.0360
(0.0464)
Predicted Always-2 X (Anticip.) eligibility at age 16 X Monetary fine (std 0.0227
(0.0549)
Predicted Always-2 -0.0703∗∗ -0.0706∗
(0.0275) (0.0379)
Observations 7607 7607 5405 5187 5405 5187
R2 0.420 0.421 0.445 0.455 0.446 0.456
Note: All regressions are OLS Difference-in-Difference specification with province level times fixed effects, control for eligibility characteristics times province fixed effects and gender. Anticipated
eligibility at age 16 is calculated on the basis of the province, eligibility characteristics and time. Eligibility controls include dummies for being an only child, having a rural household status and ethnic
minority status. Column 1 and 2 control for sex of the first child, includes only those that are married and had their first child before 2003. Clustered standard errors on province X urban level in
parenthesis. Significance levels: * 0.10; ** 0.05; *** 0.01 Data source: CFPS 2010.
Table 1.15: Monetary fines and eligibility.
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1.9.4.2 Effect of second child permits on other variables
Anticipated fertility can also have an effect on other choices. For example, those that antici-
pate to have more children could get married earlier and have their first child earlier. However,
in order to apply for a second child permit, couples often have to respect certain criteria, one
being ‘late birth’ of the first child. Late birth is defined as the woman being at least 25 years
old when having the first child. For those being born between 1970 and 1980, average age at first
birth lies at 24.75 overall, 24 for women and 25.56 for men. Thus, this criterion might actually
push those that plan to apply for a second child permit to wait until age 25 for having the first child.
Since the decisions are taken at a later stage in life, I use the anticipated eligibility status at
age 22 for the timing of marriage, and the anticipated eligibility status at age 25 for the timing of
first birth. The sample is adjusted accordingly. I also control for the years of education to correct
for any effect that fertility expectations could have through education. The result using the triple
differences specification are displayed in table 1.16. The coefficient of anticipated eligibility status
at age 22 on the age of marriage is significantly negative once it is interacted with the sex of the
individual (column 2). When female specific year and province fixed effects and an interaction be-
tween the female indicator and education are included (column 3), eligibility significantly decreases
the age at marriage only for men.
We find the same results for the age at the birth of the first child: When female specific year,
province, and educational effects are included, eligibility at age 25 significantly decreases the age at
first birth only for men (column 6). A potential explanation is that eligible women are concerned
with the official guidelines about late marriage and late birth. It is also possible that for women
the legal limit for marriage is generally binding. At the same time, there are no thresholds for men
and the legal marriage age might not be binding for most men, so that they can adjust the age of
marriage and first birth to their anticipated fertility.
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Dependent variable:
Age at marriage Age at first birth
Sample (years they turned 16) 1981-1996 1981-1996 1981-1996 1984-1999 1984-1999 1984-1999
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Nb children allowed at age 22 -0.618 -0.732∗ -0.949∗∗
(0.397) (0.419) (0.422)
Nb children allowed at age 25 -0.680∗ -0.846∗∗ -0.967∗∗
(0.358) (0.376) (0.380)
Female X Nb children allowed at age 22 0.212 0.635∗∗∗
(0.276) (0.236)
Female X Nb children allowed at age 25 0.314 0.602∗∗
(0.196) (0.243)
Female dummy; Education Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Eligibility controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Eligibility controls x Province FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE x Province FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Eligibility controls x Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Female x Year FE,Province FE & Education No No Yes No No Yes
Observations 8703 8703 8703 9725 9725 9725
R2 0.237 0.237 0.247 0.209 0.209 0.218
Note: Sample includes individuals that turned 22 between 1990 and 2000 for columns 1 to 3 and individuals that
turned 25 between 1990 and 2000 for columns 4 to 6. Eligibility at age 22 and 25 is calculated on the basis of the
province, eligibility characteristics and time. Eligibility controls include dummies for being an only child, having a
rural household status and ethnic minority status. OLS regression with robust standard errors in parenthesis. Data
source: China Family Panel Survey 2010.
Table 1.16: Effect of eligibility on age at marriage and age at first birth.
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ABSTRACT
This chapter investigates marriage patterns and underlying preferences in China. We estimate
mate preferences based on the evaluation of a series of randomly created profiles and connect our
results to recent marriage patterns in the general population. Data is collected on parents (or
other relatives) who search for a spouse on behalf of their unmarried adult child and on unmarried
students. We confirm that male profiles with a high income and real estate ownership have a higher
probability of being selected by parents than profiles with low income and no real estate, but not
female profiles. We find that parents dislike profiles with less education than their son or daughter,
but we do not find evidence for a dislike of female profiles with high education. However, some
parents may have excessively high expectations about the educational level of their son-in-law.
Parents mostly prefer male profiles with a similar age to their daughter and female profiles that
are younger than their son. Yet, when their son is in his 20s, parents also accept women who are
slightly older. If marriages formed according to parents’ preferences, the most common case would
be the husband being 2 or 3 years older. Yet, in the general population, the most common case
for recent marriages is spouses having the same age. This would be the case if marriages formed
according to students’ preferences. Both parents’ and students’ preferences predict a high degree of
assortativity on education, which we observe in recently married couples in the overall population.
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2.1 Introduction
What do people look for in a marriage partner? Partner choice has important consequences for
most life dimensions such as socioeconomic status, fertility, and overall well-being. It is therefore
not surprising that in many contemporary societies (and most historical ones) parents are involved
in the process of selecting a spouse for their child. While the economics literature on partner prefer-
ences has gained momentum (e.g. Hitsch et al. (2010), Fisman et al. (2006),(Xia et al. (2014), Ong
and Wang (2015), Kurzban and Weeden (2007), Belot and Francesconi (2006)), parental preferences
have mostly been neglected in the research literature due to the focus on Western countries and the
use of online dating data.2 This chapter investigates parental preferences for spousal characteristics
in China and compares them to the preferences of young adults. It then connects the results to
recent marriage patterns.
Understanding parental and individual spousal preferences is not only interesting in itself but
helps predict changes in the marriage structure due to, for example, imbalances in the sex ratio or
to changes in the distribution of educational levels. Yet, we first need to understand if parental or
individual preferences are driving marriage choices. Are parental preferences or individual prefer-
ences more reflected in the marriage outcome distribution? Furthermore, spousal preferences drive
premarital investment choices. If educated women prefer educated men and parents prefer an edu-
cated daughter-in-law, it can encourage educational investment in sons. It is often policy-relevant
to have estimates for these marriage market returns to education, real estate or age at marriage.
For this, it is also crucial to understand if parents have a realistic assessment of their child’s future
marriage outcome. If parents overestimate marriage market returns, it can lead to prolonged search
efforts and eventually lower marriage rates.
In China, the marriage prospects of women in their late 20s with a university degree are often
described as uncertain in the media.3 Unmarried women over 27 were even labelled as “leftover
women” by the government.4 Faced with a skewed sex ratio, lower marriage rates of educated
women seems to be a policy concern for the Chinese government. Yet, Brandt et al. (2018) find
that though university-educated women marry later, completed marriage rates are comparable to
those of women without a university degree. Furthermore, it makes a difference whether lower rates
of marriage among university-educated women are due to men (and their families) rejecting women
who are more educated than them, or due to women (and their families) rejecting men who are
less educated than them.
2Notable exceptions are Banerjee et al. (2013) and Adams and Andrew (2019) who focus on India.
3 see Fincher, 2012, New York Times https://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/12/opinion/global/
chinas-leftover-women.html
4 see Simpson, 2013, Mail online https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2282249/
The-leftover-women-China-defines-official-age-females-left-shelf-27.html and Magistad 2013, BBC
https://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-21320560
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Using the China Family Panel Study (CFPS) from 2014, a representative household survey,
we find that only around 1% of those aged between 40 and 65 have never married. We also ob-
serve that recent marriages between 2012 and 2014 are highly assortative on age and education.
Assortativity is characterized as spouses having the same educational level or similar age. Such
assortative matches could be due to endogamic preferences, meaning preferences for those of the
same type. They could also reflect increasing preferences - preferences for those with higher levels
of education. If educational levels are similar between men and women, this leads to assortative
matches.5 Finally, they can also arise if there are no specific preferences but individuals with similar
characteristics have a higher probability of meeting. To be able to differentiate these options, we
collected elicited preference data.
Parental influence over spouse choice continues to be important in China (Riley (1994), Pi-
mentel (2000)), a country that had a tradition of arranged marriage before the Communist party
came to power. In spring 2016, we interviewed men and women who were actively searching for a
spouse for their adult child or relative at a public park in Kunming, in Southern China. The phe-
nomenon of parents and other relatives searching for potential suitors in public parks at so-called
“marriage markets” is nowadays common in big Chinese cities. Respondents were asked to evaluate
a series of randomly created hypothetical profiles that we use to estimate spousal preferences. As
a comparison group, we interviewed unmarried students at a local university.
We find that parents dislike profiles with an educational level that is lower than their daugh-
ter’s or their university- or college-educated son’s. Equivalently, female and male students dislike
less educated profiles. Only parents searching on behalf of a university- or college-educated female
subjects and female students have a clear preference for profiles with higher education. We find no
evidence for a dislike of women who are more educated than the male eligible subject. High income
and real estate ownership are important only for parents who search on behalf of their daughter,
but not for those who search on behalf of their son. Parents searching on behalf of their daughter
and female students prefer profiles with a similar age. Parents searching on behalf of men prefer
younger women.
Our data set is of interest for several reasons. In contrast to data from online dating websites,
we can credibly claim that respondents are looking for a spouse and not just for a short-term re-
lationship. Furthermore, we are sure to have respondents who have thought about what they are
looking for and are experienced in selecting potential candidates. Also, because choice data are
taken from hypothetical profiles which are randomly created, we do not have the issue of a selected
pool to choose from and we can ensure that the characteristics are not directly correlated. Since
5The highest type of man would then match with the highest type of woman, the second highest type with
the second highest type and so forth. This holds under the assumption of non-transferable utility, which we make
explicitly later in the chapter. It also holds under transferable utility under some assumptions on the combined
marriage surplus (supermodularity).
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we focus on economic variables and do not include physical attractiveness, results are less noisy
and can be easily compared to outcome data from other data sets. The trade-off between income
and physical attractiveness is investigated in a companion paper with a separate profile task (Bovet
et al. (2018)).6
Popular belief is that people using this search platform are those who cannot find a spouse by
conventional means. Comparing the search platform to representative household data from the
same city, we find that the population represented at the platform is mostly local, older, more
educated and more likely to be employed than the average unmatched population. This search
platform seems to attract a specific subset of the unmatched population and it is not necessarily
those with low quality. We also find that parental respondents rank altruistic motives, such as
wanting their child to have a companion, as more important than selfish motives such as concerns
for retirement and grandchildren.
Additionally to the profile choice task, we asked parents for the upper and lower limits for age
and education that they find acceptable. The upper and lower limits give us “acceptable suitors”.
We find that a match might not be accepted by the respondents because one party has too little
education but not because one party is too educated. We investigate if recent marriages from the
CFPS 2014 would be acceptable to our respondents. For age, we find that most marriages, in
particular those between men and women in their early and mid-20s, are acceptable to parents.
Yet, while parents with daughters in their late 20s and early 30s accept husbands with similar age,
those with sons in their early 30s accept only younger women. For education, we find that 91%
of wives have acceptable educational levels based on parents’ responses. Yet, only around 60% of
husbands are within parents’ acceptable bounds. The partially unrealistic lower bounds on the
educational level of a son-in-law could be an artefact of our selected sample. However, they could
also be due to the (sometimes erroneous) expectation that their daughter’s spouse will have at least
as much education as she has. With the educational achievements of women outperforming those
of men in China in recent years, this could lead to lower marriage rates among educated women.
However, there could also be an adjustment of the threshold over time as parents update their
beliefs. Furthermore, we cannot rule out that respondent give us “strategic” lower bounds. Instead
of stating what they would accept if there was no other option, these bounds could indicate the
levels to which they aspire.
Based on parents’ and students’ preferences, we simulate marriages using a standard Gale-
Shapley algorithm (Gale and Shapley (1962)). For the supply of spouses, we use individuals who
recently married from the CFPS 2014 and compare the simulated outcomes with real outcomes.
The baseline specification based on students’ and parents’ preferences predicts a higher degree of
6The profile task used in Bovet et al. (2018) took place after the hypothetical choice task used in this chapter. The
results of Bovet et al. (2018) are in line we the results here: Respondent value income only when they are searching
on behalf of a female subject. When they are searching on behalf of a male subject, income is insignificant.
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assortativity on education than we observe in the real distribution. Frictions in the marriage sorting
process, but also a higher heterogeneity in preferences in the general population compared to our
sample, can explain this difference. The simulations based on parents’ preferences predict the most
common case to be couples where the husband is 2 or 3 years older. In the real distribution, the
most common case is the spouses having the same age. This is the result when the simulation
is based on students’ preferences. The difference can be explained by changes in age preferences
when the eligible subject, in particular a male eligible subject, gets older. It could, however, also
reflect a difference in age preferences between generations. Matches between spouses of the same
age seem to be preferred by students and accepted by parents. This hints at interesting dynamics
of marriage decision-making and demands further research.
2.1.1 Links with the literature
This chapter adds to the growing strand in the economics literature that studies marriage pat-
terns theoretically and empirically. The economic literature on marriage is based on the seminal
work on marriage markets by Becker (1973). He models a market with two sides (men and women)
and assumes transferable utility. Agents form matches and bargain about the distribution of the
surplus that is generated by the match. The functional form of this marriage surplus is of partic-
ular interest. It reflects preferences of both sides. Following the seminal paper of Choo and Siow
(2006), several papers have estimated the marriage surplus. It can be identified under relatively soft
assumptions. However, without assumptions on the structural form, the bargaining and searching
process, one cannot identify men and women’s preferences separately. Notable papers in this field
are Choo and Seitz (2013), Wong (2003), Galichon and Salanie´ (2015), Logan et al. (2008), and
Chiappori et al. (2015). A summary of these methods can be found in Chiappori and Salanie´ (2016).
Another strand of this literature assumes non-transferable utility. Under non-transferable util-
ity, men and women cannot bargain about the marriage surplus but each gets a determined fixed
utility from the match. Most papers that assume non-transferable utility use additional data about
preferences.7 This chapter follows the approach to identify preferences directly from additional
data. Its empirical strategy is most closely related to Hitsch et al. (2010) who use data from
an online dating website where they observe which profiles agents browse. They estimate which
characteristics make a profile more likely to be clicked on. In this, they follow the searching frame-
work of Adachi (2003). Similarly, Banerjee et al. (2013) use rankings of responses to marriage
advertisements in an Indian newspaper. Other papers use data from speed dating (Fisman et al.
(2006), Fisman et al. (2008)) or online dating (Xia et al. (2014), Ong and Wang (2015), Kurzban
and Weeden (2007), Belot and Francesconi (2006)). Adams and Andrew (2019) use hypothetical
marriage scenarios to elicit parents’ spousal preferences for education and marriage age and beliefs
about marriage prospects.
7A notable exception is Del Boca and Flinn (2014) who combine data on marriage outcomes and household
production.
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This chapter adds to the literature on the evolution of marriage patterns in China. Mu and
Xie (2014) describe matching patterns on age over time in China. They find that homogamy in
age, as measured by the average age difference between the spouses, increased until the 1990s,
but since then has decreased slightly. We find similar results (see section 2.2.1). At the same
time, the correlation between the age levels has increased continuously. Hu (2016) find that the
household registration status (hukou) plays an important part in determining marriages. The
household registration status is inherited from the parents and is an important determinant of
socioeconomic status. Du et al. (2015) predict that due to the availability of more single men than
women, women are more likely to marry ‘upwards’, in terms of individual income and hukou status.
Finally, this chapter touches on the issue of parents influencing the marriage outcomes of their
children. Huang et al. (2016a) find that individuals that rely on their parents for finding a spouse
end up with a different type of partner than if they found the spouse themselves. Riley (1994) uses
data from a survey collected in 1986/1987. They find that the number of arranged marriages has
decreased but point out that parents continue to have influence over marriage decisions.
2.2 Context
2.2.1 Marriage in China
The institution of marriage and the search for a marriage partner have undergone several changes
in the last century in China. For centuries, arranged marriage had been dominant. Parents chose
the spouse for their child, often with the help of a professional matchmaker (Xia and Zhou (2003),
Huang et al. (2016a)). After the Chinese Communist Party came to power in 1949, the government
passed a law making arranged marriages illegal (the Marriage Law, adopted in 1950). It was in line
with its effort to get rid of traditional Chinese classes (Engel (1984)). Moreover, the government
helped to abolish the traditional marriage system by encouraging women to join the labor force
(Pimentel (2000), Xia and Zhou (2003)). However, in rural areas, arranged marriage continued to
be important and parents still influenced marriage outcomes (Xia and Zhou (2003)).
The economic reforms of the late 1970s drastically changed the life of the Chinese people, as
China became increasingly open to the rest of the world (Higgins et al. (2002), Chang et al. (2011)).
The economic reforms led to an increase in economic opportunities, inequality and mobility. Mar-
riage again became a way to increase social status and improve the financial situation (Fan and
Huang (1998), Han et al. (2015)). This process was accompanied with changes in marital prefer-
ences. Chang et al. (2011) describes a decrease in the importance of virginity and an increase in
the importance of financial prospects. Higgins and Sun (2007) and Higgins et al. (2002) find that
though some attitudes are changing, attitudes toward sexual behaviors are still less open than in
the West. They also note that students from cities have more liberal attitudes than those from
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rural backgrounds.
Note: Answer to the question how the respondent met their spouse. Data source: China Family
Panel Study 2010, marriages between 1945 and 2010. Omits categories with low incident rates
(“other”) such as meeting online.
Figure 2.1: How individuals met their spouse.
Figure 2.1 shows the predominant ways in which individuals met their first spouse. The data
used are from the China Family Panel Study (CFPS) 2010. We see a sharp drop in marriages that
were arranged by their parents after the late 1940s and early 1950s. The share of those stating that
they were introduced to their partner by a friend or relative increases at the same time, and this
continues to be the predominant way. Unfortunately, we do not know who exactly introduced the
spouses to each other, whether it was a common friend, a parent or another relative. We can also
see that there is an increase in the proportion of couples that met at school/university and that
met at work.
Chinese parents continue to influence their children’s marriage decision (Pimentel (2000)). As
a sign for this, a new phenomenon appeared in several Chinese cities around 10 years ago: the
so-called marriage markets. These platforms were created to help parents find a potential marital
partner for their adult children. We will discuss these platforms in section 2.3.
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Note: Educational level of husband minus educational level of wife. Educational levels: No/little
education, primary school, secondary school, high school (normal and professional), tertiary
education (university or college), graduate degree. Includes those that married between 2012 and
2014. Source: China Family Panel Study 2014
Figure 2.2: Educational difference between husband and wife
2.2.2 Marriage patterns in contemporary China
What do marriage patterns look like in China today? We use the China Family Panel Study
(CFPS) 20148, a nationally representative survey, which contains information on the age and edu-
cational level of married spouses. Restricting the sample to respondents between 20 and 65 years
old, we find very high marriage rates. 82.7% of the respondents between 20 and 65 years are mar-
ried, only 12.6% are single, 1.8% are divorced and 2.5% are widowed. For those between 40 and
65, only 1% has never been married (and 1.6% is divorced). We focus on those that got married in
the last two years and are between 20 and 65 years old (910 observations). The average marriage
age in this span is 26.8 for men and 25.2 for women.
As we can see in figure 2.2, marriages are assortative on the educational level. For nearly all
educational levels, is it most common to be married to someone who has the same educational
level (see also table 2.6 in the appendix). The only exception is for individuals who have a post-
graduate degree, which is still relatively rare. The second most likely case is that the spouse has
an educational level that is one below or above. The Pearson Correlation Coefficient between the
educational level of husband and wife is highly significant at 0.65.
Furthermore, we investigate how spouses match along the dimension of age. Figure 2.3 displays
the difference between the age of husband and wife. The average lies at the husband being 1.65
years older. However, the mode is at the wife and the husband having the same age. In most cou-
ples, the husband is up to three years older. In around 13% of the cases, the wife is one or two years
older. There are some outlier couples in which the wife is more than five years older or the hus-
band more than 10 years older. The Pearson’s Correlation Coefficient is strongly significant at 0.85.
8The China Family Panel Study is a large-scale, nationally representative panel survey project conducted by the
Institute of Social Science Survey at Peking University (information be found at www.isss.edu.cn/cfps/).
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Note: Age of husband minus age of wife. Includes those that married between 2012 and 2014.
Source: China Family Panel Study 2014
Figure 2.3: Age difference between husband and wife
We use the China Family Panel Study wave of 2010 to investigate how these age patterns have
changed over time. We can see in Figure 2.4 that the age difference between a husband and a wife is
higher in marriages that were formed between 1955 and 1970. Marriages that were formed between
1985 and 2000 have an age difference below 2 years and since then there was even an increase
in the age differences. However, as the blue line indicates, the correlation coefficient between the
husband’s and the wife’s age has been constantly increasing.
Two individuals get married if both of them (or their families) decide that the marriage is
beneficial for them: marriage is an instance of a standard 1-to-1 matching procedure. Analysis of
marriage data becomes difficult because both sides supply and demand spouses at the same time.
Also, two (usually unmarried) individuals have to meet to consider marriage. The observed mar-
riage patterns could be simply due to the chances of meeting. Educated men could be more likely
to meet educated women. Men and women could be more likely to meet others of the same age.
If they are older or younger, they might be already married or too young to get married. Yet, the
observed marriage patterns can also be due to preferences. One might prefer a spouse with the same
age or level of education (endogamic or homogamic preferences) or with a high educational level in-
dependently of one’s own education. Without strong assumptions on search costs and the marriage
surplus - the utility created by the marriage minus the utilities of being single - one cannot infer
preferences from outcome data. This is why we have chosen to research partner preferences directly.
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Note: Pearson’s correlation coefficient measuring the correlation between the age of husband and
the age of wife. Includes those that married between 1955 and 2010. Source: CFPS 2010
Figure 2.4: Age difference and correlation between husband and wife’s ages over time
2.3 Parental Search at Green Lake Park
Every Saturday, one corner of the Green Lake Park in Kunming, the capital and largest city of
the province of Yunnan in South China, hosts a “marriage market”.9 On this dedicated area of the
park - accessible to the public - individuals search for a spouse for the “eligible subject”: either for
themselves or for someone else.
This marriage search platform was initiated by parents who used their weekends to chat to other
parents with unmarried children. Over time, it developed into an established event. Parents and
other participants talk to each other or post papers with basic information of the eligible subject
on the wall of the park, with their own contacts. They may check the information of others on
the wall or address one of the marriage agencies present at the park. These marriage platforms
are a new phenomenon but already widely spread. The local informal organizer indicated 2005 as
the start of parents coming to the park with an explicit search motive. She also complained about
the commercialization of the platform by the marriage agencies. The most famous marriage search
platform in a public park is at the People’s Park in Shanghai is believed to have started in 2004.10
We ran a survey in this area of the park every Saturday from late spring to early summer of
201611 named the Questionnaire for Search Activities for a Marital Partner in Yunnan (QSAMPY).
Our survey suggests that approximately 75% of all individuals who come to the park are looking
9With an estimated population of nearly 4 million (Cox (2018)), Kunming is a middle size city in China.
10According to an article in Al Jazeera: https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/inpictures/2013/04/
201343113125739211.html.
11With some exceptions due to the exam period.
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for a marriage partner on behalf of someone else. Around 23% look for a spouse for themselves.
Those that are looking for themselves are older than those who are represented by their parents
(48 years on average) and have mostly been married before. Those that are represented by their
parents, an uncle or an aunt, are younger (on average 33 years old) and usually unmarried (94%).
We are interested in preferences for the first marriage and of those who search on behalf of someone
else. We thus exclude those searching for themselves. We call this the parents’ sample, though it
includes other relatives if not explicitly specified.
2.3.1 Who is searching?
Respondents who are looking on behalf of someone else are predominantly female (64%) with
an average age of 61. The majority of respondents (86%) are retired. This suggests that they have
low opportunity costs of going to a park on a Saturday. The vast majority (91%) are married, 5%
are widowed and 2.5% are separated or divorced. Only 5% of respondents are at the park together
with the eligible subject. Around half of the respondents are searching on behalf of their daughter,
one third on behalf of their son, and the rest on behalf of their niece, their nephew or another
relative. Summary statistics are displayed in table 2.7 in the appendix.
The park where the data were collected is in the centre of the city. Most of the respondents of
the QSAMPY live and are registered in the city. The search platform does not attract many non-
locals, for example from rural areas. Of parents, 82% live with the eligible subject. As expected
for an urban Chinese sample, most parents only have one child (73%). 23% have two children and
4% have three or more children. In 75% of the cases when the respondent has more than one child,
the other child is already married. In 68% of these cases, the other child already has at least one
child.
The province of Yunnan is ethnically diverse. However, most respondents (94%) state that they
are of Han ethnicity. The share of ethnic minorities in our sample is thus lower than in the city
overall, where it was around 15% in 2007.12
Do respondents search on behalf of someone else because they themselves were introduced to
their spouse by someone else? We find that 36% of QSAMPY respondents were introduced to
their spouse by friends. 30% met at work or in the collective unit, 6% met at school or university
and 13% were introduced by a relative (not their parent). The share of those being introduced
by their parents only lies at 3%. Only 3 respondents (less than 1%) in our survey indicate that
their marriage was arranged (by their parents, relatives or a marriage agency). These numbers are
comparable with those of the general population displayed in figure 2.1.
12The the original source for this information is not available anymore. However, it is quoted in several
other websites, such as Wikipedia and https://www.gokunming.com/en/blog/item/397/kunming_residents_by_
the_numbers.
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2.3.2 How are they searching?
A large share of respondents comes to the park occasionally (35%), some regularly (18%), and
an important share always (22%). 23% indicate that this is the first time they are at the park.
Parents (and other relatives) invest an important share of their Saturday on the search. A quarter
of respondents spends between 1 and 2 hours at the park. Only 4% spend less time, 21% spend
2-3 hours, 17% 3-4 hours, 17% 4-5 hours and 13% spend more than 5 hours. Respondents focus
on finding someone at this platform: only 4% use another platform. Of those, most use online
platforms.
Several marriage agencies are present at the park. They display big folders that are supposedly
full of information on unmarried potential spouses. They sell the contact information at a piece
rate (or several for a certain price) and ask a fee for being included in the database.13 However,
we find that most parents (83%) have not paid anything to a marriage agency and only 2.7% of
eligible subjects ever went to a meeting arranged by a marriage agency.
Most of the eligible subjects (72%) know that they are represented at the park. Of those, the
majority (68%) approves of this procedure. 30% of the eligible subjects encourage their parents or
other relatives to search on their behalf. Nearly half of the respondents (42%) indicate that the
eligible subject is also searching actively for a spouse. In the case of parents, the spouse of the
respondent is sometimes also involved in the search process (36%). In the case of another relative,
the parents are often looking as well (67%). Finding a spouse for the eligible subject often seems
to be a family affair where more than one person is involved.
2.3.3 Why are they searching?
Nearly half of the respondents (42%) indicate that the eligible subject is also searching actively
for a spouse. Of those that state that the eligible subject is not searching, ‘not having time/being
too busy’ is the most stated reason. It is followed by ‘not wanting to’ and ‘being too shy’.
We offered pre-selected reasons for the search to investigate the respondents’ search motivations.
We asked if they thought this reason was important or not for them (on a Likert scale of 5). We
find that parents rank altruistic motives as more important (see table 2.8 in the appendix). These
include ‘wanting their child to have someone who takes care of him or her’ and ‘having their child
to have someone he/she feels affection’ for. More selfish reasons are less often ranked as important
or very important independent of the sex of the eligible subject. These included ‘having a son or
daughter-in-law take care of the respondent when the respondent is older’ or ‘having grandchildren’.
13We talked to two marriage agencies and visited their office. For one agency, to be included in the database, one
has to come to the office with documents to verify the information provided and to take a picture. The other agency
just had basic information and no pictures. We were not able to verify the reliability of their statements.
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These survey results suggest that parents see themselves as agents for their children. They want to
help their children by searching on behalf of them. This does not exclude that parents put direct
or indirect pressure on their children to find a spouse.
2.3.4 On whose behalf are they searching?
In the QSAMPY, we collected detailed information on the “eligible subject”. It includes age,
sex, marital status, education, income, ethnicity, religion, physical characteristics and habits. Table
2.9 in the appendix summarizes some descriptive statistics. The average age of eligible subjects is
33 years. There are more women being represented than men (58%). The sample is very educated:
98% have at least finished professional high school, 60% have completed a university degree. 21% of
eligible subjects are represented by their father, 64% by their mother. The rest is represented by an
uncle or an aunt, in few cases by another relative or a friend. Among the eligible subjects, 92% are
employed and 5% are self-employed or entrepreneurs. income is 4800 Yuan; most individuals earn
between 2000 and 8000 Yuan. 94% of eligible subjects are of Han ethnicity, 2.8% of Bai ethnicity,
and 2.2% of another ethnicity.
We use the roster data from the Skills Towards Employability and Productivity (STEP) pro-
gram to compare our sample to the general population. The STEP data in Yunnan, China, was
collected in 2012 by the World Bank within urban Kunming. The sampling method follows the
census paths to be representative. We only use the first step of the questionnaire, the household
roster. It contains basic information about all the individuals living in the household. We use the
data about the sex, age, marital status, education and income of those who are at least 20 years old.
In table 2.1, we compare the population from the QSAMPY and the STEP data. We find that
never married eligible subjects at the park are significantly older than the average never married
person (by around 6 years). Those that have no partner (including divorced and widowed) have a
similar average age to those at the park. The sex ratio in the general population is balanced. Yet,
the percentage of women who never married or are without a partner is only 44% in the STEP
data. This may reflect a skewed sex ratio (though Yunnan has one of the most balanced sex ratios
in China). Another more plausible reason is that women on average marry earlier. The comparison
with the share of women at the park indicates that women are over-represented in the QSAMPY
data.
The QSAMPY sample is much more educated than the general population. 98% of eligible
subjects have finished at least professional high school and around 60% have a university degree.
In the STEP data, only 1 person completed tertiary education and only 55% of unmarried individ-
uals finished high school. Economic indicators are also better in the QSAMPY. 97% of the eligible
14STEP: Has been working at least 1 hour in last 7 days. QSAMPY: Employed or self-employed
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QSAMPY (2016) STEP (2012) Difference
Eligible Subjects
never no partner never no partner all never no partner
married married married
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Age (mean) 32.43 33.06 26.19 33.70 44.40 6.24*** -0.64
Female 59% 58% 44% 48% 51% 15pp*** 10pp***
Completed min.
(prof.) high school 98% 98% 55% 46% 25% 43pp*** 52pp***
University degree 62% 60% 0% 0% 0% 62pp*** 60pp***
Working14 97% 97% 65% 57% 62% 32pp*** 40pp***
N 377 410 516 649 4970
Column (1) and (3) include information on those who have never married, column (2) and (4)
who currently do not have a partner (those unmarried/divorced/widowed and single), column (5)
includes the whole population (including married and with partner). Asterisks indicate significant
difference at 1% (***). Comparisons are: QSAMPY never married to STEP never married;
QSAMPY no partner - STEP no partner. Two sample t-test. Data sources: QSAMPY 2016 and
STEP 2012.
Table 2.1: Comparison between STEP and QSAMPY data
subjects are employed or self-employed. In the STEP sample, only 62% indicate having worked at
least one hour in the last seven days. This percentage goes up only slightly if we only look at those
that have never married.
There are obvious limitations to the comparability between the QSAMPY data collected in
2016 and the STEP data in 2012. The marriage age between 2012 and 2016 presumably increased,
as did educational attainments. However, the difference in the average age is unlikely to just be
driven by an increase in the marriage age. Also, the striking difference in educational levels is very
unlikely to be driven by a general increase in education. We argue that those represented by their
parents at Green Lake Park are older than the average unmarried population. They also have a
higher social status measured in educational levels and employment rates. The Green Lake Park
search platform seems to be a specialized platform attracting educated working individuals that
are above the average marriage age.
2.3.5 Comparison: The student sample
As a comparison group, we collected data from 283 students at the Yunnan Normal University.
Students were randomly approached in front of the student canteens. Students are commonly used
for surveys about marriage preferences because they are generally unmarried but of marriageable
age. The results obtained from this sample can easily be compared with other studies. Also, one
might wonder if parents’ preferences are actually decisive for the marriage choice. Do they differ
from those of their adult children? Comparing students’ preferences to parents’ preferences shows
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where they overlap and where not.
The student sample has obvious drawbacks. First, the students are not the children of the
parents we interview but a distinct sample with different characteristics. Second, students are not
necessarily looking for a long-term partner at the time of the interview. Thus, they might not
have very clear preferences or confound them with preferences they have for a current short-term
partner. This is a common drawback of stated preferences.
The student sample is female biased: 57% of the respondents are women. However, this reflects
the university population where women are over-represented. The average age is 21. The student
sample is more ethnically diverse. 82% of the students are Han Chinese, 5% Bai, 5% Yi and 8%
from other ethnicities. Only 11% of the students are from the city of Kunming. The majority
(65%) are from another place in Yunnan and 23% from another province. The student sample is,
therefore, more heterogeneous in terms of ethnicity, origin and religion. At the same time, it is
more homogeneous in terms of age and education.
2.4 Preference Estimation
2.4.1 Hypothetical profiles
During the interviews, respondents were shown four pairs of hypothetical profiles. The profiles
had information about age, income, education, ethnicity and real estate ownership. We asked re-
spondents to state if the profile represents a person that they would want their eligible subject to
meet (“meet choice”). Afterwards, they were asked which profile of the two they preferred (“pref-
erence choice”). For the “meet choice”, we have 8 observations per respondent. For the “preference
choice”, we have 4 observations per respondent. In this chapter, we focus on the “meet choice”,
however, the preferences derived from the “preferred choice” are essentially the same (compare the
results to table 2.10 in the appendix). The profiles were clearly described as hypothetical and the
answers were not incentivized. The choice data, thus, do not provide revealed preferences. How-
ever, respondents are about to choose who they want their eligible subject to meet at the park.
They have thought about which characteristics they prefer and are about to evaluate the same
information. They do not have an incentive to deviate from the strategy they use for their actual
choices. Therefore, stated preferences are presumably close to revealed preferences in this context.
The advantage of the hypothetical choice data is that characteristics are randomly created. In
other studies, the choice set is restricted due to platform entry or first sign of interest (e.g. Banerjee
et al. (2013) and Hitsch et al. (2010)). The only dimension the choice set was restricted is age.
Before the respondents saw the profiles, they could choose the age category they were interested
in. Respondents had to choose between the ranges: 20 to 39 year old, 30 to 49 years old, 40 to 59
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years old and over 50 years old. The age brackets each include 20 years or more. On the one hand,
we wanted to avoid repeatedly showing participants profiles that were far off the desired age range.
On the other hand, we wanted to observe until which age difference they found profiles acceptable.
Thus, the age brackets encompassed 20 years or more.
Figure 2.5 displays an example profile pair. The educational level was drawn from junior high
school degree (junior middle school), senior high school degree, university (bachelor) degree and
graduate (masters degree).15 High school degree and university degree had a higher likelihood of
being drawn for the creation of the profile. This was designed to avoid participants’ facing several
unacceptable profiles. The indicated monthly income indicated between 2000 Yuan and 8000 Yuan.
The ethnicity was either Han, Yi or Dai, with Han ethnicity having a higher likelihood to be on
the profile. Real estate property indicated either “yes” or “no” with the same likelihood and was
not further specified. The profiles mimic information that participants usually share with others
at the park via written CV.
Figure 2.5: English example for the hypothetical profiles that were shown to respondents.
2.4.2 Estimation Framework
In theory, participants agree to a meeting if they expect the utility generated by the potential
match to be higher than their “reservation utility” which is the utility of staying single and con-
tinuing the search. We define the utility a woman w gets from marrying a man m as uw(m) and
the utility a man m gets from marrying a woman w a um(w). We denote the reservation utility
of women w vw and the reservation utility of man m vm . We can then define the probability of
the respondents indicating that they would want their subject to meet the person described in the
profile as the probability that the utility derived from the match is higher than the reservation
utility:
Prob(Meet = 1) = Prob(uw(m)− vw ≥ 0) (2.1)
15Education is officially mandatory until the completion of junior high school (9 years of education). Afterwards,
students can decide to continue schooling at different types of senior high school (regular or vocational) for three
years which was not further specified in the profiles.
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This method is derived from the model of Adachi (2003) and also used in Hitsch et al. (2010).
We can parametrize the utility function of woman w uw(m) as a function of the man m’s observed
characteristics, how they interact with woman w’s characteristics plus an unobserved term that
captures unobserved characteristics including how well the two get along:
uw(m) = f(m,w
′m, θ) + ǫw,m (2.2)
with θ being the parameters to estimate.
Assuming ǫw,m is i.i.d. with the standard logistic distribution, we can derive the binomial logistic
regression:
Prob(Meet = 1) = Prob(f(m,w′m, θ)− vw ≥ 0) =
exp(f(m,w′m, θ)− vw)
1 + exp(f(m,w′m, θ)− vw)
(2.3)
This equation can now be estimated using a logit regression. We control for vw/vm by including
individual fixed effects since we have repetitive choices. However, this implies that respondents
that always stated either ‘yes’ or ‘no’ to all profiles, are discarded from the estimation.
2.4.3 Results: Parents
We run a logit regression with the dependent variable being the meeting indicator. The indicator
equals 1 if the respondent would want the eligible subject to meet the person described in the profile.
The results are displayed in table 2.2. We look at men and women separately. At first, the whole
sample is included. We then split the sample between those where the eligible sample does and
does not have a university degree (including a college degree which is more applied). The reference
category for education is “Profile: Only Junior High School”. We include individual fixed effects
and cluster standard errors at the individual level. The coefficients display average marginal effects.
In table 2.3, the educational levels and income are replaced by the difference between the eligi-
ble subject’s educational level/income and the profile’s educational level/income. There are some
missing values particularly for the eligible subject’s income. Thus, this specification has fewer ob-
servations. There is too little variation in the ethnicity of the eligible subject (most of them are Han
Chinese). We can unfortunately not distinguish if individuals prefer a spouse with Han ethnicity
or with the same ethnicity.
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Dependent variable: Indicator of wanting to meet
Female eligible subject Male eligible subject
all w/o degree with degree all all w/o degree with degree all
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Profile: HS degree 0.117∗∗∗ 0.141∗∗ 0.113∗∗∗ 0.114∗∗ 0.129∗∗∗ 0.107+ 0.208∗∗∗ 0.115∗∗
(0.0306) (0.0717) (0.0319) (0.0444) (0.0458) (0.0658) (0.0499) (0.0460)
Profile: Undergraduate degree 0.304∗∗∗ 0.240∗∗∗ 0.334∗∗∗ 0.301∗∗∗ 0.161∗∗∗ 0.0650 0.314∗∗∗ 0.147∗∗∗
(0.0340) (0.0717) (0.0424) (0.0641) (0.0472) (0.0696) (0.0589) (0.0476)
Profile: Graduate degree 0.362∗∗∗ 0.228∗∗∗ 0.416∗∗∗ 0.358∗∗∗ 0.123∗∗ -0.0614 0.392∗∗∗ 0.0983∗
(0.0436) (0.0784) (0.0502) (0.0688) (0.0559) (0.0768) (0.0713) (0.0549)
Profile: Han ethnicity 0.0507∗∗ 0.0985∗∗ 0.0265 0.0490∗∗ 0.0342 0.00970 0.0547 0.0268
(0.0227) (0.0451) (0.0256) (0.0223) (0.0313) (0.0381) (0.0466) (0.0311)
Profile: Log(income) 0.163∗∗∗ 0.178∗∗∗ 0.146∗∗∗ 0.161∗∗∗ -0.0320 -0.109∗∗ 0.0754 -0.0366
(0.0287) (0.0533) (0.0345) (0.0304) (0.0405) (0.0527) (0.0584) (0.0406)
Age difference (+) -0.0236∗∗∗ -0.0171∗∗ -0.0259∗∗∗ -0.0202∗∗∗ -0.0481∗∗∗ -0.0528∗∗∗ -0.0448∗∗∗ -0.0499∗∗∗
(0.00416) (0.00714) (0.00514) (0.00736) (0.00930) (0.0144) (0.0123) (0.0109)
Age difference (-) -0.0454∗∗∗ -0.0249∗∗ -0.0545∗∗∗ -0.0711∗∗∗ 0.0102∗ 0.00609 0.0103+ 0.0567∗∗∗
(0.00684) (0.0106) (0.00970) (0.0121) (0.00525) (0.00731) (0.00666) (0.0143)
Profile: Owns real estate 0.0724∗∗∗ 0.0842∗ 0.0695∗∗ 0.0742∗∗∗ 0.0282 0.0286 0.0449 0.0247
(0.0260) (0.0452) (0.0309) (0.0236) (0.0294) (0.0391) (0.0415) (0.0283)
Age difference (+) squared -0.000437 0.00127∗∗∗
(0.000474) (0.000338)
Age difference (-) squared 0.00284∗∗∗ -0.00376∗∗∗
(0.000771) (0.00102)
Observations 1726 502 1224 1726 1184 656 528 1184
Note: Logit regression including individual fixed effects, coefficients indicate average marginal effects, standard errors, clustered on the individuals
level, are in parenthesis. Female eligible subject = respondent is choosing on behalf of a woman; male eligible subject = respondent is choosing on
behalf of a man. Reference category for education: “Profile: Only Junior High School”. “HS” is the abbreviation for high school. Age difference is
calculated at the age of the profile minus the age of the eligible subject. Source: QSAMPY 2016
Table 2.2: Estimation using hypothetical choice data and the question which profile the respondent would like their eligible subject to
meet.
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Dependent variable: Indicator of wanting to meet
Female eligible subject Male eligible subject
all w/o degree with degree all w/o degree with degree
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Educational difference (+) 0.0437 0.00530 0.0937∗∗ -0.0444 -0.0473 0.0434
(0.0305) (0.0429) (0.0453) (0.0318) (0.0375) (0.0597)
Educational difference (-) -0.176∗∗∗ -0.154∗∗∗ -0.173∗∗∗ -0.119∗∗∗ -0.0420 -0.149∗∗∗
(0.0193) (0.0484) (0.0213) (0.0273) (0.0476) (0.0301)
Profile: Han ethnicity 0.0461∗∗ 0.0875∗ 0.0240 0.0319 0.0106 0.0497
(0.0227) (0.0457) (0.0256) (0.0316) (0.0406) (0.0481)
Income difference (+) 0.130∗∗ 0.177∗∗ 0.0831 -0.0595 -0.114 0.0715
(0.0521) (0.0902) (0.0684) (0.0727) (0.0928) (0.119)
Income difference (-) -0.190∗∗∗ -0.171+ -0.192∗∗∗ -0.00854 0.0944 -0.0802
(0.0465) (0.107) (0.0503) (0.0609) (0.0916) (0.0773)
Age difference (+) -0.0233∗∗∗ -0.0171∗∗ -0.0259∗∗∗ -0.0500∗∗∗ -0.0515∗∗∗ -0.0480∗∗∗
(0.00421) (0.00707) (0.00520) (0.00954) (0.0148) (0.0131)
Age difference (-) -0.0445∗∗∗ -0.0213∗∗ -0.0547∗∗∗ 0.00865∗ 0.00495 0.0106+
(0.00709) (0.0105) (0.00971) (0.00522) (0.00747) (0.00695)
Profile: Owns real estate 0.0703∗∗∗ 0.0865∗ 0.0670∗∗ 0.0326 0.0222 0.0508
(0.0263) (0.0451) (0.0309) (0.0299) (0.0408) (0.0420)
Observations 1694 486 1208 1152 640 512
Note: Logit regression including individual fixed effects, coefficients indicate average marginal effects,
standard errors clustered on the individual level are in parenthesis. Female eligible subject = respondent is
choosing on behalf of a woman; male eligible subject = respondent is choosing on behalf of a man. The
differences are calculated at the characteristic of the profile minus the characteristic of the eligible subject.
Source: QSAMPY 2016
Table 2.3: Estimation using hypothetical choice data and the question which profile the respondent
would like their eligible subject to meet.
2.4.3.1 Results for Women
We first have a look at spousal preferences when the eligible subject is a woman. The respon-
dents are thus looking for a son-in-law.
• Education: The likelihood of wanting a meeting increases significantly with the educational
level of the profile. This holds for both female subjects with and without a university degree
(table 2.2 column 1 to 3). On average, a profile with a graduate degree is 36 percentage
points more likely to be chosen to meet than one with only junior high school. The marginal
effect of education is higher when the female subject has a university degree herself. We find
that respondents dislike male profiles with a lower educational level (see table 2.3). When
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the female eligible subject has a university degree, respondents have a preference for male
profiles with higher education.
• Income and Real Estate: Respondent prefer male profiles with higher income. A profile
with double the income has a 16 percentage point higher likelihood to be selected. The
coefficient is higher for women who do not have a university degree but not significantly
so. In table 2.3 we see that for respondents with a university-educated female subject, it is
important that the man earns as much as her, but not necessarily more than her.
Owning real estate also increases the likelihood of being selected by around 7 percentage
points. This holds for female subjects with and without a university degree.
• Age: Respondents dislike a negative and a positive age difference between the eligible subject
and the profile. They prefer someone of a similar age. We include squared terms of the age
variables (table 2.2 column 7). Figure 2.6 shows the average predicted likelihoods. Respon-
dents dislike a negative age difference more than a positive age difference. For a positive age
difference, the predicted likelihood is slowly decreasing (only 2 percentage points per year).
Figure 2.6: Female subjects: The predicted likelihood of choosing the profile according to the age
difference (age of profile minus age of eligible subject).
• Ethnicity: Only respondents choosing on behalf of a female subject without a university
degree have a preference for Han ethnicity. They are around 10 percentage points more likely
to select a profile that states “Han ethnicity” than one of the minority ethnicities.
2.4.3.2 Results for Men
We now look at spousal preferences when the eligible subject is a man. Respondents are thus
looking for a daughter-in-law.
• Education: When the male subject has a university degree respondents prefer educated
female profiles. For university-educated subjects, a profile with an undergraduate degree has
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a 31 percentage point higher likelihood to be selected than one that has only a high school
degree (table 2.3 column 6). This does not hold for subjects that do not have a university
degree. Educational preferences for subjects without tertiary education are insignificant.
We do not find evidence for a dislike of “too educated” women. The coefficients for higher
and lower education that the subject has are negative, but far from being significant (table
2.3 column 6). For men with a university degree, respondents dislike profiles with a lower
educational degree. They do not have significant preferences for a higher degree either.
• Income and Real Estate: Respondents choosing on behalf of subjects without a university
degree have a dislike for high income. For those choosing on behalf of men with a university
degree the coefficient is positive but not significant. Looking at the relative income, none
on the coefficients are significant. It is still interesting that the signs are opposite. For men
without a university degree, respondents might be less likely to select the profile when the
woman earns more than the man. This might be the opposite for men with a university
degree. There is no significant preference for the spouse owning real estate.
• Age: Respondents dislike a positive age difference where the woman is older than the eligible
subject. Introducing squared terms (column 8), we find that respondents prefer younger
women but this preferences decreases with the age difference. Looking at figure 2.7, we see
the dislike of (much) older woman on the right panel and a preference for younger women
on the left panel. The mathematically optimal age difference based on the coefficient lies at
15.08 years. Yet, we have less power at higher age differences and do not know if preferences
are decreasing afterwards.
Figure 2.7: Male subjects: The predicted likelihood of choosing the profile according to the age
difference (age of profile minus age of eligible subject).
• Ethnicity: The variable for ethnicity is not significant.
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2.4.4 Results: Students
The results from the student sample are displayed in table 2.4. Since the students have not
entered the labour market, we do not know how much income they will earn. Furthermore, we do
not know their realized educational level. We therefore only run the estimation with income and
education level, but not differences.
• Age: Female students have a preference for meeting someone with a similar age. They have
a clear dislike of meeting a man who is younger than themselves. Male students have a dislike
for meeting someone who is older. They seem to be indifferent between someone who has the
same age and someone who is younger.
• Education: Both male and female students have a strong preference for someone who is
educated. The likelihood of the profile being chosen for a meeting is the highest with a
graduate degree when a woman is choosing and an undergraduate degree when a man is
choosing.
• Ethnicity: Both male and female students have a preference for Han Chinese.
• Income and Real estate: Both male and female students have a preferences for higher
income. Interestingly, the coefficient for male students is nearly as high as the coefficient for
female students. Female students have a preference for someone who has real estate.
2.4.5 What do we learn from the preferences?
In our dataset, we find that respondents have preferences for male profiles with at least as
much education as the female subject. For educated female subjects, respondents clearly have
increasing preferences: the more education the better. We see the same patterns among female
students. Respondents searching on behalf of men with a university degree also prefer educated
profiles. The coefficient for a negative educational difference is high. This making education one
of the key characteristics. We see the same among male students, who place high importance on
female profiles having a university degree. Yet, when the man does not have a university degree,
education is not important. Overall, we do not find evidence for a dislike of “over-educated” women.
Preferences for age are endogamic for respondents searching on behalf of a female subject and
female students: they prefer male profiles with a similar age. Yet, they are more tolerant of the man
being older than younger. Male students and respondents have a dislike against the female profile
being older. There is weak evidence that they favour younger female profiles. Yet, the coefficients
are only clearly significant in the non-linear form in the pooled parents sample.
Thus, even though there is no explicit dislike of educated women, there might be a weak prefer-
ence against the combination of being educated and older. Consider a respondent choosing between
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Dependent variable:
Indicator for selecting ‘meet’ option
Female subject Men subject
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Profile: HS degree 0.177∗∗∗ 0.178∗∗∗ 0.121∗∗∗ 0.118∗∗∗
(0.0427) (0.0427) (0.0456) (0.0457)
Profile: Undergraduate degree 0.371∗∗∗ 0.371∗∗∗ 0.376∗∗∗ 0.374∗∗∗
(0.0450) (0.0449) (0.0499) (0.0501)
Profile: Graduate degree 0.429∗∗∗ 0.433∗∗∗ 0.297∗∗∗ 0.303∗∗∗
(0.0520) (0.0518) (0.0590) (0.0589)
Profile: Han ethnicity 0.140∗∗∗ 0.137∗∗∗ 0.140∗∗∗ 0.101∗∗∗ 0.105∗∗∗ 0.0926∗∗∗
(0.0271) (0.0269) (0.0271) (0.0321) (0.0319) (0.0328)
Profile: Log(income) 0.215∗∗∗ 0.215∗∗∗ 0.217∗∗∗ 0.154∗∗∗ 0.155∗∗∗ 0.148∗∗∗
(0.0328) (0.0328) (0.0326) (0.0335) (0.0334) (0.0337)
Age difference (+) -0.0263∗∗∗ -0.0103 -0.0265∗∗∗ -0.0457∗∗∗ -0.0670∗∗∗ -0.0444∗∗∗
(0.00427) (0.0122) (0.00427) (0.00709) (0.0150) (0.00724)
Age difference (-) -0.0757∗∗∗ -0.0342 -0.0764∗∗∗ -0.0115 0.00687 -0.0115
(0.0127) (0.0445) (0.0126) (0.00882) (0.0259) (0.00898)
Profile: Owns real estate 0.0665∗∗ 0.0655∗∗ 0.0625∗∗ 0.0374 0.0379 0.0337
(0.0305) (0.0306) (0.0303) (0.0393) (0.0396) (0.0392)
Age difference (+) squared -0.000957 0.00194∗
(0.000750) (0.00112)
Age difference (-) squared -0.00665 -0.00380
(0.00705) (0.00324)
Educational difference (+) 0.105∗∗∗ 0.0130
(0.0301) (0.0379)
Educational difference (-) -0.199∗∗∗ -0.205∗∗∗
(0.0263) (0.0258)
Observations 1168 1168 1168 930 930 930
Note: Logit regression including individual fixed effects, coefficients indicate average marginal effects,
standard errors are in parenthesis. Source: QSAMPY 2016
Table 2.4: Student Sample: Estimation using hypothetical choice data and the question which
profile the respondent would like to meet.
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a woman with a high school degree and a woman with a university degree with the same age as
the male subject. Everything else equal, the average respondent would choose the woman with the
university degree. This advantage can be offset if the less educated woman is ten years younger
than the male subject. However, if the university-educated woman was a couple of years older
than the male subject, the less educated women would only have to be two years younger than her
to make up for the educational disadvantage. The trade-off is stronger for male subjects without
tertiary education, as the respondents do not place any significant value on education.
Respondents and students generally prefer high-income male profiles with real estate (table
2.2). For female subjects without a university degree, preferences for income are increasing. For
university-educated female subjects, respondents prefer men who earn at least as much income as
the female subject. Earning more than her is not as important. We cannot verify this preference
among female students as they have not yet entered the labour market. We find support for the
idea that for men having real estate is important in the marriage market. However, the marginal
effects on education are much higher. A university degree compared to junior high school increases
the likelihood of being selected by parents by 30 percentage points and 37 percentage point by stu-
dents. Senior high school compared to junior high school, increases the likelihood by 11 percentage
points (18 percentage points for students). Having real estate increases the chances to be selected
by only 7 percentage points.
On the other side of the market, respondents searching on behalf of men without a university
degree dislike female profiles with high income (table 2.2). Combined with table 2.3, it seems that
the dislike is only towards those who earn more than the male eligible subject. Yet, for men with
a university degree and male students, we do not find this preference.
Overall, we find that educated women with high income have good chances among those that
they themselves prefer: men with education. There is a weak preference among respondents search-
ing on behalf of men without a university degree against women who earn more. Yet, those searching
on behalf of such women have a stronger preference against such men. The same holds for education.
Respondents searching on behalf of men without a university degree do not place any significant
value on tertiary education. Yet, those searching on behalf of university-educated women and fe-
male students have a strong preference against these less educated men. For men with a university
degree and male students - the “target group” of respondents searching on behalf of a female sub-
ject and of female students - respondents place value on education and show no signs of a dislike
for the women being more educated or having more income.
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2.5 Comparison with marriage patterns
The estimated preferences offer interesting insights into the likes and dislikes of parents and
young adults. However, can they explain the marriage patterns in the general population? This
question is crucial as our two samples are not representative of the general population. What
claims can we make about marriage preferences in the general population? Furthermore, we do not
know how much influence parents and individuals have over mate choice. Are parents’ or students’
preferences more reflected in the general marriage pattern?
To address these questions, we connect our preference and questionnaire data to the recent
marriage patterns in the general population. We first look at the accepted levels of education
and age. We then simulate marriages based on the estimated preferences and compare simulated
marriages with real marriages.
2.5.1 Stated acceptance limits
Respondents at the park were asked which level of education and age they would accept for
their daughter- or son-in-law. For these variables, they indicated a lower and an upper bound of
what would be acceptable. They could also choose “no limit”. The lower and upper bounds then
give us acceptance sets for men and women: all those that lie between the limits are “acceptable”
to parents. When the acceptance sets overlap, matches are agreeable by both parties and thus
feasible. The area where acceptance sets overlap is called the correspondence set. Students also
answered these question - however, they are of less interest because students are homogeneous in
age and education. We focus on how the acceptance limits for age and education and investigate
how they vary with the age and education of the eligible subject.
Asking respondents about their acceptable limits is similar to asking individuals about their
willingness-to-accept for an object without incentivizing the answer. Yet, in our case, respondents
are about to select potential suitors in real life and this question asks them about the decision rule
that they are just now employing. However, the answers should not be interpreted as the limits
if there is clearly no other option, but as the cut-off that they are currently employing which may
change over time. Therefore, they reflect also what they aspire their son- or daughter-in-law to be
like.
The acceptance limits for education are displayed in figure 2.8. The lower and upper bounds
for female eligible subjects are illustrated in red. They vary with the female subject’s education
which is displayed along the x-axis. For male subjects, the lower and upper bounds are drawn
in blue and vary with the subject’s educational level displayed along the y-axis. The shaded ar-
eas illustrate the 95% confidence intervals. The area between the dotted line and the triangle line
each represent the acceptance sets. The correspondence set is where the two acceptance sets overlap.
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We observe that the lower bounds for education are increasing in the eligible subject’s educa-
tion for both men and women. Furthermore, the upper bounds are high for both male and female
eligible subjects. For example, parents searching on behalf of a female subject with a high school
degree would accept men with at least a high school degree and at most a university degree. Parents
searching on behalf of a male subject with a high school degree half expect the wife to have at
least middle school, half expect at least high school. Some might reject a woman with a university
degree, but most would not.
The correspondence set, where the acceptance sets overlap, is bounded by the lower bounds
on both sides. This implies that if one side agrees to a match, it is possible that the other side
rejects because the proposed person does not have sufficient education. However, a match that is
agreeable to one side, would not be rejected by the other side because of too much education.
It is also clear that the matches that are agreeable to both sides are along the 45 degree line:
when men and women have the same educational levels. In figure 2.9, we add the information about
recently married couples in the general population from the CFPS 2014. The bigger the circle, the
higher the frequency of couples at this point. Unfortunately, we do not have information on the
limits when the female subjects does not have a high school degree.
For women with a high school degree or higher, 48% are married to a partner who falls within
the acceptance set. This increases to 63% when we include the 95% confidence intervals. These
results are summarized in table 2.11 in the appendix. In particular, many women with a high
school degree are married to a husband who has less education than what we would expect based
on the acceptance sets. Parents want their high school educated daughters to marry someone who
has a higher educational level. However, as we can see in figure 2.8, most marry someone with a
high school degree and several marry a man with only middle school education.
For men with a middle school degree or higher, 77% are married to a woman who falls within the
acceptance set. It increases to 91% when we include the confidence intervals. These high numbers
are due to parents not having high expectations for their daughter-in-law’s education. They usually
accept women with the same education or one level lower than their son, which encompasses nearly
all of the matches that we observe in the general population.
Overall, 47% of the population fall within the estimated correspondence set, 63% if we include
the confidence intervals. Therefore, more than half of the marriages in the general population would
have been accepted by the parents that we interviewed. However, parents who search on behalf of
an educated daughter might not always have realistic lower educational bounds.
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Upper and lower levels that respondents indicated that they would accept as the educational level
for the partner of their eligible subject. Responses on behalf of female subjects are displayed on
the x-axis. Responses on behalf of male subjects are displayed on the y-axis.
Figure 2.8: Education: Acceptance Sets
The acceptance sets for age are displayed in figure 2.10. Again, the lower and upper limits for
female subjects are illustrated in red and vary along the subject’s age on the x-axis. The lower and
upper limits for male subjects are illustrated in blue and vary along the y-axis.
For age, parents searching on behalf of male and female subjects indicated lower and upper
bounds (nobody chooses“no limit”). These bounds are clearly increasing with own age. The ac-
cepted age span is usually around 7 year, except for men below the age of 30, where parents have
smaller acceptable age spans. Until around the age of 30, the lower limits are bounding the corre-
spondence set: parents of young female subjects want the husband to be older than their daughter.
Interestingly, parents of young male subjects do not want them to have a wife that is considerably
younger. After the age of around 30, the upper limits are binding. Parents of older female subjects
would accept husbands that are around the same age or slightly younger or older, but not one
who is considerably older. Parents of older male subjects expect the wife to be younger. The
correspondence set gets small toward the end of the 30s.
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Upper and lower levels that respondents indicated that they would accept as the educational level
for the partner of their eligible subject. Responses on behalf of female subjects are displayed on
the x-axis. Responses on behalf of male subjects are displayed on the y-axis. Circles display
actual marriages taken from the CFPS 2014.
Figure 2.9: Education: Acceptance Sets with frequency of recent marriages
We overlay the information of marriage outcomes from the general population in figure 2.11.
Most people get married in their 20s. Most marriage are in the correspondence set, however, they
are bunched around the lower bound of the female subjects. The statistics can be found in table
2.12 in the appendix. Indeed, for women up to 26, as well as for men up to 34, nearly all spouses
fall into the estimated acceptance set with confidence intervals (86% to 100%). The numbers are
smaller for women between 27 and 34 and men between 35 and 38. The share is also small for the
age group over 41, which is very broad but encompasses few observations.
Overall, 40% of couples lie in the correspondence set, 72% in the correspondence set with the
confidence intervals. Most marriages that lie outside of the parents’ correspondence set involve
women between 27 and 34 - whose parents want slightly older sons-in-law (but there are also some
who are too old) - or men between 35 and 38 where parents want younger daughter-in-laws.
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Upper and lower levels that respondents indicated that they would accept as the age for the
partner of their eligible subject. Responses on behalf of female subjects are displayed on the
x-axis. Responses on behalf of male subjects are displayed on the y-axis.
Figure 2.10: Acceptance Sets on Age
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Upper and lower levels that respondents indicated that they would accept as the age for the
partner of their eligible subject. Responses on behalf of female subjects are displayed on the
x-axis. Responses on behalf of male subjects are displayed on the y-axis. Circles display actual
marriages taken from the CFPS 2014.
Figure 2.11: Acceptance Sets on Age with frequency of recent marriages
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2.5.2 Match Simulation
2.5.2.1 Estimation
Can the estimated preference explain current marriage patterns? Marriage is a two-sided match-
ing problem. Outcomes are the combination of preferences on both side. We simulate marriages
where the previously estimated preferences determine the demand function and the characteristics
of the general population determine the supply.
From the China Family Panel Study (2014) we have information on the educational levels
and the age of both spouses for marriages that were formed between 2012 and 2014. We use
these observation as supply of husbands and wives. For each woman w (man m), we predict the
likelihood of choosing each man m (women w) based on equation 2.3 and the estimated parameters
of θ. We denote this likelihood the “selection likelihood”. In the profile taks this is equivalent to
the respondent selecting the (male) profile p on behalf of the (female) eligible subject i. Denote Yip
the indicator for denoting “yes” to profile p for subject i. We use θ from three specifications:
• Specification 1 (Baseline): Includes the age and educational difference (profile minus eligible
subject):
Yip = θ1∆Ageip + θ2∆Educationip + ǫip (2.4)
• Specification 2: Includes the educational difference interacted with an indicator if the subject
has a university degree and the age difference:
Yip = θ1∆Ageip + θ˜2∆Educationip
′ uni degreei + ǫip (2.5)
• Specification 3: Includes age difference interacted with an indicator if the subject is over 30
and educational difference interacted with an indicator if the subject has a university degree:
Yip = θ˜1∆Ageip
′ over 30yi + θ˜2∆Educationip
′ uni degreei + ǫip (2.6)
Specifications 2 and 3 each add an interaction term and thus estimate group-specific prefer-
ences. The groups are eligible subjects with and without a university degree and eligible subjects
being older and younger than 30. This has the advantage that we can account for characteristic-
dependent preferences and potentially get point estimates that are closer to the true preferences.
However, since some of the groups do not have many observations in our data set, we also introduce
more noise in the estimates. Faced with this trade-off, we run and interpret all three specifications.
The higher the predicted selection likelihood of a woman w for men m (Yˆwm), the higher the
utility woman w derives from being matched with men m (see equation 2.1). The predicted se-
lection likelihood thus gives us a cardinal ranking: The man with the highest selection likelihood
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is the woman’s first choice, the man with the second highest selection likelihood is the woman’s
second choice and so forth.
The marriage market simulation works as followed: Men propose to the woman that they rank
highest based on the predicted selection likelihood. A woman with one proposal stays with the
proposer. A woman who received more than one proposal selects the man that she ranks highest
among them and rejects the others. In the second round, the rejected men propose to the woman
that they attribute the second highest rank. Women then repeat their selection among the propos-
als. This is repeated until all individuals are matched.
This matching process corresponds to the man-proposing Gale-Sharpley mechanism (Gale and
Shapley (1962)). The resulting matches are stable. A match is defined as stable if neither of the
two spouses can find a better match (Roth and Sotomayor (1992)). However, the matches are not
unique. Furthermore, we have several individuals with the same characteristics (age and educa-
tion) such that they get attributed the same likelihood. The ranking function is programmed to
randomly rank individuals with the same likelihood. The matching process is thus repeated 100
times. At the end, we take the average of the match’s characteristics over each matching process. In
order to verify the robustness of the resulting distribution, we also run the algorithm with women
making the proposals and men rejecting and accepting proposals (woman-proposing Gale-Sharpley
mechanism).
The Gale-Shapley mechanisms forces all women and men to match. There is no option to stay
unmarried. This implies that there could be matches that would not form because one side would
rather prefer to stay single. To address this issue, we calculate the lowest selection likelihood that
is observed in the real outcome data for each specification: For each women w and each man m,
we predict the selection likelihood of their actual spouse, based on θ. We determine the minimum
of the selection likelihoods for women and men respectively as the minimum thresholds. We can
then compute how many individuals have a lower selection likelihood from their simulated match
than their sex-specific minimum threshold.
2.5.2.2 Results
Table 2.13 in the appendix displays the results for θ for the three specifications for men and
women. These marginal effects are then used to calculate the demand function. As students are
always high educated and below 30, we can only use specification 1.
The frequency histogram of the actual educational difference between husband and wife and the
simulated educational difference, based on parents’ and students’ preferences, are displayed in fig-
ure 2.12 for the men-proposing Gale-Shapley mechanism. The histograms for the women-proposing
mechanism is displayed in figure 2.14 in the appendix. Table 2.5 summarizes the characteristics of
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real outcome distribution and the four predicted distributions: the correlation coefficient for the
matched couples’ levels, the coefficient of variation for the differences between the matched couples’
levels, the most common case (mode) and the share of matches with the same level.
Specification 1 based on parents’ and students’ preferences predict matches that are more as-
sortative on education than what is observed in the actual distribution. More couples would form
between husband and wife having exactly the same educational level. Specification 2 and speci-
fication 3 based on parents’ preferences, however, predict less assortative matches. Specification
2 and 3 based on parents’ preferences lead to a higher coefficient of variation in the educational
differences between spouses and to a lower correlation between the spouses’ educational levels.
The same graphs for the age differences between husband and wife are displayed in figure 2.13
(men-proposing) and 2.15 (women-proposing, in the appendix). Specification 1 based on students
preferences predicts again more matches with the same age level. All specification based on parents’
preferences shift the peak of the distribution to the right - where husbands are older than their
wives. In the actual distribution, the modal point is at the husband and the wife having the same
age. In the predicted distributions based on parents’ preferences, the modal point is at the husband
being 2 years older than the wife in specifications 1 and 2. In specification 3, the mode is at the
husband being 3 years older. Again, specifications 2 and 3 based on parents preferences predict
distributions with a higher coefficient of variation and lower correlations between the age of spouses.
We calculate how many women and men have a lower selection likelihood for their simulated
match that the minimum threshold. In specification 1 and 2 based on parents’ preferences and
specification 1 based on students’ preferences, no woman has a lower selection likelihood than
the minimum selection likelihood of real matches. Only in specification 3, 3 women have a lower
likelihood than the minimum threshold. For men, it is the reverse: In specification 1 based on
parents’ preferences, 2 men have a lower selection likelihood that the minimum that men receive
from their actual match. In specification 2, 3 men fulfill this criteria and 2 men in specification
1 based on students’ preferences. However, in specification 3, all men have a selection likelihood
higher than the minimum threshold. As these numbers are small, deleting them from the sample
does not change the distributions significantly.
2.5.3 Discussion
The first observation is that specification 1 with parents’ and students’ preferences predicts a
higher degree of assortativity on education and age. The share of matches with the same educa-
tional level is 71% based on students’ preferences and 78% based on parents’ preferences. In the
16Pearson’s Correlation Coefficient
17The coefficient of variation of the difference between the spouses.
18Pearson’s Correlation Coefficient
19The coefficient of variation of the difference between the spouses.
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(a) Specification 1 - parents’ preferences (b) Specification 2 - parents’ preferences
(c) Specification 3 - parents’ preferences (d) Specification 1 - students’ preferences
Note: Graphs show the actual distribution of the educational difference between husband and
wife, taken from the CFPS 2014, including marriages formed between 2012 and 2014. The
simulated distribution is based on the real education of the husband and the simulated education
of the wife. Preferences taken from table 2.13. Uses the men-proposing Gale-Shapley Algorithm.
Figure 2.12: Education: Comparing actual educational differences between husband and wife and
educational differences in simulated matches.
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(a) Specification 1 - parents’ preferences (b) Specification 2 - parents’ preferences
(c) Specification 3 - parents’ preferences (d) Specification 1 - students’ preferences
Note: Graphs show the actual distribution of the age difference between husband and wife, taken
from the CFPS 2014, including marriages formed between 2012 and 2014. The simulated
distribution is based on the real age of the husband and the simulated age of the wife. Preferences
taken from table 2.13. Uses the men-proposing Gale-Shapley Algorithm.
Figure 2.13: Age: Comparing actual educational differences between husband and wife and educa-
tional differences in simulated matches.
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Real Spe. 1 Spe. 2 Spe.3 Spe. 1
distribution Parents Parents Parents Students
Education
Average difference 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05
btw. spouses
Correlation between 0.56 0.44 0.03 0.01 0.56
spouses’ levels16
Coefficient of 20.71 14.78 26.95 27.82 12.01
Variation17
Most common Same level Same level Same level Same level Same level
case (mode)
Share same level 0.45 0.78 0.29 0.31 0.71
Age
Average difference 1.68 1.68 1.68 1.68 1.68
btw. spouses
Correlation between 0.87 0.81 0.61 0.64 0.83
spouses’ levels18
Coefficient of 1.91 2.31 3.33 3.16 2.18
Variation19
Most common Same age Husband Husband Husband Same age
case (mode) 2 years older 2 years older 3 years older
Share same age 0.63 0.72 0.48 0.22 0.84
+/- 2 years
Table 2.5: Comparing real marriage distribution with predicted distributions
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real distribution, the share is only 45%. The share of matches with a small age gap (up to 2 years)
is 72% based on parents’ preferences and 84% based on students’ preferences, compared to 63%
in the real distribution. This higher degree of assortativity can be explained by the lack of search
frictions in the simulation. Search frictions in the marriage market can include search costs or limits
to whom you meet. However, the non-representativeness of our sample can also be an explanation.
The preferences in the general population might be more heterogeneous than the preferences in our
sample.
Specification 2 and 3 lead to higher variation in the differences between the levels of spouses for
both education and age. These specifications have group-specific estimates. These group-specific
estimates, though possibly closer to the true parameters, are also noisier. This is particularly true
for the groups that are under-represented in our survey: those without a university degree and
below 30. Yet, these are the groups that are more represented in the general marriage population.
The noisily measured estimates can explain the low correlation levels and the high coefficients of
variation.
The distributions based on parents’ and students’ preferences display one clear difference: Stu-
dents’ preferences predict the mode of the distribution to be where spouses have the same age.
Parents’ preferences predict the modal point to be at an age difference between 2 and 3 years. In
this case, the students’ preferences are more reflected in the actual outcome data. This could be
because the eligible subjects on whose behalf parents are searching are on average older than the
average marriage age. Parents with an older son might prefer a higher age gap for fertility reasons
- if they believe that the likelihood of having a grand-child is higher if the daughter-in-law is below
30 rather than in her 30s. Yet, accounting for different preferences for eligible subjects above and
below 30 only increases the age gap in the simulations.
We know from section 2.5.1 that when the eligible subjects are in the early or mid-20s, matches
between individuals with the same age are acceptable for parents. It seems that a lot of actual
matches are preferable for students and acceptable for parents. This hints at an interesting dynamic
between parents and their adult children when it comes to spouse choice. This encourages further
research.
When looking at the acceptance sets on age, over 80% of actual husband and wives lie within
the acceptance set of parents. More than 90% of wives fall within the acceptance sets for parents.
Yet, nearly 40% of husbands are outside of the acceptance set of parents. Parents seem to have
excessively high expectations on the educational level of their son-in-law. Again, this could be
due to our non-representative sample. The overall population might have wider acceptance sets
on education. It can also be due to parents having unrealistic expectations about the marriage
outcome of their daughter. To form accurate expectations, parents need to know the distribution
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in types and the preferences rankings for both sides of the market. This implies having information
about the educational distribution of unmarried men and women and their preferences on education.
This might be difficult and costly to obtain. Finally, respondents could also answer this question
strategically. The acceptance sets could give us limits to what they aspire or expect rather than
what they would accept if they had no other choice.
2.6 Conclusion
This chapter investigates marriage sorting and spousal preferences in China. It discusses not
only the preferences of the individual that is single, but also those of their their parents and other
relatives. Marriage is an important institution in China: only 1% of individuals between 40 and
65 have never been married (China Family Panel Study 2014). Parents with children above the
average marriage age might pressure their children or actively search for a suitor themselves. We
interview parents that fall at least into the latter category.
The parents we interviewed see themselves as agents for their children. They often state that
their child is too busy or too shy to search for themselves. They might also search in parallel with
their children. They also rank altruistic search motives as more important that more selfish motives.
Yet, we find that parents’ preferences and preferences of students do not always overlap and
would not lead to the same marriage patterns. Parents seem to have a preference for an age gap
that students do not. This could be due to age preferences changing with the age of the eligible
subject. Parents mostly search on behalf of an eligible subject that are older than students. Yet,
it is also possible that there is a difference between generations. If the latter is true, where would
this come from? One possibility is that the younger generation is more in contact with other indi-
viduals of the opposite sex. This could be due to the increase in time spent on education. Higher
secondary and tertiary education is becoming more and more common in China. It implies that
individuals meet others with the same age (and education) during this time where many couples
form. These meeting opportunities, seeing couples form around them, can shape their preferences.
While matches between spouses with the same age are not necessarily the equilibrium outcome
based on parents’ preferences, they still accept those marriages. This motivates further research
into the dynamics of bargaining over spousal choice.
Both parents’ and students’ preferences predict that most matches form between spouses with
the same level of education. Yet, many parents searching on behalf of a female subject accept only
sons-in-law with a higher educational level. Even if those parents in the end settle for a son-in-law
with the same education, trends in the educational distribution might be worrisome for them. Since
2016, more women are enrolled in tertiary education than men.20 This suggests that in the future,
20According to the UNESCO Institute for Statistics, the gross tertiary female school enrollment rate was 53%
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more women might have to settle for a husband with a lower level of education or stay single.21
2.7 Appendix
2.7.1 Figures
in 2016 and 56% in 2017. Accessed on the World Bank website https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SE.TER.
ENRR.FE?locations=CN in February 2019.
21This chapter is a part of the collaboration of Eva Raiber, Weiwei Ren, Jeanne Bovet, Paul Seabright and Charlotte
Wang. The initiative for the project was started by Eva Raiber, Paul Seabright and Jeanne Bovet. Charlotte Wang
and Weiwei Ren successfully organised and coordinated the cooperation with the Yunnan Normal University. The
questionnaire and the profile task used for this chapter was proposed by Eva Raiber, with important contributions
from all team members, and translated by Weiwei Ren, Charlotte Wang and the Yunnan Normal University student
team. Weiwei Ren, with the support of Charlotte Wang, recruited the student team and trained them with the help
of Eva Raiber and Jeanne Bovet. Weiwei Ren organised and supervised data collection. Data analysis and write up
of the chapter was done by Eva Raiber with inputs from Paul Seabright and comments by the other team members.
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(a) Specification 1 - parents’ preferences (b) Specification 2 - parents’ preferences
(c) Specification 3 - parents’ preferences (d) Specification 1 - students’ preferences
Note: Graphs show the actual distribution of the educational difference between husband and
wife, taken from the CFPS 2014, including marriages formed between 2012 and 2014. The
simulated distribution is based on the real education of the husband and the simulated education
of the wife.
Figure 2.14: Education: women-proposing Gale-Shapley algorithm
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(a) Specification 1 - parents’ preferences (b) Specification 2 - parents’ preferences
(c) Specification 3 - parents’ preferences (d) Specification 1 - students’ preferences
Note: Graphs show the actual distribution of the age difference between husband and wife, taken
from the CFPS 2014, including marriages formed between 2012 and 2014. The simulated
distribution is based on the real age of the husband and the simulated age of the wife.
Figure 2.15: Age: women-proposing Gale-Shapley mechanism
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2.7.2 Tables
Husband: Educational Level by wife: educational level
Wife: Educational Level
Husband: Illiterate Primary Junior Senior College Bachelor’s
Educational Level Semi-literate school HS HS degree
Illiterate/Semi-literate 13 8 4 0 1 0
Primary school 5 32 56 17 2 0
Junior high school 11 39 167 69 11 2
Senior high school 1 12 65 71 36 9
College 0 4 21 38 61 28
Bachelor’s degree 2 3 1 16 39 50
Graduate degree 0 0 0 0 2 7
Total 32 98 314 211 152 96 Note: Includes those that marri
Table 2.6: Educational Levels of husband and wife
Variable Mean Std. Dev. N
Respondent: Female 0.678 0.468 549
Respondent: Mother 0.481 0.5 549
Respondent: Father 0.158 0.366 549
Respondent: Uncle 0.016 0.127 549
Respondent: Aunt 0.053 0.224 549
Respondent: Married 0.915 0.28 410
Respondent: Widowed 0.049 0.216 410
Respondent: Divorced 0.016 0.127 549
Respondent: Retired 0.84 0.367 412
Respondent: Working 0.189 0.392 412
Note: Source QSAMPY 2016
Table 2.7: Summary statistics on respondents
22Mothers and fathers, excluding uncles and aunts and other relatives
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All22 Searching Husband Searching Wife
Mother Father Mother Father
Eligible subject having someone who helps 52% 41% 68% 62% 57%
him/her with household chores .
Eligible subject having someone to take care 86% 85% 79% 90 % 81%
of him/her in time of need (sickness/old-age).
Eligible subject having someone he/she feels 96% 95% 97 % 97 % 98%
affection for.
Having someone to care for you (and 51% 51% 50% 56% 43%
your spouse) when you are older.
Having grandchildren 63% 60% 57% 69% 68%
N 351 170 34 94 53
Source: QSAMPY (2016)
Table 2.8: Share of respondent indicating reason for search as important or very important.
Variable Mean
Age 33.063
(5.292)
Child: Female 0.58
Completed at least (professional) high school 0.98
Completed university degree 0.6
father 0.212
mother 0.644
Child: Has been married 0.08
N 410
Note: Source QSAMPY 2016
Table 2.9: Summary statistics on eligible subjects on whose behalf respondents are searching
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Dependent variable: Indicator of preferring profile 1.
Women Men Women Men Women Men
without univ. degree with univ. degree
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Age difference (1 minus 2) 0.000261 -0.0137∗∗∗ 0.00270 -0.0106∗∗∗ -0.00479 -0.0151∗∗∗
(0.00112) (0.00293) (0.00186) (0.00403) (0.00295) (0.00414)
Diff.education (1 minus 2) 0.0975∗∗∗ 0.0261∗ 0.0817∗∗∗ -0.00292 0.104∗∗∗ 0.0756∗∗∗
(0.0116) (0.0155) (0.0221) (0.0206) (0.0129) (0.0221)
Income difference (1 minus 2) 0.0104∗∗∗ 0.00233 0.0163∗∗∗ -0.00266 0.00851∗∗∗ 0.00699∗
(0.00210) (0.00293) (0.00397) (0.00426) (0.00241) (0.00370)
Real estate diff.(1-2) 0.0510∗∗ 0.0320 0.0382 0.00563 0.0532∗∗ 0.0656∗
(0.0223) (0.0264) (0.0413) (0.0344) (0.0262) (0.0381)
Han ethnicity diff. (1-2) 0.0452∗∗ 0.0240 0.127∗∗∗ 0.00566 0.0132 0.0443
(0.0214) (0.0267) (0.0423) (0.0338) (0.0236) (0.0420)
Observations 932 635 275 347 657 288
Note: Logit regression, coefficients are average marginal effects, standard error in parenthesis are clustered
pm the individual level. Source: QSAMPY 2016
Table 2.10: Estimation using hypothetical choice data and the question which of the two profiles
the respondent prefers for the eligible subject.
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Educational N Average Average Share partners Share Share partners Share
Level Lower bound Upper bound in AC in CS in AC + CI in CS + CI
High School (Level 4) 204 4.09 6.06 0.23 0.58
Women College (Level 5) 161 4.8 6.63 0.7 0.7
University (Level 6) 107 5.37 6.59 0.63 0.63
Total 472 4.62 6.37 0.48 0.63
Middle School (Level 3) 301 2.29 5.71 0.83 0.96
High School (Level 4) 193 3.45 5.78 0.55 0.93
Men College (Level 5) 150 3.82 6.06 0.87 0.87
University (Level 6) 132 4.82 6.4 0.85 0.85
Total 776 3.3 5.91 0.77 0.91
0.47 0.63
Note: Average age, lower and upper bounds according to age categories. Column 5: Share of partners that fall into the acceptance set.
Column 7: Share of partners that fall into the acceptance set plus the 95% confidence intervals. Column 6: Share of matches that are in
the correspondence set. Column 8: Share of women that are in the correspondence set plus the 95% correspondence intervals.
Table 2.11: Lower and upper acceptance bounds on education according to parents112
Age N Average Average Share partners Share in Share partners Share in
category Lower bound Upper bound in AC in CS in AC + CI CS + CI
<23 209 22.5 31.75 0.66 1
23-26 414 24.65 31.24 0.71 0.86
27-30 179 28.13 34.18 0.48 0.64
Women 31-34 46 31.93 38.06 0.48 0.48
35-38 21 35.61 42.17 0.81 0.81
39-41 6 39.17 45.17 0.5 0.5
>41 34 45.73 54.64 0.29 0.68
Total 909 26.35 33.5 0.62 0.82
<23 92 21.33 24.67 0.43 0.97
23-26 364 21.33 25.8 0.65 0.86
27-30 285 23.41 28.53 0.72 0.88
Men 31-34 82 25.1 31.92 0.61 0.9
35-38 35 27.89 33.91 0.46 0.49
39-41 15 29.78 36.89 0.47 0.87
>41 36 34.25 43.19 0.25 0.47
Total 909 23.23 28.28 0.62 0.85
0.4 0.72
Note: Average age, lower and upper bounds according to age categories. Column 5: Share of partners that fall into the acceptance set.
Column 7: Share of partners that fall into the acceptance set plus the 95% confidence intervals. Column 6: Share of matches that are in
the correspondence set. Column 8: Share of women that are in the correspondence set plus the 95% correspondence intervals.
Table 2.12: Lower and upper acceptance bounds on age according to parents
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Dependent variable: Indicator: Select Profile
Female Subject Male Subject Female Male
Students Students
Spe. 1 Spe. 2 Spe. 3 Spe. 1 Spe. 2 Spe. 3 Spe.1 Spe 1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Age Difference (+) −0.129∗∗∗ −0.130∗∗∗ 0.051 −0.166∗∗∗ −0.171∗∗∗ −0.112 −0.0001 −0.099∗∗∗
(0.021) (0.021) (0.073) (0.039) (0.039) (0.136) (0.046) (0.033)
Age Difference (+) Sqrd 0.003∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ −0.008 0.004∗∗ 0.004∗∗ −0.006 −0.004 0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002) (0.013) (0.003) (0.002)
Age Difference (-) −0.388∗∗∗ −0.388∗∗∗ −0.102 0.186∗∗∗ 0.188∗∗∗ 0.411 −0.263 −0.143∗
(0.054) (0.054) (0.235) (0.049) (0.049) (0.282) (0.176) (0.084)
Age Difference (-) Sqrd 0.023∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗ −0.023 −0.015∗∗∗ −0.015∗∗∗ −0.075 −0.012 −0.001
(0.005) (0.005) (0.045) (0.004) (0.004) (0.052) (0.032) (0.012)
Education Diff (+) 0.126 0.017 −0.002 −0.132 −0.115 −0.140 0.255∗∗ 0.142∗
(0.101) (0.206) (0.207) (0.109) (0.153) (0.155) (0.107) (0.080)
Education Diff (-) −0.557∗∗∗ −0.532∗ −0.551∗ −0.276∗∗∗ 0.074 0.051 −0.448∗∗∗ −0.524∗∗∗
(0.079) (0.312) (0.310) (0.089) (0.178) (0.180) (0.100) (0.074)
Indicator: Educated 0.189 0.194 0.096 0.065
(0.230) (0.231) (0.199) (0.201)
Education Diff(+) X Ind.: Educated 0.220 0.236 −0.002 0.048
(0.239) (0.240) (0.231) (0.234)
Education Diff(-) X Ind.: Educated −0.039 −0.019 −0.442∗∗ −0.408∗
(0.323) (0.321) (0.207) (0.209)
Indicator: Over 30 0.411 −0.747∗∗
(0.257) (0.322)
Age Difference(+) X Ind.: Over 30 −0.211∗∗∗ −0.041
(0.078) (0.147)
Age Diff. (+) Sqrd X Ind.: Over 30 0.011∗∗ 0.010
(0.005) (0.013)
Age Difference(-) X Ind.: Over 30 −0.298 −0.151
(0.243) (0.288)
Age Diff. (-) Sqrd X Ind.: Over 30 0.047 0.057
(0.045) (0.052)
Observations 1,845 1,845 1,845 1,266 1,266 1,266 1,264 2,238
Source: QSAMPY 2016. Logit regression with non clustered standard errors. Education variable more broadly defined than in previous tables to fit
to the variable used in the CFPS 2014. Indicator for educated is 1 if the subject has college or university education. ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Table 2.13: Estimations to simulate marriage outcomes
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God insures those who pay? Formal
insurance and religious offerings in
Ghana1
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ABSTRACT
This chapter provides experimental support for the hypothesis that insurance can be a motive
for religious donations by members of a Pentecostal church in Ghana. We randomize enrolment into
a commercial funeral insurance policy, then church members allocate money between themselves
and a set of religious goods in a series of dictator games with significant stakes. Members enrolled
in insurance give significantly less money to their own church compared a control group of members
that only receive information about the insurance. Enrolment also reduces giving towards other
spiritual goods. We set up a model exploring different channels of religiously based insurance.
The implications of the model and the results from the dictator games suggest that adherents
perceive the church as a source of insurance and that this insurance is derived from beliefs in an
interventionist God. Survey results suggest that material insurance from the church community is
also important and we hypothesize that these two insurance channels exist in parallel.
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3.1 Introduction
Do religious believers give money to their churches in the hope of receiving insurance against
economic shocks? And if so, is this because they expect the church to look after them when shocks
occur, or God to look after them by making such shocks less likely to happen? Recent studies have
emphasized the important economic functions that religious institutions fulfil across the world, of
which the provision of informal insurance is one that has recently gained attention (Chen (2010),
Ager and Ciccone (2016)). Such insurance is likely to be particularly important in settings with
weak formal institutions and where individuals are exposed to a variety of uninsured risks. In this
chapter we report a study examining the effect of providing formal market-based insurance on the
demand for informal church-based insurance in Accra, Ghana.
We conduct a lab-in-the-field experiment with members of a Pentecostal church in Accra to test
whether insurance is one motive behind religious participation. We do not claim it is the only or
even the most important motive. We perform our experiment by randomly assigning free enroll-
ment into a formal, commercially available funeral insurance policy and measuring how this affects
willingness to contribute money in a dictator game to the church and two other charitable recipients.
The additional recipients - a secular charity and a nationwide prayer event - provide a means
of differentiating between two possible mechanisms by which members might expect insurance to
work. The first mechanism, consistent with a club good interpretation of church involvement, is
one in which the church provides financial support to those who suffer economic hardship provided
they have previously given money to the church. The second mechanism is one in which members
expect God to intervene to reduce the risk of adverse economic shocks provided the individuals
concerned have demonstrated spiritually meritorious actions. Giving money to a secular charity
or to a nationwide prayer event might be considered meritorious actions but they do not involve
a contribution to the church, and so would be consistent with belief in the second mechanism but
not with belief in the first.
Urban Ghana is a particularly interesting setting in which to study interactions between re-
ligious participation and insurance. First of all, as we describe in section 2.2.1, Pentecostalist
churches are massively present in Ghana and many members of the population give very significant
shares of their income to their church. This setting therefore allows us to examine the motives
for costly participation in activities that are also present in many other countries in the world.
In our model we envisage multiple motives for participation - both the consumption of spiritual
activities as such and the purchase of insurance against various shocks, and our survey evidence
indicates that both of these motives matter. Secondly, in our main sample of church members we
find that only 31% of all those interviewed participate in the National Health Insurance Scheme
(NHI), Ghana’s public health insurance program. Only 19% indicate that they hold any other types
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of insurance (see Table 3.8). Relatively low rates of insurance mean that enrollment in a formal
policy is likely to be a meaningful and significant treatment for many of our participants. Overall,
therefore, our results are likely to be relevant for other settings characterized by low penetration of
formal insurance and the importance of religious institutions, including other Sub-Saharan African
countries but also other parts of the world such as Latin America.
We find that enrollment in the formal insurance policy causes church members to give less
money to the church in a dictator game, compared to members that only receive information about
the insurance. Interestingly, we find that formal insurance also causes church members to give less
to the other recipients who are not directly linked to the church, but are associated with church
teachings on “good behaviour”. Furthermore, we find that church members who receive only in-
formation about the funeral insurance but are not enrolled, increase their giving to the church and
other charitable recipients as compared to participants who are not informed about the content
of the insurance. This finding is interesting since many of the church’s communications place a
heavy emphasis on the ever-present risk of death, and our results suggest that information which
increases the salience of this risk is highly effective at increasing individual willingness to donate.
We set up a simple model to illustrate the conditions under which we can interpret these re-
sults as evidence for insurance. In the model, a church member derives utility from secular and
religious consumption. We first show that if religious consumption does not have an insurance
motivation, a reduction in perceived losses (through our enrolment treatment) should increase the
amount allocated to religious consumption, via an income effect. However, if religious consumption
does have an insurance motivation, and if the insurance is perceived as sufficiently effective, the
substitution effect of a reduction in perceived losses will outweigh the income effect and lead to a
reduction in the amount allocated to religious consumption. This is what we find in our experiment.
This insurance motive can work either through a reduction in perceived losses from negative
shocks because of transfers from other church members or from the church organisation, or through
a reduction in perceived probabilities of adverse shocks because of belief in a divine response to
religious giving. Our experiment finds strong evidence for the latter mechanism: church members
change donations to the church as well as to the non-church recipients in a manner that is consistent
with interpreting giving as a demand for divine protection. Indeed, church members who receive
only information about funeral insurance react to the increased salience of a potential loss with an
increase in donations to the church and other non-church recipients. Provision of formal insurance
decreases the need for this type of risk-coping mechanism, and we find that insured church members
decrease charitable giving compared to those that are primed with risk.
Finally, we find that subjects who give substantially more than the average, or who participate
in the game during intensive “revival weeks” – events in which churchgoers donate much more than
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in an average week – demonstrate treatment effects that are of the opposite sign to the average for
the sample. This is consistent with the interpretation that exogenous factors that increase religious
giving, thereby reducing the marginal insurance utility from religious consumption, can reduce the
probability that the substitution effect outweighs the income effect.
Although our model is an instance of standard micro-economic analysis as applied to the alloca-
tion of resources between secular and religious consumption, our empirical study is methodologically
innovative in two main ways. First, we have provided an experimental intervention that directly
affects the demand for religious insurance by providing an institutional substitute. Secondly, we
have sought to distinguish carefully between different channels through which religious insurance
might work - notably, through influencing the behavior of other members of the religious com-
munity as opposed to influencing the probabilities of adverse events themselves that are believed
by subjects to be determined by God. To this end, our study experimentally links the religious
practice of church giving to an insurance motive, and we find evidence that subjects believe their
donations can induce God to intervene causally in the world. A Pentecostal church is a particularly
good setting to test this because participation costs and expected outcomes are made explicit, and
“giving to God” has a clear doctrinal mandate.
3.1.1 Links with the literature
The macro-economic literature, in the wake of Weber (1905), has long recognized the potential
importance of culture, and especially religion, for economic growth. However, most empirical stud-
ies in this literature face a challenge in surmounting endogeneity problems, and it is generally hard
to rule out the possibility that confounding factors explain both the religiosity of a population and
the growth of its economy. For instance, McCleary and Barro (2006a) find in their instrumental
variable model that higher GDP per capita causes a reduction in average religiosity. They also find
that the relationship between economic development and religiosity depends on the particular di-
mension of development. For example, education has different effects than urbanization (McCleary
and Barro (2006b)). Thus, even when it is possible to estimate the magnitude of aggregate causal
effects, such large-scale studies have difficulty pinpointing the mechanisms involved. Experimental
methods are therefore helpful both in establishing causality and in identifying the likely mecha-
nisms. This chapter aims at understanding a specific economic function of religious organizations:
their role as informal insurers.
In examining religious organisations as insurers, our work follows that of Chen (2010), who
finds that religious intensity increased with the need for ex-post insurance after financial shocks
in Indonesia, and Ager and Ciccone (2016), who find a relationship between higher rainfall risk
and religious participation. However, each study is compatible with a number of possible causal
mechanisms, which our experiment is designed to elucidate. In particular, while the findings of
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Chen (2010) suggest an insurance motive for religious participation, they are also compatible with
other explanations for religious participation, such as that religion provides comfort in distress
after shocks strike. The findings of Ager and Ciccone (2016) are compatible with interpretations
where other characteristics associated with rainfall risk are also the proximate cause of religious
membership (such as the amount and type of education). Our experiment allows us to allocate
insurance randomly to subjects to test the insurance mechanisms more directly.
In other studies, religious participation has also been shown to provide partial insurance against
fluctuations in consumption and well being (Dehejia et al. (2007)). Other evidence from cross-
country surveys and historical evidence from the Great Depression demonstrate a degree of substi-
tution between access to social welfare and religious participation (Gruber and Hungerman (2007);
Scheve and Stasavage (2006)). We add experimental evidence to this literature, causally demon-
strating that access to secular insurance can reduce religious involvement. More importantly, the
experimental approach allows us to test for the mechanism at hand and therefore acts as a com-
plement to previous research done with observational data.
Our finding that spiritual insurance is an economically important reaction to risk of those that
are not formally insured has important implications for the interpretation of the previously men-
tioned studies. Indeed, the previous literature on the interplay between religion and insurance is
not able to distinguish between those two channels and might overstate the role of religious insti-
tutions as a provider of community-based financial insurance and understate the importance of a
spiritual or psychological response to risk that is reflected in increased religiosity. This problem of
identification is vindicated by some recent studies showing that beliefs in divine intervention in the
daily lives of individuals can be an important determinant of real and costly social decisions (see
Hadnes and Schumacher (2012), Gershman (2016) and Nunn and de la Sierra (2017)).2
Our experiment contributes to the microinsurance literature by studying in a controlled en-
vironment how religious participation might affect demand for formal insurance. In recent years,
microinsurance policies have been proposed and tested as poverty alleviation tools with limited suc-
cess (Cole et al. (2013), Giesbert et al. (2011), Giesbert and Steiner (2015), Karlan et al. (2014)).
Consistently across studies, take-up has been lower than expected and this has been attributed to
a variety of factors including liquidity constraints (Cole et al. (2013)), limited attention (Zwane
et al. (2011)), trust in the insurance mechanism (Karlan et al. (2014)), and the existence of in-
formal insurance substitutes (Mobarak and Rosenzweig (2013)). Our results suggest that religious
institutions, which are an important instance of informal networks in developing countries, already
provide global spiritual insurance to their members (although we do not claim that this is the only
2Gershman (2016) demonstrates a negative association between trust and the presence of witchcraft beliefs, while
Hadnes and Schumacher (2012) experimentally find that priming voodoo beliefs increases trust and trustworthiness.
Nunn and de la Sierra (2017) document the prevalence of beliefs in protective spells in South Congo, arguing that
these beliefs helped village residents coordinate a stronger resistance against enemy fighters.
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motive for church participation), and this may partly explain the puzzle of the limited success
of specific formal insurance in some contexts. Since our survey results suggest that churches are
also important sources of financial assistance to their members, we hypothesize that an informal,
community-based material insurance exists in parallel, reducing further the need for formal insur-
ance.
In the following section, we describe the religious context of our study. In section 3, we present
the experimental design. In section 4, we use a simple model to derive our experimental hypotheses
to identify an insurance effect and to distinguish between community-based insurance and spiritual
insurance. In section 5, we discuss the experimental results and conclude in section 6.
3.2 Context
3.2.1 Pentecostalism
Pentecostalism represents one of the fastest-growing segments of global Christianity. Approx-
imately one-quarter of the world’s two billion Christians are members of churches that can be
classified as Pentecostal or Charismatic. These are related movements of Protestant Christianity
that emphasize the work of a Holy Spirit and claim that spiritual gifts, such as prophecy, divine
healing and speaking in tongues are expected to be present in the lives of believers (Pew Research
Center (2006)). Although Pentecostal and Charismatic movements differ in some aspects, these
aspects are marginal for our study, and we will use the term Pentecostal broadly. This makes sense
especially in Ghana and across Africa, where popular speech hardly draws a distinction between
the two (Okyerefo (2011); Botha (2007)).
The striking growth of this movement of global Christianity has largely taken place over the
last three decades (Botha (2007); Thelen (2017)). The speed with which Pentecostal congregations
have grown is particularly remarkable as most typical definitions of the movements only date their
beginnings to the early 1900s. This marked change in the composition of global Christianity has
been so significant that a number of commentators refer to the “Pentecostal explosion” as a “new
Reformation”(Thelen (2017); Jenkins (2011)).3 Sub-Saharan Africa has been an important centre
of this change. Estimates from 2015 suggest that almost 40% of the continent’s Christians iden-
tify as Pentecostal or Charismatic.4 This reflects the wider shift in the Pentecostal revival from
3Comparing the reformation of 16th century Europe with the “new reformation” of Pentecostal-charismatic
Christianity, theologian Harvey Cox states that “today, Christianity is living through a reformation that will prove to
be even more basic and more sweeping than the one that shook Europe during the sixteenth century . . . That earlier
reformation. . . was confined to one small corner of the globe. The current reformation, however, is an earth-circling
one. The present reformation is shaking the foundations more dramatically than its sixteenth-century predecessor,
and its results will be more far-reaching and radical.”Cox (2011)
4Todd M. Johnson and Gina A. Zurlo, eds. World Christian Database (Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2007).
http://worldchristiandatabase.org
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the Global North to the Global South. Although many early Pentecostal churches in sub-Saharan
Africa were planted and funded by American missionaries, much of the dramatic growth that has
taken place since the 1980s has been fuelled by indigenous developments in theology, teaching and
practice. Many scholars argue that preexisting belief systems and economic conditions made sub-
Saharan Africa particularly receptive to Pentecostal teachings (see for instance Ukah (2005)).
Participants in our experiment were recruited from different branches of the Assemblies of God
(AoG), one of the oldest and most established Pentecostal denominations. Founded in 1914 in the
United States of America, the denomination now has an international reach that covers approxi-
mately 360 000 churches in more than 250 countries (Assemblies of God World Missions (2017)).
National AoG bodies are largely autonomous but are united by some shared beliefs and a common
history. Taken together, Assemblies of God fellowships form the largest Pentecostal denomination
and the sixth largest religious grouping in the world. 5
About a third of the worldwide Assemblies of God adherents are found in sub-Saharan Africa.
This represents approximately twenty-two million adherents (Assemblies of God World Missions
(2017)), about 2.5 million of whom are in Ghana6. In Ghana they represent just under 10% of the
national population, attracting members from all social strata. Table 3.4 in the appendix presents
some descriptive statistics of the six church branches where we recruited participants for our study.
We approached these churches using a snowball sampling strategy. The church branches are het-
erogeneous in terms of age, size, members’ characteristics, and geographical locations in the city.
They represent the great diversity of Assemblies of God branches that can be found in Accra.
Many of these teachings that have taken root and been developed in sub-Saharan churches are
shared by Pentecostal believers across the world in the transnational exchange of ideas and re-
sources that characterises Pentecostalism today (Gifford (2004); Kalu (2008)). There is, of course,
considerable heterogeneity in beliefs and practices within individuals in a given church, across
branches within a single denomination, and across denominations of the broader Pentecostal move-
ment. However, the key features of Pentecostal belief and practice which are important for the
interpretation of our study design are widely shared. By focusing recruitment from a popular and
established denomination, we are able to draw out insights that should be applicable to this large
and growing movement, and to other religious practices that share certain features of these beliefs.
5www.adherents.com
6Todd M. Johnson and Gina A. Zurlo, eds. World Christian Database (Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2007).
http://worldchristiandatabase.org
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3.2.2 The role of the church in Pentecostalism
In terms of practice, the church is an essential part of life for Pentecostal adherents. They go to
church more regularly than other Christians and perform other religious practices more frequently.
For example, compared to the general population, Pentecostals pray and read the Bible more of-
ten, and more frequently watch or listen to religious programs on television and radio. They are
also more likely to share their beliefs with others to spread their faith (Pew Research Center (2006)).
Members also enjoy non-spiritual benefits from their church. An essential function of Pente-
costal churches in Ghana, in particular in urban areas, is to offer a place for social gathering. Table
3.5 in the appendix shows descriptive statistics of selected answers from our study questionnaire
about the social role of churches. For instance, 40% of our study participants declare that they have
found their spouse (or are most likely to find their future spouse if not already married) in church.
This does not mean that for them, the church is just or even mainly a place to meet potential
marriage partners. On the contrary, precisely its appeal in this dimension consists in providing
access to marriage partners who are there for other, at least partly spiritual or ethical motives.
Some church members even report that they favour church members as business partners (48%
of church members in our study). More fundamentally, people seem to be attracted to such churches
because they feel part of a broader community which looks after them, be it through other church
members, church leaders, or God. When faced with any personal or family problems, 71% of our
participants would call their pastor and 25% would ask another church member for help. This
is consistent with survey evidence from the Afrobarometer and the World Values Survey show-
ing that across Africa, religious leaders are considered amongst the most trustworthy members of
civil society. They are expected to take responsibility for their members’ welfare in the absence
of government-led social interventions and urbanization enhances these expectations (McCauley
(2013)).
Pentecostal adherents are expected to support their church financially. Giving is often multi-
layered and different ways of transferring money might have different motivations. Tithing, the
practice of giving away a tenth of all income, usually takes the form of a non-anonymous monthly
payment to the church for which church members receive a receipt. This type of giving is akin to a
membership fee to the church community. On the other hand, there is giving for specific purposes
such as pledges, which are occasional non-anonymous donations involving large amounts of money,
often for investment in church infrastructure. Finally, there are spontaneous offerings, made on a
more regular basis, which are generally anonymous and the amounts are given unobserved (though
during collections in Sunday services the fact of going forward to give may be very visible to a
member’s friends and family). Opportunities for this form of giving are frequent and contributions
are expected beyond the other regular or earmarked forms of giving. This includes among others
seed offerings - the practice of giving money in anticipation of a future material benefit, or thanks-
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givings in gratitude for already materialized benefits (Maxwell (1998); Gifford (2004)). The type
of giving we observe in our experiment falls into this category of spontaneous giving.
3.2.3 Giving to God to access insurance
Giving to the church might interact with the use of the church as an insurer in a number of
ways. Firstly, individuals might give to the church in expectation that the church as an institution
would reward this sign of commitment by disbursing funds in times of need. Secondly, individuals
might use their public giving to send signals that they are good community members to other
church members, and expect that other church members then contribute to help them in times
of need. The costs of religious participation can be seen as screening mechanisms to ensure that
members are reliable and to prevent free-riding (Iannaccone (1992)). Additionally, the community
structure of the group with repeated interactions reduces monitoring costs (Berman (2000)). These
two types of community-based insurance could be considered “material” insurance.
In addition to its role as a social network, the church is also believed by its members to be a
setting for encounters with the divine. The church, therefore, has a value as an insurer because it fa-
cilitates access to an interventionist God who can prevent negative shocks and favour positive ones.
We call this type of insurance “spiritual” insurance. This form of insurance is interesting because
it does not rely solely on giving to the church but on “giving to God”, which can be interpreted as
“sowing on any fertile ground” - undertaking projects that will be blessed by God (Gifford (2004)).
This expansive interpretation of “giving to God” allows us to extend our experimental design to
investigate how participants react to giving to recipients which are separate from the church, but
which still fulfil the spiritual mandate. This allows us to make some distinctions about the different
types of insurance experienced in the church. These mechanisms are formalised in the model in
section 3.4, and the doctrinal features are discussed here.
The first and most prominent feature is the forthright relationship between giving to God and
material well-being. Pentecostal preachers across Africa speak of a God who does not want His
people to be poor or to suffer.7 This mandate is often described as a variant of the “Prosperity
Gospel”, the set of teachings that say that “Christianity has to do with success, wealth, and status”
(Gifford (2004)).8 And in contrast to other Christian groups where rewards are generally given out
7Enoch Adeboye, head of the Lagos-based international Pentecostal megachurch Redeemed Christian Church of
God, teaches, “God is not poor at all by any standard...the closest friends of God [in the Bible] were wealthy people...
Poverty is a curse and prosperity is not evil” (Ukah (2005) pg 260). Similarly Gifford (2004) pg 50 cites a pastor
proclaiming ”God is in the business of addition and multiplications; Satan is in the business of subtraction and
division.”
8While the term “Prosperity gospel” has typically been used to describe teachings from some Evangelical churches
in North America, some scholars of African Pentecostal theologies argue that the “African prosperity gospel” is more
nuanced, certain aspects of it “are borrowed from external sources; others are home-grown. Still, others are derived
from external sources and adapted to fit local contexts” (Kalu (2008))
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in the afterlife, it is usually pointed out that the expected timeframe of miracles is short and imme-
diate.9 The immediacy of the miraculous work is reflected in the structure of many church services
that are themed around the material successes of its members proclaimed in lively testimonies.10
Pastors emphasize how behaving in a manner that unlocks God’s blessing helps to avoid the risks
that get in the way of achieving these successes. Their preaching makes a particularly strong and
explicit link between giving to God and insurance: “The Lord will remember your offering; it is
comprehensive assurance” (Gifford (2004) Pg 65).11 And unlocking God’s blessings is invariably
achieved by “doing something special that will move God and cause him to bless you more than
you intended” i.e. giving money, preferably to the church (Ukah (2005)).
3.3 Experiment
We ran an experiment in Accra, Ghana involving 576 participants in 69 sessions, with a me-
dian number of participants per session of 10 and a mean of 9.3. Randomisation was done at
the session level. At the start of each session, one participant per group was invited to pick one
out of three unmarked envelopes. Participants were told that the envelopes contained a piece of
paper that would determine the type of session they would play. The pieces of paper were labelled
“Insurance”, which corresponded to our insurance enrolment treatment; “Insurance information”,
which corresponded to the control, and “No insurance”, which corresponded to the no insurance
information treatment (i.e., groups who were not enrolled in the policy and did not have any sort
of discussion about insurance). The insurance was a funeral insurance policy offered by a leading
micro-insurer active in the Ghanaian market. The outcomes we measured were allocations out of
an endowment (which subjects were free to keep, all or in part) towards a participant’s church and
two other non-church recipients.
3.3.1 Enrolment treatment: Funeral insurance policy
Funerals are large and costly events in many sub-Saharan African societies (Berg (2016); Case
et al. (2013)). Surviving family members are expected to honour the dead through lavish com-
memorations. The rising toll of funeral costs has received attention from media, academics and
9Some declarations made during a church service include: “Before the year comes to an end, there are people
here who will be counting millions of dollars in their accounts...”, “This month, no accident sickness, stagnation will
affect you” or “Marriages don’t collapse here, businesses don’t collapse here, nobody fails here” (Gifford (2004) Pg
50 and 58)
10Gifford cites some testimony themes that include the following: ”I am a millionaire today!”, ”Jobs started coming
in!”, “My own choice car!”, “Now they pay me in dollars!”, “A Baby, Two Cars, and Promotion”.
11Other examples include: ’The preacher asked the congregation if they were putting aside for a rainy day, but
promised: ‘If you give, you won’t have a rainy day”’ (Gifford (2004) Pg 50). ”Every part of your destiny is assured
by God, insured by God” (Gifford (2004) Pg 58).
125
political leaders.12 More recently private financial service providers have begun to offer savings and
insurance products designed specifically to meet these costs.
In Ghana, guests and other members of the bereaved’s community typically make contribu-
tions that help to cover the funeral costs. It is important to note that community support is not
only financial - churches also organise the provision of food and moral and logistical support, so
any formal insurance product will only be addressing a single aspect of the church contributions.
The degree of formalisation of this type of support varies across the churches in our sample. In
interviews with church leaders, most confirmed that observed commitment from members was a
prerequisite for church involvement in their funerals. Definitions of commitment always included
attendance of church events and financial commitment to the church in terms of tithes and offerings.
The funeral policy we offered to participants is a micro-insurance offered in the Ghanaian market
for pre-existing groups and needs to be coordinated by a member of the group. In our case, the
coordinators were the Pastors of each church branch. The policy covered the life of the participant
and a member of his or her immediate family. If either of these parties were to pass away within
a year, the policy would pay GHS 1000 ($265) to the surviving family members. This policy cost
GHS 12.5 ($3USD) for two family members per year.13 Individuals in this treatment were enrolled
on the spot after completing a demographic survey and before playing the dictator game.
3.3.2 Control group and no insurance information treatment
During pre-tests, it became clear that discussions of death and planning around death would be
sensitive topics. Reluctance to contemplate large unpleasant risks has been raised in the literature,
particularly in other developing country settings where people are severely limited in the steps they
can take to address these risks (Case et al. (2013)). Furthermore, findings in psychological research
show that awareness of mortality can modify Christians’ religiosity and beliefs in a supernatural
entity (see for instance Jong et al. (2012); Norenzayan and Hansen (2006)). As the insurance
treatment was designed to isolate the effect of being enrolled in insurance, we offered the same
information about the insurance policy to the control group, so that the same issues of death would
be salient in both settings.
Furthermore, we were interested in isolating the potential effect of risk priming which we ex-
12See for instance ”The long goodbye: Why funerals are big deals in Ghana” By Paula Newton
available at http://edition.cnn.com/2014/03/11/world/africa/on-the-road-ghana-funerals/index.html and
”Bankruptcy and burials: Can Ghanaians afford such splendid funerals?” The Economist 2007 available at
http://www.economist.com/node/9234475, and also ”Death around the world: Funerals and fantasy coffins in
Ghana” available at https://www.funeralzone.co.uk/blog/death-around-the-world-funerals-in-ghana
13One main goal of the group micro-insurance is to have a simplified scheme and low coordination costs. This
implied that the tariff was independent of the gender, age or other characteristics of the insured. The main insurance
taker only had to be above the age of 18 and below the age of 75 who could then insure his/her children and other
close family members under the age of 75.
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pected would modify participants’ behaviour. Since discussion about risky events is part of church
services as described in the context section, participants’ reaction to a risk prime can be linked to
their giving behaviour in church. We, therefore, added a second treatment where people were not
informed about the content of the insurance policy. Comparisons between this group that did not
discuss death and the control group that received insurance information allow us to see how church
members react to an increase of perceived risk in the absence of formal insurance.
3.3.3 Recruitment
We recruited 576 study participants from different church branches within one particular de-
nomination. Participants for the main study were recruited from six church branches through
announcements made on Sunday mornings during regular church services, and to avoid confounds
with normal Sunday offering, all sessions took place during the subsequent work week in a neutral
location. A subset of 122 participants was inadvertently recruited during “revival weeks” when
their churches were engaged in active fundraising services during the work week. We found inter-
esting results for this subset. They are discussed after presenting the main experimental results,
which involve 454 participants.
We were also interested in seeing how our hypothesised mechanisms operate within a secular
organisation, so we recruited an additional 242 market sellers. Traders in this market are organized
into an association that could provide financial assistance such as credit or insurance to dues-paying
members. During the first round of data collection, we realized that the insurance treatment did
not operate in this sample as it did within the group of church members. Indeed, the funeral insur-
ance was coordinated by the head of the market association and informal discussions with study
participants as well as their answers to survey questions warned us that trust in the insurance
coordinator might be low. It, therefore, seemed likely to us that participants would not trust that
the insurance would be actually implemented, thus discrediting the insurance treatment. Further-
more, the questionnaire answers informed us that the market association is not a commonly-used
risk-sharing structure, and is by no means similar to the church community in that respect. We,
therefore, stopped collecting data on market members after the first round of the study and the
sample for this group is too small to be able to detect treatment effects. Results from this smaller
additional sample are available from the authors on request.
3.3.4 Experimental Setup and Design
It was very important for the credibility of our study that, at the exception of recruitment, all
interactions with participants took place off church premises and that participants be assured of
anonymity so as to avoid any contamination of the results by perceived pressure from the church
authorities. This involved a substantial effort to transport the recruited individuals to a study
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location at some distance from the church, as well as the setting up of a proper lab-in the-field with
laptops and room dividers between subjects so as to make the assurance of anonymity credible. All
participants were compensated for transport to the neutral locations.
Interested participants were assigned to sessions of 8 - 12 people, randomized between treatments
and control. A session consisted of an extended survey where each participant was interviewed by
an enumerator who spoke the participant’s local language and a set of dictator game decisions.
Participants privately played 10 modified dictator games. Each game asked participants to
allocate GHS 11 (a little less than average daily income) between two recipients. The set of recip-
ients consisted of the participant’s church, a secular charity, a national prayer organisation, and
the possibility of keeping the money. There were also two ways in which individuals would give to
the church: the first being an anonymous donation, the second being a named donation. The pairs
of recipients are listed in Table 3.1. The order of the 10 dictator games was randomized by the
computer program.14
A Self Church (anonymous)
B Self Street children
C Self Thanksgiving
D Self Church (non-anonymous)
E Church (anonymous) Street children
F Church (anonymous) Thanksgiving
G Church (anonymous) Church (non-anonymous)
H Street children Thanksgiving
I Street children Church (non-anonymous)
J Thanksgiving Church (non-anonymous)
Table 3.1: Pairs of dictator game recipients.
The Street Children’s Fund is a charity that takes care of the educational needs of homeless and
vulnerable children. The charity operates in a district of the city that is geographically and cultur-
ally distinct from the ones where we recruited participants. Giving to this charity could largely be
understood as an altruistic action. The thanksgiving offering is part of an annual inter-faith prayer
event. Leaders and members of various faiths join together in prayer for Ghana. Giving towards
this event was meant to be interpreted as giving towards a largely spiritual interest. Pre-tests and
focus groups during piloting confirmed that study participants would see these two recipients in
this manner.
14Regarding anonymous and non-anonymous donations, one concern is that participants that see named donations
before anonymous choices may think about the latter in a different way. We randomize the order of the dictator
games precisely to address this type of concern. However, we also checked whether seeing named donations before
anonymous ones affect later choices to give to church anonymously and we find that this is not the case.
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Participants were paid a flat show-up fee of GHS 20. After all decisions had been made in the
dictator games, one game was selected at random individually for each participant, and further
payments were made according to the decision taken for that game. This meant that participants
had the opportunity to earn up to GHS 31. Average overall earnings from the experiment were
GHS 22.50 which were paid privately to participants.
The experiment protocol and the questionnaire can be found in the appendix. This experiment
was pre-registered in the AEA registry.15
3.4 Model
We develop a simple model to formalize the types of behaviour we expect our experiment to cap-
ture, and use results from the model to motivate the experimental hypotheses. First, we establish
how church members who derive utility from secular as well as spiritual consumption would behave
given the risk of an exogenous income shock in a bad state of the world if there is no insurance
offered by the church. We then consider two church-based insurance channels. Community-based
insurance is modelled as a payment given to a church member in the case of a loss where the
size of the payment depends on how much the church member gives to their own church. Spiri-
tual insurance is modelled as a belief that the subjective probability of a loss is reduced by giving
to the church and other goods used for religious signalling, such as the spiritual and secular charities.
The mechanisms of our experiment are captured in the model as changes to the size of the loss.
The insurance scheme into which we enrolled individuals paid out in the event of their own death
or the death of a relative. The loss we model is a financial loss and is not intended to cover all of
the aspects of the distress suffered by an individual facing the death of a loved one, let alone the
adverse emotional and other consequences to them of their own death. As in any life insurance
decision, the individual does not expect to be compensated for their own death but rather intends
to offset in part the financial consequences of death to those still left alive. Individuals are capable
of anticipating the benefit of that payout and considering it as a (possibly vicarious) benefit in
anticipation of which they are willing to pay a premium, even if they do not expect to be alive
when the payout occurs.
There are two ways in which our insurance treatments affect the size of the loss. The first is
when insurance information is provided to participants. The process necessitates a lengthy discus-
sion about death both of the participating individual and his or her loved ones. This discussion
brings home to participants the reality of a risk they had perhaps been inclined not to think about,
and thereby makes death more salient. We represent this as an increase in the perceived size of the
loss, compared to the situation before they had received this information.
15AEA RCT Registry ID: AEARCTR-0000558
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The second way in which our insurance treatment affects the size of the loss is when individuals
are actually enrolled. We represent this as a reduction in the perceived size of the loss.
We show how in the presence of an insurance motive in the church, the main insurance treat-
ment can lead to a decrease in giving, and the provision of only insurance information can lead to
an increase in giving.
3.4.1 Setup
We assume that a church member has an income of Y and chooses to give an amount g to the
church. The church member enjoys utility u(Y − g) from consuming Y − g ≥ 0 secular goods, and
utility θf(g) from contributing g ≥ 0 to church goods. Thus a church member who gives g to the
church enjoys a total utility of u(Y − g) + θf(g). The parameter θ reflects the relative weight the
individual puts on church activities compared to secular consumption. This weight might differ
from one individual to the next (there may be individual heterogeneity). More importantly for our
empirical analysis, it might also differ in time (for instance, in revival weeks individuals go to church
every day and are focused on spiritual activities). Both utility functions u and f are increasing and
concave in their arguments. We, therefore, make the assumption that religious consumption is a
normal good.16
In each period, church members face a probability π of an income loss of size D. Under the
assumption that insurance is offered through the church, giving an amount g also has the impact of
reducing the size of the loss by an amount l(g), thus the total loss would be D− l(g). Under the as-
sumption that church members believe in spiritual insurance, the probability of a loss is decomposed
into a basic probability of loss π˜, and a reduction in the probability of loss that can be mitigated
by giving money to spiritual goods. Therefore, the total subjective probability of loss is π = π˜−p(g).
The following subsections set-up the maximization problems and show how optimal giving varies
with the perceived size of the loss. All proofs are in the appendix.
3.4.2 Optimal giving to the church in the absence of any insurance
In this section we assume that church members choose a particular level of giving g to maximize
their total expected utility. There is no insurance offered through the church. We label this
16This assumption contradicts the secularization hypothesis that higher income leads to lower religiosity. However,
it is in line with new studies using panel or microdata (Becker and Woessmann (2013) and Buser (2015)). A theoretical
rationale for the positive association of income on religious consumption can be found in club good models of religion
(Iannaccone (1992), Berman (2000), Berman and Laitin (2008)).
130
Hypothesis H0. The optimization is:
max
g
(1− π)u(Y − g) + πu(Y − g −D) + θf(g) (3.1)
Solving for the first order conditions and taking optimal giving g∗ as a function of D allows us
to show that giving is decreasing with the size of the loss D:
∂g∗
∂D
< 0 (3.2)
This classical result of consumption smoothing comes from the standard concavity assumptions of
the utilities derived from secular and religious consumption. When faced with an increase in the
potential loss D, church members shift spending from religious consumption to secular consumption
to ensure a higher level of secular consumption in case of loss. We call this result the “income effect”.
Therefore, this subsection predicts that if there is no insurance mechanism in the church (nei-
ther community-based nor spiritual), the information about the funeral policy in the control group,
by increasing the perceived loss D, would lead individuals to decrease church giving g∗.
We summarize this empirical prediction of Hypothesis H0 in the form of:
Empirical prediction H0a: Compared to no information, insurance information decreases giving
to the church.
Correspondingly, compared to the control group, the enrolment treatment reduces the perceived
risk of loss, thereby decreasing D, and thus would increase giving to the church.
The second empirical prediction of Hypothesis H0 is:
Empirical prediction H0b: Compared to insurance information, insurance enrollment increases
giving to the church.
3.4.3 Community insurance: optimal giving when giving reduces the size of a
loss
In this section, we assume that the church community provides material insurance such that
church giving reduces the size of the loss. We call this Hypothesis H1, and we write L = D − l(g),
where l is an increasing and concave function with l(0) = 0 and l′(0) > 1 (this last condition means
that the community insurance in the bad state more than offsets the amount previously donated
by the individual). In this case, church giving can be seen as payment of the premium of informal
insurance that covers part of the possible loss. As it is offered by the church community, only giving
to the church - and not giving to other religious goods - provides access to this type of insurance.
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The utility maximization problem is as follows:
max
g
(1− π)u(Y − g) + πu(Y − g −D + l(g)) + θf(g) (3.3)
We solve for the first order conditions and express optimal giving g∗ as a function of the loss
D. We find that:
∂g∗
∂D
> 0⇔ l′(g∗) > 1 (3.4)
When there is an insurance motive behind church donations, an increase in the potential loss D
triggers two opposite effects: the substitution effect, whereby church members try to mitigate the
increase in loss by buying more informal insurance; and the income effect, where church members
reduce giving to the church to have more money available for secular consumption smoothing.
Condition (3.4) shows that as long as community-based insurance is effective enough in de-
creasing the loss, which is the case for low enough g∗, the consumption-smoothing effect from the
baseline model (income effect) is outweighed by the increased demand for church insurance (sub-
stitution effect). Therefore, the overall effect of an increase in D is an increase in optimal giving.
This subsection predicts that if there exists effective community insurance that reduces the size
of a loss in case of a shock, the information about insurance should increase church giving (com-
pared to no insurance information) while the enrolment treatment would decrease church giving
(compared to the control group). These effects are the opposite of the predicted effects discussed
in the previous section when there is no insurance motive for giving to the church. There should
be no impact of either treatment on giving to other recipients.
The three empirical predictions of Hypothesis H1 are:
Empirical prediction H1a: Compared to no information, insurance information increases giving
to the church.
Empirical prediction H1b: Compared to insurance information, insurance enrollment decreases giv-
ing to the church.
Empirical prediction H1c: There is no effect of either insurance information or enrolment on giving
to the other recipients (the thanksgiving offering and the street children’s fund).
3.4.4 Spiritual insurance: optimal giving when giving reduces the subjective
probability of a loss
In this section we assume that there is a spiritual insurance motive such that giving reduces the
subjective probability of the loss π = π˜ − p(g). It is important to stress that giving can be to the
church or to any other charitable/spiritual organizations that can be used for religious signalling.
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The mechanism here works through God: being a good Christian reduces the subjective probability
of a negative shock. We call this Hypothesis H2. Utility can now be written as:
max
g
(1− π˜ + p(g))u(Y − g) + (π˜ − p(g))u(Y − g −D) + θf(g) (3.5)
We can show that:
∂g∗
∂D
> 0⇔ p′(g∗)u′(Y − g ∗ −D) > (π˜ − p(g∗))u′′(Y − g∗ −D) (3.6)
This condition is harder to interpret intuitively in the non-parametrized form, and for the sec-
ond order condition to hold requires that the second derivative of the utility function not increase
too fast in the size of the loss, which means that the income effect must not be large. So we defer
the discussion to the appendix where we investigate it using a CARA utility function. In short, we
find that the optimal giving g∗ is increasing in the size of loss D when the spiritual insurance is
effective enough. Indeed, when this is the case, individuals prefer to invest in decreasing the sub-
jective probability of loss by increasing their religious giving rather than smoothing consumption
(in other words, the substitution effect of the loss dominates the income effect).
Therefore, this subsection predicts that providing participants with insurance information would
increase giving to any charitable or spiritual organization (compared to no insurance information)
while enrolling them in the insurance treatment would decrease giving to any charitable or spiritual
organization (compared to the information treatment).
The three empirical predictions of Hypothesis H2 are:
Empirical prediction H2a: Compared to no information, insurance information increases giving
to the church.
Empirical prediction H2b: Compared to insurance information, insurance enrollment decreases giv-
ing to the church.
Empirical prediction H2c: The effects on giving to the thanksgiving offering or the street children’s
fund are similar to the effects on giving to the church.
3.4.5 Experimental hypotheses
We collect here all the empirical predictions of the three different insurance hypotheses so they
can be compared and tested against one another.
H0 There is no insurance provided through the church (section 3.4.2).
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H0a Compared to no information, insurance information decreases giving to the church.
H0b Compared to insurance information, insurance enrollment increases giving to the church.
H1 Community insurance is provided through the church (section 3.4.3).
H1a Compared to no information, insurance information increases giving to the church.
H1b Compared to insurance information, insurance enrollment decreases giving to the church.
H1c There is no effect on giving to the thanksgiving offering or the street children’s fund.
H2 Spiritual insurance is provided through God (section 3.4.4).
H2a Compared to no information, insurance information increases giving to the church.
H2b Compared to insurance information, insurance enrollment decreases giving to the church.
H2c The effects on giving to the thanksgiving offering or the street children’s fund are similar
to the effects on giving to the church.
Our experimental design allows us to test for an insurance mechanism in giving (test for H0a
against H1a/H2a and H0b against H1b/H2b) and then test the two insurance channels of spiri-
tual and community-based insurance against each other (H1c against H2c). Spiritual insurance
effects should be similar across recipients. However they might be different in magnitude since,
for instance, church members could see church donations as the most effective tool to decrease the
probability of a loss.
Our model and experimental design do not allow us to make a clear prediction of the result if we
compared the group that received no insurance information to the group that received insurance.
This is because, as described in the model setup, the insurance treatment is composed of both the
actual insurance effect which we are interested in and a salience effect. The model demonstrates
how these two effects work in opposing directions. While we are unable to formulate an ex-ante
hypothesis about the overall comparison between receiving insurance and not receiving any infor-
mation, we discuss the results in subsection 3.5.3.3, where we suggest some interpretations about
the relative magnitudes we observe and discuss what they might further tell us about the potential
mechanisms of church-based insurance.
3.5 Experimental Results
3.5.1 Descriptive statistics
Our main results include 454 church members recruited during regular service weeks from six
different church branches and we have additional socio-demographic information for 404 of those.17
17The questionnaire software malfunctioned during the first few sessions, so some survey data were not saved.
There were no problems with data from the dictator games.
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Table 3.6 in the appendix summarises basic demographic variables of these participants. The final
column in this table also includes nationally representative demographic information. Consistent
with the recruitment process taking place in churches that are not gender-balanced, we find that
our study population had more women than men. Only a fifth of our participants had completed
at least a high school education. On average, our participants earned approximately GHS 350,
equivalent to $92 dollars, per month or roughly GHS 12, a little more than $3, per day. Only 31%
held National Health Insurance and only 19% held any other sort of insurance prior to participating
in the study. Table 3.8 in the appendix presents a summary of these results.
Compared to the national population, our participants had lower incomes and were less likely
to be employed. Again, this is consistent with the fact that we recruit relatively active church
members. We believe that this selection is not a threat to external validity: we are interested in
the attitudes towards insurance in precisely this significant subgroup of the general population who
are likely to be particularly vulnerable and face a greater number of formally uninsured risks.
Table 3.7 in the appendix shows that the groups were balanced across treatments for all key
variables except gender (women tend to be over-represented in the insurance information and no
insurance groups) as shown in Table 3.7. An F-test rejects the hypothesis that these main demo-
graphic variables jointly explain the assignment to any of the treatments. We report results of
regressions with and without control variables for individuals’ demographics (gender, age, educa-
tion, income, employment status, ethnicity) and measures of religious behaviour (church attendance
and prayer frequency) as well as church fixed effects. The treatment effects remain quantitatively
similar and their statistical significance is unchanged whether or not we include the demographic
variables.
3.5.2 Summary of the allocation decisions
In this subsection and the following, we focus on the three dictator games among the ten played
where anonymous donations to the three recipients were paired with the possibility to keep the
money. Results from the other games are discussed in subsection 3.5.4. The histograms in Figure
3.1 plot the distributions of giving to the three different recipients. On average, participants chose
to keep 5.77 GHS or 52% of their endowment and give 5.22 GHS or 48% of the endowment. We
find that 40% of participants selected an allocation of either 5 GHS or 6 GHS. Across recipients,
roughly 7% of participants gave nothing, and 10% of participants gave everything away. These
spikes at the extreme values highlight that allocations to the recipients may have been censored.
To account for this, we report all experimental results using a Tobit regression.
We also find that giving towards the three recipients is significantly correlated, with the corre-
lation coefficients between the pairs of choices ranging from 0.52 to 0.59. If the experimental design
induced any order effects, these high degrees of correlation could be problematic for interpretations
135
0
20
40
60
80
10
0
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y
0 5 10
Giving to church
(a)
0
20
40
60
80
10
0
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y
0 5 10
Giving to street.
(b)
0
20
40
60
80
10
0
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y
0 5 10
Giving to thanks.
(c)
Note: Includes participants during normal church weeks (not revival). Shows the amount that
participants decided to give to their own church (panel a), the street children’s fund (panel b) and
the inter-denominational thanksgiving event (panel c) with the alternative of keeping the money.
Figure 3.1: Distribution of giving among normal church population.
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across recipients. However, the order of dictator decisions was randomised across participants,
mitigating the concern that any order effects could interact with treatment effects.
3.5.3 Treatment effects
3.5.3.1 The effect of insurance information
The first treatment effect tests the hypothesis that a more salient threat of death and a dis-
cussion of the associated risk coping strategies affect giving. Table 3.2 presents the basic results
of the insurance information on giving relative to the no insurance information treatment (even
columns show results of regressions including control variables, odd columns show results of re-
gressions without controls). In the sessions with no insurance information, participants gave an
average of GHS 5.05 or 45% of the endowment to the church. Participants who received insurance
information increased giving to the church by GHS 0.78, an effect which is statistically significant
at 10% and economically large, representing 7% of the endowment and 15% of the mean amount
donated by the control groups. This increase in giving is consistent with the hypothesis that the
focused discussion of risk puts participants in a fearful state, which makes them more likely to give
money to the church. Interestingly there was also an increase in giving of similar magnitude to the
street children’s fund (an increase of GHS 1.00) and the thanksgiving offering (an increase of GHS
0.75). Tests for equality of the coefficients on the treatment effects across these different outcomes
do not reject the null that the difference between them is zero.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Giving to church Giving to church Giving to thanks. Giving to thanks. Giving to street. Giving to street.
Insurance information 0.778∗ 0.756∗ 0.746∗ 0.662 1.004∗∗ 1.024∗∗
(0.450) (0.412) (0.448) (0.412) (0.457) (0.473)
Constant 5.045∗∗∗ 4.561∗∗∗ 4.937∗∗∗ 4.575∗∗∗ 5.220∗∗∗ 5.254∗∗∗
(0.256) (1.403) (0.204) (1.500) (0.266) (1.708)
Individual controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
Church dummies No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 289 260 289 260 289 260
Note: Tobit regression censored at 0 and 11. Dependent variables measure donations intended for the own church branch, the street
children’s fund (secular NGO) and the Inter-denominational Thanksgiving (religious NGO) with the alternative option to keep the
money. Control variables include participants demographics and measures of religious behaviour. Standard errors (between
parentheses) are clustered at session level. Significance levels: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01.
Table 3.2: Giving after receiving insurance information compared to giving with no insurance nor insurance information
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The finding that a more salient threat of death increases donations to the church and the other
recipients are in line with hypothesis H2a and H2c (Spiritual insurance provided by God).
The GHS 11 endowment used in the dictator games is a little bit more than the median weekly
offering to the church. Comparing giving in the no insurance information treatment with the insur-
ance information control, it is interesting to see that a relatively brief discussion about insurance
and death could raise giving by 15%, and provides an indication of the importance of the church in
this context where there is a lot of uncertainty, but few institutions to deal with it. Furthermore, if
this were a pure framing effect unrelated to any insurance motive, we would have expected to see
a negative effect on donations to the church instead of the observed positive effect.
3.5.3.2 The effect of being enrolled in an insurance policy
Table 3.3 presents the results of the effect of actually being enrolled in an insurance policy.
These results are obtained by comparing people who received insurance with people receiving only
insurance information. Column 1 demonstrates that enrolment in the formal insurance policy re-
duces giving to the church by GHS 0.92. Again, we find similar effects regarding giving to the
street children’s fund and giving to the thanksgiving offering (a decrease of GHS 0.93 in both cases
as shown in column 3 and 5). These numbers correspond to an effect size of approximately 0.55
standard deviations across the three recipients. The effects are once again statistically significant
at 10%. They are also economically important in magnitude, representing a reduction in giving
equal to over 15% of the mean amount donated in the control group.
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Table 3.3: Giving after enrolment in insurance compared to giving with insurance information only
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Giving to church Giving to church Giving to thanks. Giving to thanks. Giving to street. Giving to street.
Insurance -0.915∗ -0.698∗ -0.930∗ -0.973∗ -0.926∗∗ -1.029∗∗
(0.471) (0.396) (0.502) (0.497) (0.434) (0.451)
Constant 5.846∗∗∗ 4.733∗∗∗ 5.703∗∗∗ 7.309∗∗∗ 6.227∗∗∗ 7.145∗∗∗
(0.385) (1.501) (0.408) (1.642) (0.377) (1.389)
Individual controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
Church dummies No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 285 251 285 251 285 251
Note: Tobit regression censored at 0 and 11. Dependent variables measure donations intended for the own church branch, the street
children’s fund (secular NGO) and the Inter-denominational Thanksgiving (religious NGO) with the alternative option to keep the
money. Control variables include participants demographics and measures of religious behaviour. Standard errors (between
parentheses) are clustered at session level. Significance levels: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01.
140
These effects are robust when we control for a large set of church and demographic character-
istics as demonstrated in columns 2, 4 and 6 of Table 3.3. These controls should pick up variation
in church structure on important characteristics such as the level of formal church support during
members’ funerals and any variation in church teaching on giving. Neither the individual level
characteristics nor the church characteristics explain the treatment effects on giving.
Again, these findings are in line with hypothesis H2b and H2c (Spiritual insurance provided by
God). Hypothesis H1 - community insurance provided by the church - cannot explain the treatment
effects on the non-church recipients.
From this and the previous section, we can see that only Hypothesis H2 - the spiritual insur-
ance hypothesis - is in line with the evidence. Both predictions of Hypothesis H0 - no insurance
- contrast with the experimental results, while Hypothesis H1 - community insurance - though
compatible with the findings of the treatment effects on giving to the church, is not compatible
with the findings on giving to the other recipients.
3.5.3.3 Comparing those being enrolled in the insurance policy with those that do
not receive information about the insurance
As mentioned before, the insurance treatment includes both the actual insurance effect and a
salience effect and these two effects play in opposite directions. Table 3.9 in the appendix, which
compares those being enrolled in the insurance policy with those that do not receive information
about the insurance, shows that there is no significant difference in giving levels. Providing insur-
ance information to participants without giving them insurance leads them to increase donations
to the church and the two charitable recipients, while the provision of the formal insurance policy
leads our participants to decrease their donations to the church and the two charitable recipients.
These two effects are of similar magnitude and they cancel out. In other words, providing secular
funeral insurance counteracts the effect that a discussion about death has on individuals’ behaviour.
The fact that our experiment identifies an enrolment effect that is able to completely offset the
salience effect suggests that insurance coverage can provoke immediate behavioural changes. This
is in line with recent studies that explore the impact of agricultural insurance policies in developing
countries and find strong and immediate responses by farmers regarding production decisions of
the insured crop or animal (see Cai et al. (2015), Cole et al. (2017), Karlan et al. (2014)). Provided
that they trust the insurance, farmers begin to take riskier decisions such as choosing rain-sensitive
crops or a different level of fertilizer shortly after enrollment. The most important behavioural
changes in these settings took place on margins associated with the insured products with little
change for other uninsured investments, suggesting that risk and insurance coverage (or the lack of
it) were salient features in the farmers’ decisions.
141
This does not imply that in ordinary life church members are thinking specifically about in-
surance against funeral expenses when giving donations to the church. Indeed, in many of the
situations when church members make donations, as members of this group do in our dictator
games, these are unlikely to be mentally earmarked with the specific goal of decreasing the risks
of death. However, the behaviour of our two other groups not only shows that making these risks
salient has a real effect on donations - but it also tests for the mechanism by which making the
risks salient brings about this behavioural change, namely by inducing church members to seek
insurance from the church.
This is how communication within the church operates: pastors’ sermons frequently make life
risks (e.g. risk of death, or of joblessness, or marital failure, etc.) salient while suggesting dona-
tions as a means of coping with these risks. In this way, the church sermons themselves frequently
combine the two effects that our experiment seeks to disentangle (salience and insurance). An inter-
esting avenue for research would investigate the ancillary comparison separately: what behavioural
responses could we expect from insurance when risks are not made salient?
3.5.4 Discussion
3.5.4.1 How does insurance work?
These experimental results point to an interesting relationship between the type of insurance
parishioners might believe they receive from the church and their willingness to engage in costly
behaviours to signal membership. Firstly, treatment effects are present across the three recipients.
As discussed earlier, neither the street children’s fund nor the national thanksgiving offering are
linked to the participant’s church; and the configuration of our experimental laboratory, with phys-
ical partitions between the subjects, rules out any signalling motive. If the type of insurance the
participant associates with his/her church membership is purely community based, there should
not be a treatment effect on giving to these external recipients.
Thus, the fact that we find similar effects of giving to them, of similar magnitude as effects
on giving to the church, indicates that a substantial part of the insurance channel works through
beliefs that encourage giving as an act of worship to an interventionist god.
To investigate this spiritual insurance mechanism, we also look at the treatment effects in other
dictator games played by participants (as described in table 3.1). First, we investigate the possi-
bility to give to the church where the participant’s name would be attached to his donation rather
than an anonymous giving. Table 3.13 in the appendix shows that the priming and enrolment
treatments have qualitatively the same effect on church giving when donations are not anonymous
as when they are. The fact that our subjects do not try to signal their generosity through the use
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of nominal donations strengthens the interpretation that charitable behaviour is used as a spiritual
mechanism to cope with risk.
We also show in table 3.14 in the appendix that both the insurance information and the in-
surance enrollment treatment do not modify the participants’ decisions to allocate money to their
own church against charitable recipients (columns 1 to 4), nor the money allocation between the
two NGOs (column 5 and 6). Additionally, figure 3.1 shows that distributions to the different
recipients are very similar. It seems that the three different beneficiaries are equally important in
the participants’ mind for coping with risk.
3.5.4.2 Heterogeneous treatment effects: church members during fund-raising events
Up to this point, we discussed results for church members recruited during normal service weeks.
After recruitment, we learnt that two churches had hosted revival weeks during the course of our
experiments. Revival weeks are special periods of church activity where members are encouraged
to attend church daily. The services consist of prayer, teaching, singing, and exhortation to give
money to the church.
Kwabena (2015) describes revival meetings as an essential feature of the contemporary Pen-
tecostal liturgy. In his view, Pentecostal teaching is focused on “scriptures applied in ways that
encourage members to invest in financial markets, seize opportunities in education, business, poli-
tics and entertainment and wherever able, increase their spheres of influence in the world”. Access
to these material benefits is accomplished through religious activities including “massive revival
meetings, summits and conferences, all day prayer services and all-night prophetic vigils and mass
evangelistic crusades”.
In total, 122 church members participated in the experiment while they were in the middle of
a revival week.18 In terms of demographics, we do not find them to be different from members
recruited during regular service weeks. However, participants sampled during revival week are
more religiously active (see table 3.10 in the appendix). This could be due to selection or, more
likely, to a revival week effect. For this sample, we find important differences in treatment effects.
After receiving insurance information, revival week members decreased giving to the church and af-
ter being enrolled in insurance, they increased giving to the church (see table 3.11 in the appendix).
Referring back to the model, these results are consistent with interpreting the revival week as an
upwards shift of θ, the relative weight in our subjects’ utility function of church activities compared
to secular ones. As equation (3.38) in the appendix demonstrates, when equilibrium giving is higher
than a given threshold, even in the presence of spiritual insurance, church members respond to an
18Survey answers were saved for 117 individuals
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exogenous shock increasing the size of a loss by a decrease in optimal giving. Intuitively, there is
a point at which members have already given so much money to the church, that when faced with
the prospect of a negative income shock, they prefer to keep money to smooth secular consumption
(i.e., when g∗ is large, the income effect dominates the substitution effect).
This explanation of the revival week effect is consistent with the types of activities and benefits
members are supposed to derive from revival weeks. Additionally, we find suggestive evidence that
people who self report to be habitually high givers respond to treatment in the same manner as
people who completed the experiment during a revival week (see Table 3.15 in the appendix). In
other words, their reaction to our treatments is the reverse of the reaction of people who are not
in revival week, suggesting that for high givers the income effect dominates the substitution effect.
The results highlight that the spiritual state of church members (captured by θ in the model)
matters. Intensive religious participation seems to decrease the demand for spiritual insurance and
one might derive that overall demand for insurance, formal or informal, is low during important
religious events when individuals already “feel protected”. This result would point to a degree of
substitution between church participation and church giving; again, this calls for further research.
3.6 Conclusion
We conducted a lab-in-the-field experiment with church members from an established Pente-
costal church in Accra, Ghana. We find evidence for religious and charitable giving being part
of a church member’s risk-coping strategy. This spiritual insurance channel does not contradict
the possibility that other church community-based mechanisms exist in parallel. Indeed, survey
responses from church members and leaders emphasize the important role the church plays as a
financial contributor. However, our experimental findings add nuance to the literature on religious
institutions as coordinating platforms by demonstrating that adherents might care at least as much
about spiritual insurance (affecting outcomes through signalling to an interventionist God) as they
do about material insurance (accessing transfers of goods and services from other church members).
The treatment effects obtained within the church population depend on three important fac-
tors. First, Pentecostal churches stress the involvement of God in terms of blessings in everyday life
and teach about God rewarding religious and charitable giving. This particular religious discourse
makes members of these churches more prone to see charitable behaviour as a means to decrease
the risk of bad events happening and to increase the occurrence of good events. Second, trust in
insurance is fundamental, especially in a context where formal institutions are generally weak. In
our case, the church was used as a coordinator for the insurance scheme and participants seemed
to trust the insurance because it was coordinated by their pastor.19 Finally, our results obviously
19By contrast when we tried to run a similar experiment with the market association, the insurance enrollment
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depend on the absence (or limited presence) of better institutions to deal with risk. As long as these
three conditions are met we expect our results to hold. In particular, we believe that our results
would hold in other Pentecostal churches and settings where the development of formal insurance
is low. Since the focus on beliefs in religious rituals that influence immediate events are common
among a variety of religions and faiths in developing countries, it would be interesting to reproduce
the experiment in a different religious setting.
The experiment stressed the importance of religion for economic decisions made by individuals
in a setting with weak formal institutions. While individuals might go to religious institutions in
those settings because they offer risk-mitigating strategies, we show that formal, private insurance
can at least partially substitute spiritual based insurance mechanisms. Since the church was used as
a credible coordinator for the insurance scheme, we are inclined to see religious institutions in this
context as opportunities to spread formal insurance rather than as an obstacle to its development.
failed to yield any effect because market participants did not trust the head of the market association who was chosen
to administrate the insurance scheme.
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3.7 Appendix
3.7.1 Tables
(1)
mean
Age of the church branch 26.17
Number of church members (approx.) 1035.67
Church members have an education level higher than average 0.33
Church members have income higher than average 0.17
Average number attending Sunday service 610.00
Average amount received on a Sunday 1150.00
The church owns its building 0.83
The church owns other properties 0.17
Number of paid staff 6.67
The church has a welfare fund 1.00
Observations 6
Note: Information about each individual church branch can be found in Table 3.12
Table 3.4: Summary statistics of church branches
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(1)
mean
I have found (or I am most likely to find) my spouse:
In church 0.40
Through friends 0.08
Through family 0.10
Through work 0.15
Through school 0.04
Thanks to other social gathering 0.14
On the Internet 0.00
Other 0.04
Do you do business with people from the same church as you?
Yes, only 0.09
Yes, I try 0.39
No, not important 0.49
No, I avoid 0.01
Who do you call when you need counselling about personal or family issues?
No one 0.05
Government or NGO social services 0.00
Friends 0.20
Family 0.39
Pastor 0.71
Church member 0.25
Work superior 0.04
Medical professional 0.03
Other 0.06
Note: Includes all participants. For the last question, multiple answers were possible. The
questions were answered in a face-to-face interview with a enumerator.
Table 3.5: Social role of the churches
(1) (2)
Study participants General population
mean mean
female 0.61 0.52
married 0.43 0.39
higher education 0.28 0.15
employed 0.62 0.76
income 362.08 445.50
Note: Includes all study participants (column 1). Figures for general population are from Ghana
Living Standard Survey Round 6 (Ghana Statistical Service (2014)). Higher education is defined
as having completed at least high school.
Table 3.6: Summary statistics of study participants and comparison with general population
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(1) (2) (3)
Insurance Insurance information No insurance
mean mean mean
female 0.54 (0.05) 0.64 (0.77) 0.65
age 36.77 (0.45) 35.68 (0.99) 35.69
married 0.45 (0.49) 0.44 (0.66) 0.41
higher education 0.29 (0.94) 0.26 (0.65) 0.29
employed 0.62 (0.61) 0.59 (0.34) 0.65
monthly income 378.97 (0.40) 361.41 (0.72) 346.67
going to church daily 0.08 (0.88) 0.07 (0.69) 0.08
frequent prayer 0.90 (0.30) 0.93 (0.05) 0.86
any insurance 0.44 (0.83) 0.45 (0.71) 0.42
Observations 144 107 153
F stat .53 .76
p-value .85 .65
Note: P-values of a t-test of equality of mean between insurance or insurance information and no
insurance groups are reported between parentheses. Higher education is defined as having
completed at least high school. Frequent prayer is defined as praying at least once per day.
Table 3.7: Summary statistics of study participants across treatments
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(1)
mean
Main reason for your church choice:
Teaching about God 0.87
Moral guidance 0.53
Atmosphere of the services 0.38
Friends and relatives 0.28
Welcoming community 0.21
Presence of interesting and succesful people 0.08
Meeting good marriage partner 0.04
Location of church building 0.15
Comfortable facilities 0.04
Other 0.04
Who would go for financial help?
No one 0.09
Government or NGO social services 0.02
Friends 0.26
Family 0.53
Church community 0.25
Bank 0.16
Informal financial services 0.08
Work superior 0.04
Others 0.06
Church assistance
I have received financial assistance from my church in the last 2 years 0.26
Financial decision
I usually participate to financial decisions in my household 0.62
I usually participate to financial decisions in my household - women only 0.60
Do you hold other type of insurance?
Yes, NIH 0.31
Yes, other type of insurance 0.19
Yes, NIH or other insurance 0.44
Note: Includes all study participants. In the first 2 questions, multiple answers were possible.
Table 3.8: Financial role of the churches
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Giving to church Giving to church Giving to thanks. Giving to thanks. Giving to street. Giving to street.
Insurance -0.116 -0.166 -0.159 -0.185 0.0827 0.0198
(0.387) (0.290) (0.347) (0.292) (0.377) (0.329)
Constant 5.044∗∗∗ 3.957∗∗ 4.937∗∗∗ 7.568∗∗∗ 5.219∗∗∗ 5.024∗∗∗
(0.259) (1.657) (0.203) (1.535) (0.267) (1.679)
Individual controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
Church dummies No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 334 297 334 297 334 297
Note: Tobit regression censored at 0 and 11. Dependent variables measure donations intended for the own church branch, the street
children’s fund (secular NGO) and the Inter-denominational Thanksgiving (religious NGO) with the alternative option to keep the
money. Control variables include participants demographics and measures of religious behaviour. Standard errors (between
parentheses) are clustered at session level. Significance levels: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01.
Table 3.9: Giving after enrolment in insurance compared to giving with no insurance nor insurance information
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(1) (2)
Non revival participants Revival participants
mean mean
female 0.61 0.61
age 36.07 34.96
married 0.43 0.32
higher education 0.28 0.35
employed 0.62 0.56
monthly income 362.08 367.24
going to church daily 0.08 0.11
frequent prayer 0.89 0.96
any insurance 0.44 0.48
Observations 404 117
F stat 1.59
p-value .12
Note: Revival participants are defined as participants that did the experiment during a revival
week. Revival weeks are defined as fundraising weeks with a higher number of services (usually
one per day). Higher education is defined as completing at least high school. Frequent prayer is
defined as praying at least once per day.
Table 3.10: Comparison of regular and revival week participants
(1) (2)
Giving to church Giving to church
Insurance -0.911∗ 2.249∗∗∗
(0.475) (0.661)
No insurance -0.878∗ 2.033∗∗
(0.460) (0.956)
Revival week -2.247∗∗∗
(0.619)
Revival week X Insurance 3.065∗∗∗
(0.824)
Revival week X No insurance 2.866∗∗∗
(1.062)
Constant 4.726∗∗∗ 2.468
(0.956) (1.877)
Constant 3.447∗∗∗ 3.585∗∗∗
(0.151) (0.261)
Individual controls Yes Yes
Observations 521 117
Note: Tobit regression censored at 0 and 11. Dependent variables measure donations intended for
the own church branch, the street children’s fund (secular NGO) and the Inter-denominational
Thanksgiving (religious NGO) with the alternative option to keep the money. Standard errors
(between parenthesis) are clustered at session level. Significance levels: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05;
∗∗∗p<0.01.
Table 3.11: Treatment effects on church giving for total sample (column 1) and revival week only
(colmun 2)
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Age of the church branch 27 22 21 22 43 22
Number of church members (approx.) 2500 300 500 500 2114 300
Church members have an education level higher than average Yes No No No Yes No
Church members have income higher than average No No No No Yes No
Average number attending Sunday service 1500 250 200 300 1260 150
Average amount received on a Sunday (GHS) 2000 . 300 . .
The church owns its building Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
The church owns other properties No No No No Yes No
Number of paid staff 8 4 6 8 13 1
The church has a welfare fund Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: Each column represents one church where we recruited participants for the study.
Information was gathered by semi-structures questionnaires with a pastor, usually the head
pastor.
Table 3.12: Information on church branches
(1) (2)
Giving to Church named (vs keep) Giving to Church named (vs keep)
model
Insurance -1.013∗∗ -0.928∗
(0.473) (0.483)
No insurance -0.548 -0.607
(0.493) (0.495)
Constant 5.607∗∗∗ 4.492∗∗∗
(0.413) (1.520)
sigma
Constant 3.574∗∗∗ 3.528∗∗∗
(0.203) (0.214)
Individual controls No Yes
Church dummies No Yes
Observations 454 404
Note: Tobit regression censored at 0 and 11. Dependent variables measure donations intended for
the own church branch, the street children’s fund (secular NGO) and the Inter-denominational
Thanksgiving (religious NGO) with the alternative option to keep the money. Standard errors
(between parenthesis) are clustered at session level. Significance levels: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05;
∗∗∗p<0.01.
Table 3.13: Non-anonymous church giving
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Thanks Thanks Street Street Thanks Thanks
(vs church) (vs church) (vs church) (vs church) (vs street) (vs street)
Insurance -0.082 -0.129 0.006 0.024 -0.255 -0.389
(0.330) (0.298) (0.271) (0.307) (0.266) (0.262)
No insurance 0.093 -0.114 0.169 0.234 -0.127 -0.388
(0.335) (0.303) (0.258) (0.300) (0.254) (0.243)
Constant 4.901∗∗∗ 7.658∗∗∗ 5.702∗∗∗ 6.772∗∗∗ 4.841∗∗∗ 6.769∗∗∗
(0.249) (1.050) (0.205) (0.831) (0.185) (0.963)
Individual controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
Church dummies No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 454 404 454 404 454 404
Note: Includes only normal study participants (not revival). Tobit regression censored at 0 and 11. Dependent variables measure
donations intended for one institution compared to another institution. Thanks = Inter-denominational thanksgiving fund; Street =
Street children’s fund; church = own church branch (anonymously). Significance levels: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01.
Table 3.14: Treatment effects for other dictator games
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(1) (2) (3)
Giving to church Giving to thanks. Giving to street.
Insurance -0.955∗ -1.197∗∗ -1.229∗∗
(0.540) (0.599) (0.487)
No insurance -1.198∗∗ -1.354∗∗∗ -1.333∗∗∗
(0.521) (0.499) (0.477)
High givers -0.750 -1.635∗∗ -1.307∗∗
(0.644) (0.656) (0.633)
High givers X Insurance 0.609 1.173 1.290
(0.872) (0.802) (0.825)
High givers X No insurance 1.358∗ 2.373∗∗∗ 0.991
(0.788) (0.812) (0.815)
Revival week -1.893∗∗∗ -2.436∗∗∗ -2.376∗∗∗
(0.620) (0.491) (0.443)
Revival week X Insurance 2.800∗∗∗ 2.833∗∗∗ 2.872∗∗∗
(0.939) (0.727) (0.526)
Revival week X No insurance 2.293∗∗ 2.424∗∗ 2.191∗∗∗
(1.013) (0.989) (0.744)
employed 0.273 0.478 0.0471
(0.313) (0.307) (0.318)
log(income) 0.113 -0.177 0.200
(0.197) (0.248) (0.208)
going to church daily -0.128 -0.925∗ -0.764
(0.569) (0.553) (0.602)
going to church more -0.0586 -0.785∗∗ -0.697
than once per week (0.414) (0.357) (0.423)
frequent prayer 0.0404 0.787 -0.278
(0.559) (0.548) (0.564)
Constant 5.307∗∗∗ 6.699∗∗∗ 6.293∗∗∗
(1.307) (1.366) (1.298)
Observations 514 514 514
Note: Includes all study participants. Tobit regression censored at 0 and 11. Dependent variables measure
donations intended for the own church branch, the street children’s fund (secular NGO) and the
Inter-denominational Thanksgiving (religious NGO) with the alternative option to keep the money.
Standard errors (between parenthesis) are clustered at session level. Significance levels: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05;
∗∗∗p<0.01.
Table 3.15: Comparing revival church members and church members giving relatively high amounts
to the church
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3.7.2 Model Appendix
3.7.2.1 Setup
We assume that a church member has an income of Y and chooses to give an amount g to the
church. The church member enjoys utility u(.) from consuming secular goods, and utility θf(.)
from consuming church goods. Thus a church member who gives g to the church enjoys a total
utility of u(Y − g) + θf(g). Both utility functions are concave, thrice differentiable, and increasing
in their arguments. In each period church members face a probability π of an income loss of size
D.
Under the assumption that insurance is offered through the church community, church giving
also has the impact of reducing the size of the loss, thus the total loss would be D − l(g). The
function l(g) is assumed to be increasing and concave. Under the assumption that church members
believe in spiritual insurance, this probability is decomposed into a basic probability of loss π˜, and
a portion of the loss that can be mitigated by giving money to spiritual goods. Therefore, the total
subjective probability of giving is π = π˜− p(g). The function p(g) is assumed to be increasing and
concave.
3.7.2.2 Optimal giving to the church in the absence of any insurance
In this section we assume that church members choose a particular level of giving to maximise
their total expected utility. There is no insurance offered through the church.
max
g
(1− π)u(Y − g) + πu(Y − g −D) + θf(g) (3.7)
This leads to the following first order condition:
(π − 1)u′(Y − g)− πu′(Y − g −D) + θf ′(g) = 0 (3.8)
The second order condition is satisfied:
(1− π)u′′(Y − g) + πu′′(Y − g −D) + θf ′′(g) < 0
To determine how optimal giving varies with D the size of the loss, we rewrite the FOC in terms
of g∗(D, θ),
(π − 1)u′(Y − g∗(D, θ))− πu′(Y − g∗(D, θ)−D) + θf ′(g∗(D, θ)) = 0 (3.9)
This equation implicitly defines the optimal giving g∗, which is a function of the expected loss
D and θ.
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We want to know the impact of experimentally manipulating D on the level of giving of indi-
viduals, in other terms the sign of
∂g∗(D, θ)
∂D
.
Let g∗
′
D(D, θ) =
∂g∗(D, θ)
∂D
. Taking the derivative of the FOC with respect to D leads to the
following equality:
g∗
′
D(D, θ) ∗ [π[u
′′(Y − g∗ −D)− u′′(Y − g∗)] + u′′(Y − g∗) + θf ′′(g∗)] = −πu′′(Y − g∗ −D) (3.10)
The right-hand side of the expression is positive. Each individual term of the expression multi-
plied by g∗
′
D is negative. Therefore g
∗
′
D must also be negative.
Let us call g∗
′
θ =
∂g∗(D, θ)
∂θ
. We can also show that g∗
′
θ is positive: a positive shock on the
utility from consuming church goods increases church donations. Taking the derivative of the FOC
with respect to θ leads to the following equality:
g∗
′
θ (D, θ) ∗ [(1− π)u
′′(Y − g∗) + πu′′(Y − g∗ −D) + θf ′′(g∗)] = −f ′(g∗) (3.11)
The right-hand side of the expression is negative. Each individual term of the expression mul-
tiplied by g∗
′
θ is negative. Therefore g
∗
′
θ is positive.
3.7.2.3 Community insurance: optimal giving when giving reduces the size of a loss
In this section we assume that giving to church reduces the size of the loss. L = D − l(g) This
assumption illustrates the channel of community insurance.
max
g
(1− π)u(Y − g) + πu(Y − g −D + l(g)) + θf(g) (3.12)
This leads to the following first order condition:
(π − 1)u′(Y − g) + π(−1 + l′(g))u′(Y − g −D + l(g)) + θf ′(g) = 0 (3.13)
The secod order condition is satisfied:
(1− π)u′′(Y − g) + πl′′(g)u′(Y − g −D + l(g)) + π(l′(g)− 1)2u′′(Y − g −D + l(g)) + θf ′′(g) < 0
Rewriting the FOC in terms of g∗(D, θ):
(π − 1)u′(Y − g∗(D, θ))) + π(−1 + l′(g∗(D, θ)))u′(Y − g∗(D, θ)−D + l(g∗(D, θ)))
+ θf ′(g∗(D, θ))) = 0 (3.14)
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Taking the derivative of the FOC with respect to D leads to the following equality:
g∗
′
D ∗ [(1− π)u
′′(Y − g∗) + π(l′(g∗)− 1)2u′′(Y − g∗ −D + l(g∗))
+ πl′′(g∗)u′(Y − g −D + l(g∗)) + θf ′′(g∗)] = π(l′(g∗)− 1)u′′(Y − g∗ −D + l(g)) (3.15)
On the right-hand side u′′(Y − g∗−D+ l(g)) is always negative while the expression multiplied
by g∗
′
D of the left-hand side is also always negative. Therefore the sign of g
∗
′
D depends on (l
′(g∗)−1).
This provides a relationship between the efficiency of community based insurance and the op-
timal response of giving.
g∗
′
D > 0 when l
′(g∗) > 1, or g∗ < l′−1(1) (3.16)
and
g∗
′
D ≤ 0 when l
′(g∗) ≤ 1, or g∗ ≥ l′−1(1) (3.17)
These conditions tell us that for low levels of optimal giving, experimentally increasing the
perceived loss D will decrease optimal giving.
We show below that the variation in optimal giving g∗ can be the result of a variation in θ.
More particularly, we demonstrate that g∗
′
θ > 0. Taking the derivative of the FOC with respect to
θ gives:
g∗
′
θ ∗ [(1− π)u
′′(Y − g∗) + πl′′(g∗)u′(Y − g∗ −D + l(g∗))
+ π(−1 + l′(g∗))2u′′(Y − g∗ −D + l(g∗)) + θf ′′(g∗)] = −f ′(g∗) (3.18)
The right-hand side of the expression is negative. Each individual term of the expression mul-
tiplied by g∗
′
θ is negative. Therefore g
∗
′
θ is positive.
Therefore our model predicts that there exist a threshold level for θ that will trigger a switch
in the sign of g∗
′
D.
3.7.2.3.1 Numerical illustration
Graphs 3.2 and 3.3 illustrate a numerical example, in which we simulate the case of g
′
∗
D(D, θ)
changing sign around the threshold θ˜.
This example uses a CARA utility function (u(c) = 1 − exp(−ac)), and assumes that l(g) =
s log(1 + g). The parameters D, s are chosen such that D − l(g) ≥ 0. Figure 3.2 shows that the
optimal giving g∗(D, θ) is increasing in θ while Figure 3.3 indicates that g∗(D, θ) is an increasing
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Note: Y = 10, D = 8, π = 0.4, u(.) CARA with a = 0.1, f(.) CARA with a = 1, and l(.) a
logarithmic function with s = 3.5
Figure 3.2: Community insurance - Numerical example
function of D until the threshold θ˜ = 0.345.
3.7.2.4 Spiritual insurance: optimal giving when giving reduces the subjective prob-
ability of a loss
In this section we assume that giving reduces the size of the loss. π = π˜−p(g) This assumption
illustrates the channel of spiritual insurance.
max
g
(1− π˜ + p(g))u(Y − g) + (π˜ − p(g))u(Y − g −D) + θf(g) (3.19)
This leads to the following first order condition:
p′(g)u(Y −g)−(1−π˜+p(g))u′(Y −g)−p′(g)u(Y −g−D)−(π˜−p(g))u′(Y −g−D)+θf ′(g) = 0 (3.20)
Taking the second derivative of the objective function leads to:
p′′(g)(u(Y − g)− u(Y − g −D)) + 2p′(g)(u′(Y − g −D)− u′(Y − g))+
(1− π˜ + p(g))u′′(Y − g) + (π˜ − p(g))u′′(Y − g −D) + θf ′′(g) (3.21)
The first, third, fourth, and fifth terms are negative. The second term is positive. Intuitively, this
expression is negative and the SOC is satisfied if the effect of the loss on the marginal utility of
income not be too large. In other words, the income effect of the loss on the demand for insurance
should not outweigh the substitution effect.
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Note: g∗
′
(D) as a function of θ - numerical example marking the threshold θ˜ where the sign of
g∗
′
(D) changes from positive to negative
Figure 3.3: Community insurance - Threshold on θ
This condition is not too demanding. For example, it is satisfied in the numerical simulation
shown below, where u is a CARA utility function: u(c) = 1− e−ac. Indeed, in this case,
p′′(g)(u(Y − g)− u(Y − g −D)) + 2p′(g)(u′(Y − g −D)− u′(Y − g))+
(1− π˜ + p(g))u′′(Y − g) + (π˜ − p(g))u′′(Y − g −D) + θf ′′(g)
= [p′′(g) + 2ap′(g))− a2(π˜ − p(g))](e(−a(Y−g−D)) − e(−a(Y−g)))− a2e(−a(Y−g)) + θf ′′(g) (3.22)
A sufficient condition for this expression to be negative is thus given by
p′′(g) + 2ap′(g)− a2(π˜ − p(g)) ≤ 0
With p(g) = klog(1 + g) as in the numerical example below, this is equivalent to
k ≤
π˜
2
a(1+g) −
1
a2(1+g)2
+ log(1 + g)
This condition holds for example in the simulation below, where Y = 10, D = 8, π˜ = 0.4, a = 0.1
and k = 0.09.
In order to determine how optimal giving varies with D the size of the loss, we rewrite the FOC
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in terms of g∗(D, θ),
p′(g∗(D, θ))u(Y − g∗(D, θ))− (1− π˜ + p(g∗(D, θ)))u′(Y − g∗(D, θ))−
p′(g∗(D, θ))u(Y − g∗(D, θ)−D)− (π˜ − p(g∗(D, θ)))u′(Y − g∗(D, θ)−D) + θf ′(g∗(D, θ)) = 0
(3.23)
Taking the derivative of the FOC with respect to D leads to the following equality:
g∗
′
D ∗ [p
′′(g∗)[u(Y − g∗)− u(Y − g∗ −D)] + 2p′(g∗)[u′(Y − g∗ −D)− u′(Y − g∗)]
+ (π˜ − p(g∗))[u′′(Y − g∗ −D)− u′′(Y − g∗)] + u′′(Y − g∗) + f ′′(g)]
= −[p′(g∗)u′(Y − g ∗ −D) + (π˜ − p(g))u′′(Y − g∗ −D)] (3.24)
Therefore, we have the following conditions:
g∗
′
D > 0 when − [p
′(g∗)u′(Y − g ∗ −D) + (π˜ − p(g))u′′(Y − g∗ −D)] < 0 (3.25)
g∗
′
D < 0 when − [p
′(g∗)u′(Y − g ∗ −D) + (π˜ − p(g))u′′(Y − g∗ −D)] > 0 (3.26)
3.7.2.4.1 Numerical illustration
We simplify these conditions using a CARA utility function: u(c) = 1 − e−ac, u′(c) = ae−ac,
u′′(c) = −a2e−ac and the risk aversion R(c) = −
u′′(c)
u′(c)
= a
− p′(g)− (π − p(g))
u′′(Y − g −D)
u′(Y − g −D)
= −p′(g) + (π˜ − p(g))a (3.27)
Therefore:
g∗
′
D > 0 when − p
′(g∗) + (π˜ − p(g∗))a < 0 (3.28)
g∗
′
D < 0 when − p
′(g∗) + (π˜ − p(g∗))a > 0 (3.29)
which can be rewritten as:
g∗
′
D > 0 when
1
a
p′(g∗) > (π˜ − p(g∗)) (3.30)
g∗
′
D < 0 when
1
a
p′(g∗) < (π˜ − p(g∗)) (3.31)
161
Therefore, we find that g∗
′
D is positive when the effectiveness of the spiritual insurance divided
by the coefficient of absolute risk aversion at g∗ is greater than the level of risk at g∗.
We can now also derive the conditions under which g∗
′
D is increasing until a certain level, and
then decreasing. For this, we use the following reformulation of conditions (3.30) and (3.31):
g∗
′
D > 0 when p
′(g∗) + ap(g∗) > aπ˜ (3.32)
g∗
′
D < 0 when p
′(g∗) + ap(g∗) < aπ˜ (3.33)
Let us define Γ(g) = p′(g) + ap(g). For g∗
′
D to be first positive and then negative we need Γ(g)
to be decreasing:
g∗
′
D > 0 when g
∗ < Γ−1(aπ) (3.34)
g∗
′
D < 0 when g
∗ > Γ−1(aπ) (3.35)
In order for Γ′ to be decreasing, we need the following condition to be true:
Γ′(g) ≤ 0⇔ p′′(g) + ap′(g) ≤ 0 (3.36)
In the following, we will use a parametrization of p(g) that is concave, and an a such that
condition (3.36) hold in order to illustrate that with an increase in the level of giving, due to a
higher θ for example, the sign of g∗
′
D can reverse.
We know that g∗ is a function of θ, and we will now show a numerical example that illustrates
the possibility of g∗
′
D|g∗(θ) to be positive until g
∗(θ˜) and negative afterwards. We will use the a
simple logarithmic function p(g) = klog(g + 1) where π˜ and k are such that 0 < π˜ − p(g) < 1. If
we insert this into equation (3.30), we get:
−
k
g∗(θ) + 1
+ (π˜ − klog(g∗(θ) + 1))a < 0 (3.37)
Together with (3.31), we know that at a specific θ˜, this equation is equal to zero:
−
k
g∗(θ˜) + 1
+ (π˜ − klog(g∗(θ˜) + 1))a = 0 (3.38)
The following graphs illustrate a numerical example, in which we simulate the case of g∗(θ)
being around the threshold in (3.38).
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Note: Y = 10, D = 8, π = 0.4, u(.) CARA with a = 0.1, f(.) CARA with a = 1, and p(.) a
logarithmic function with k = 0.09
Figure 3.4: Spiritual insurance - Numerical example
Note: Marks the threshold θ˜ where the sign of g∗
′
(D) changes from positive to negative
Figure 3.5: Spiritual insurance: Response of optimal giving to an increase in D
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3.7.3 Questionnaire
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1. How old are you?
– number between 18 and 75
2. What is your gender?
– Male
– Female
– prefer not to answer
– do not know
– not applicable
3. Where were you born?
– Accra
– Rural Ghana
– Urban Ghana (not Accra)
– Outside Ghana in Africa
– Outside Africa
– prefer not to answer
– do not know
– not applicable
4. How long have you lived in Accra?
– Whole life
– More than 10 years
– 5 – 10 years
– 2-5 years
– Less than 2 years
– prefer not to answer
– do not know
– not applicable
5. Are you married?
– Yes
– No
– prefer not to answer
– do not know
– not applicable
6. What is the highest level of education you
have completed?
– No schooling
– Primary
– JHSS
– SHS
– Polytechnic
– Professional degree
– First degree
– Advanced degree
– prefer not to answer
– do not know
– not applicable
7. As an adult, have you ever left Ghana for
more than 3 months for work or study?
– Yes
– Where did you go?
– No
– prefer not to answer
– do not know
– not applicable
8. What is your current work status?
– Student
– Unemployed or casual workers
– Employed
– Self-employed
– Inactive(e.g. housewife)
– Retired
– prefer not to answer
– do not know
– not applicable
9. In which sector is your principal activity?
– Unemployed
– Student
– Government
– Agriculture
– Services
– Manufacturing or construction
– Not-for-profit
– prefer not to answer
– do not know
– not applicable
10. What is your principal source of income?
– Salaried job
– Entrepreneur
– Family
– Pension
– Social support
– prefer not to answer
– do not know
– not applicable
11. How many people live in your household?
– number
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– prefer not to answer
– do not know
– not applicable
12. Who usually makes the final financial de-
cisions in your household?
– Me
– Spouse
– Parent
– Other senior relative
– Joint decisions incl. me
– Joint decisions not incl. me
– prefer not to answer
– do not know
– not applicable
13. How much do you earn on average per
month in Ghana cedis?
– Less than 200
– 200 – 500
– 500-1000
– 1000-1500
– 1500-2000
– 2500-3000
– 3000-8000
– More than 8000
– prefer not to answer
– do not know
– not applicable
14. How much does your household earn on av-
erage per month in Ghana cedis?
– Less than 200
– 200 – 500
– 500-1000
– 1000-1500
– 1500-2000
– 2500-3000
– 3000-8000
– More than 8000
– prefer not to answer
– do not know
– not applicable
15. Are you responsible for the daily financial
needs (not including any salary payments)
of any of the following people other than
yourself?
– Minor children
– Adult children
– Elderly parent
– Other family
– Other community member
– prefer not to answer
– do not know
– not applicable
16. How many people in each of the categories
are you financially responsible for?
17. Which of the following expenses in you and
your dependents’ lives do you face on a reg-
ular monthly basis?
– Food
– Sickness(including medication costs,
etc.)
– Transport
– Insurance
– Helping needy family members
– Church contribution
– Other social contribution (e.g. pledge
to a school or charity)
– Investment in own business
– Investment in friend, relative, or busi-
ness partner’s business
– prefer not to answer
– do not know
– not applicable
18. How much do you spend each month in
cedis on the particular expenses?
19. In the last year, was there a substantial,
unexpected increase in any of these aspects
of you and your dependant’s lives?
– Food
– Sickness(including medication costs,
etc.)
– Transport
– Insurance
– Helping needy family members
– Church contribution
– Other social contribution (e.g. pledge
to a school or charity)
– Investment in own business
– Investment in friend, relative, or busi-
ness partner’s business
– I faced no unexpected expenses
– prefer not to answer
– do not know
– not applicable
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20. How much did you spend to address the
substantial increase?
21. What is your principal daily means of
transport?
– Privately owned car
– Privately owned motorcycle
– Trotro
– Taxi
– Bicycle
– Foot
– Train
– prefer not to answer
– do not know
– not applicable
22. How many cellphones do you own?
– number
– prefer not to answer
– do not know
– not applicable
23. How many hours a week do you spend
browsing the internet?
– Less than 30 minutes
– 30 minutes to 2 hours
– 2 to 5 hours
– 5-10 hours
– More than 10 hours
– prefer not to answer
– do not know
– not applicable
24. Do you own a business?
– Yes
– No
– prefer not to answer
– do not know
– not applicable
25. How many years have you owned your busi-
ness?
– Less than 1 year
– 1 – 3 years
– 3 – 10 years
– More than 10 years
– prefer not to answer
– do not know
– not applicable
26. How many employees do you have?
– number
– prefer not to answer
– do not know
– not applicable
27. Which religion do you belong to?
– Pentecostal or charismatic Christian
– Catholic Christian
– Traditional
– Protestant Christian
– Muslim
– No religion
– prefer not to answer
– do not know
– not applicable
28. Were you born into this religion?
– Yes
– No
– prefer not to answer
– do not know
– not applicable
29. Which denomination do you belong to?
(Please specify a particular denomination,
e.g. Action Chapel, ICGC, etc.)
– name
– prefer not to answer
– do not know
– not applicable
30. Do you belong to a different denomination
than 5 years ago?
– No
– Yes,I changed within the last 5 years
– Yes, I changed more than 5 years ago
– prefer not to answer
– do not know
– not applicable
31. What are the main reasons you are with
your current church?
– The teaching about God corresponds
to what I believe in
– I go for the moral guidance to me and
my family
– I like the atmosphere of the services
– Friends or relatives brought me there
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– Other members made an effort to wel-
come me
– The congregation contains many in-
teresting and successful people
– I hope to meet a good marriage part-
ner for me or my children
– The building is close to my home
– The facilities are comfortable (e.g.
airconditioning, comfortable seating,
etc.)
– prefer not to answer
– do not know
– not applicable
32. Are you engaged in any of the following
ministries of your church?
– Ushering or welcoming guests
– Children’s ministry
– Worship team
– Prayer ministry
– Men or women’s ministry
– Youth ministry
– Outreach
– Deacon or deaconess
– Protocol
– Pastoring
– prefer not to answer
– do not know
– not applicable
33. How many hours a week do you spend
on each ministry? (preparation, participa-
tion, etc.)
34. Have you received financial assistance from
your church in the last 5 years (incl. pro-
visions)?
– Yes
– No
– prefer not to answer
– do not know
– not applicable
35. How many times per week or per year do
you attend your church?
– Less than once a year
– A few times per year
– A few times per month
– Weekly
– More than once per week
– prefer not to answer
– do not know
– not applicable
36. On average, how many hours do you spend
each time you visit your church? (e.g du-
ration of a service, prayer meeting, etc.)
– Less than 1 hour
– 1-2 hours
– 2-3 hours
– More than 3 hours
– prefer not to answer
– do not know
– not applicable
37. How many hours do you travel (going and
coming) to attend your regular church?
– Less than 30minutes
– 30minutes – 1 hour
– More than 1 hour
– prefer not to answer
– do not know
– not applicable
38. Have you moved your place of residence in
order to be closer to your church?
– Yes
– No
– prefer not to answer
– do not know
– not applicable
39. In the last 6 weeks, have you engaged in
any of the following activities to bring oth-
ers to your church?
– Preaching or teaching in the church
– Preaching or teaching outside the
church
– Inviting friends or family to church
– Distributing church material in public
– Speaking or writing in public media
(newspapers, radio, television, etc.)
– Prayer
– prefer not to answer
– do not know
– not applicable
40. How often do you pray to God?
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– Multiple times per day
– Once per day
– A few times per week
– Occasionally
– prefer not to answer
– do not know
– not applicable
41. Are there any foods you do not eat for re-
ligious reasons?
– Yes
– No
– prefer not to answer
– do not know
– not applicable
42. Do you drink alcohol?
– Yes
– No
– prefer not to answer
– do not know
– not applicable
43. Is this decision for religious reasons?
– Yes
– No
– prefer not to answer
– do not know
– not applicable
44. Do you smoke tobacco?
– Yes
– No
– prefer not to answer
– do not know
– not applicable
45. Is this decision for religious reasons?
– Yes
– No
– prefer not to answer
– do not know
– not applicable
46. Do your religious beliefs affect the way you
dress?
– Yes
– No
– prefer not to answer
– do not know
– not applicable
47. Which of the following ceremonies have
you done or would you do for your new-
born child?
– Traditional naming
– Church blessing
– Baptism
– Outdooring party
– Nothing
– prefer not to answer
– do not know
– not applicable
48. What was the main cause of the most re-
cent death in your extended family?
– Accident
– Illness
– Violence
– Old age
– prefer not to answer
– do not know
– not applicable
49. Do you think there was spiritual element
involved?
– Yes
– No
– prefer not to answer
– do not know
– not applicable
50. How much on average do you give to the
church per month?
– Less than 5 cedis
– 5 – 10 cedis
– 11 – 50 cedis
– 51 – 100 cedis
– 101 – 200cedis
– 201-500 cedis
– More than 501 cedis
– prefer not to answer
– do not know
– not applicable
51. Does giving to charity serve the same spir-
itual duty as giving directly to the church?
– No, charity is more important
– No, charity is less important
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– Yes, they are equally important
– I do not think I have a duty to either.
– prefer not to answer
– do not know
– not applicable
52. How is God involved in your finances?
– God leaves me to run my own finan-
cial affairs
– God provides enough that I do not
suffer
– God blesses me with financial abun-
dance
– God is not interested in my finances
– prefer not to answer
– do not know
– not applicable
53. Is it important for you that your close
friends come from the same church as you?
– Yes, I try to only make friends with
people from my church or mosque
– Yes, I try to seek people from my
church or mosque but it is not so im-
portant
– No, it is not important at all
– No, I prefer not to be friends with
people from my church or mosque
– prefer not to answer
– do not know
– not applicable
54. Is it important for you that your coworkers
come from the same church as you?
– Yes, I only work with people from my
church or mosque
– Yes, I try to seek people from my
church or mosque but it is not so im-
portant
– No, it is not important at all
– No, I prefer not to work with people
from my church or mosque
– prefer not to answer
– do not know
– not applicable
55. Do you try to do business with people from
the same church as you?
– Yes, I only work with people from my
church
– Yes, I try to seek people from my
church but it is not so important
– No, it is not important at all
– No, I prefer not to work with people
from my church or mosque
– prefer not to answer
– do not know
– not applicable
56. Who do you call when you need counselling
about personal or family issues?
– No one
– Government or NGO social services
– Friends
– Family
– Pastor
– Imam
– Church member
– Work superior
– Medical professional
– prefer not to answer
– do not know
– not applicable
57. Who do you go to when you need financial
help?
– No one
– Government or NGO social services
– Friends
– Family
– Church community
– Bank
– Informal financial services (e.g susu
group, moneylenders)
– Work superior
– prefer not to answer
– do not know
– not applicable
58. Who do you go to for medical support
when you are sick?
– No one
– Government hospital
– Private hospital
– Traditional healer
– Local clinic
– Friends
– Family
– Pastor
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– Imam
– Work superior
– prefer not to answer
– do not know
– not applicable
59. Within the last 2 years, have you ever at-
tended a prayer camp either for yourself or
on behalf of a friend or family member?
– Yes
– No
– prefer not to answer
– do not know
– not applicable
60. Which other clubs or associations are you
an active member of?
– name
– prefer not to answer
– do not know
– not applicable
61. How did you meet your spouse if you are
married? Where is the most likely place
you will meet your spouse if you are not
married?
– Church
– Through friends
– Through family
– Through work
– Through school
– Other social gathering
– Internet
– prefer not to answer
– do not know
– not applicable
62. Generally speaking, would you say other
Ghanaians can be trusted?
– People can almost always be trusted
– People can usually be trusted
– You usually cannot be too careful
dealing with people
– You always cannot be too careful
dealing with people
– prefer not to answer
– do not know
– not applicable
63. How much of the time do you trust the
Ghanaian government?
– I always trust the government
– I mostly trust the government
– I mostly mistrust the government
– I always mistrust the government
– prefer not to answer
– do not know
– not applicable
64. Are you registered for the National Health
Insurance Scheme?
– No
– Yes
– prefer not to answer
– do not know
– not applicable
65. Why not?
66. Do you hold any other sorts of insurance?
– Yes
– No
– prefer not to answer
– do not know
– not applicable
67. Please specify which ones
– name
– prefer not to answer
– do not know
– not applicable
ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS FOR MAR-
KET MEMBERS
68. Do you belong to the Kaneshie Markets As-
sociation?
– Yes
– No
– prefer not to answer
– do not know
– not applicable
69. How many years have you belonged to the
association?
– number
– prefer not to answer
– do not know
– not applicable
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70. How many years have you paid your mar-
ket dues?
– number
– prefer not to answer
– do not know
– not applicable
71. Have you ever met Auntie Eva, the market
secretary?
– Yes
– No, but I know who she is
– No, I have no idea who she is
– prefer not to answer
– do not know
– not applicable
72. Have you ever received financial help from
the market (loan, emergency money, help
with stock, etc.)?
– Yes, from the head of the market line
– Yes, from the Kaneshie Market Asso-
ciation
– Yes, from any other market members
– No, I have received no help from the
market
– prefer not to answer
– do not know
– not applicable
73. Which market line do you belong to?
– name
– prefer not to answer
– do not know
– not applicable
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3.7.4 Experimental protocol
Before participants arrive, enumerators prepare the room: they install chairs, tables, computers,
and dividers. The session monitor prepares desks numbers to be given to participants, receipts,
insurance forms, and envelopes for random draw. Enumerators sit and start the program while
waiting for the participants.
When participants arrive, they are given an ID number and sit in front of a computer. The
session monitor welcomes them and explains the experiment in English. One enumerator translates
the explanations in the local language spoken by the participants (most often Twi).
Session monitor: “Welcome to our study, thank you for coming. We are a group of researcher
from Toulouse in France and we are doing a study here in Ghana in collaboration with Central
University College. The first part of the study consists in a questionnaire that contains demographic
questions as well as questions about your religious practices. For completing the survey, you will
receive 20GHS.The questionnaire is anonymous, no one will be able to associate you with the
questionnaire. We will not record any private information with your answers. You are allowed
to skip any question you do not want to answer. If you choose to stop the interview we will give
you 5GHS for your effort to come here. In a second part, you will play a game on how to allocate
11GHS. You will be asked 10 questions; in each question you can choose you to allocate money
between two different recipients. The list of the different recipients is written on the white board.
First, in some occasions, you will have the opportunity to keep money for yourself. Another option
will be to give money to the Street’s Children Fund. This is an NGO active in Jamestown that
helps children from the streets to access education. You will also be allowed to give to the National
Thanksgiving Association, for a National Week of Prayer gathering as many Ghanaians as possible,
from different religions, to pray for Ghana. This year the Week of prayer is expected to be held in
March. You will also have the chance to make some donation to your own church privately, and in
another option you can offer money to your church with your name. At the end of the game, we
will pick one question randomly with equal probabilities. We will make payments according to your
answers to this question. First, you will play a practice round, helped by your enumerator. You
will play the real round privately. The session monitor is here to help you at any time. There are
different types of sessions. The session we run with you is picked at random. We now ask you if
you agree with us using the data from this session - the answers you give in the questionnaire and
in the game which are anonymous - for research purpose.”
PAUSE, wait for objections. Continue if there are no objections. One participant draws an
envelope that contains the type of the session: ‘INSURANCE’, ‘INSURANCE INFORMATION’,
or ‘NO INSURANCE’.
If the session is ‘INSURANCE’:
Session monitor: “The type of session we run with you is called ‘INSURANCE’. This means
that we will offer you a funeral insurance policy. This insurance scheme is offered on the market
by Enterprise Life and we will purchase it for you. From the day we enroll your name and for one
year, if you or one of your family members (to be designated) dies, a recipient will get money to
finance the funeral expenses (1000GHS). You can choose to enroll with you one family member. It
can be of your parents, one of your minor children, your wife or husband. They should be younger
than 74. To cover you and a family member, this insurance costs annually 12.50GHS. This group
insurance is coordinated by your church. The coordinator is your Pastor (name). At the end of
the year, you can collectively decide to continue or not the insurance contract. Any claim should
be addressed to your Pastor, he will receive money for you if anything happens. If you do not wish
to be benefit from the insurance policy, please inform us. “
If the session is ‘INSURANCE INFORMATION’:
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Monitor: “The type of session we run with you is called ‘INSURANCE’. This means that we
will give you information about an insurance that you can decide to purchase for yourself. The
insurance we would like to discuss with you is a funeral insurance offered by Enterprise Life: if you
or one of your family members (to be designated) dies, a recipient will get money to finance the
funeral expenses (1000GHS). You can choose to enroll with you one of your parents, one of your
minor children, or your wife or husband. They should be younger than 74. To cover you and one
family member, this insurance costs annually 12.50GHS. At the end of the year, you can collectively
decide to continue or not the insurance contract. The coordinator for this group insurance could
be your Pastor (name). Any claim would be addressed to him, he would receive money for you if
anything happens. If you are interested in buying this insurance, please contact Pastor (name).”
For all the sessions:
Monitor: “The experiment is now about to start. Please remember that the answers that you
will give will be anonymous and be kept secret. The enumerators are here to guide you through the
survey and translate it if necessary. You can leave the experiment at any time and you will be paid
a show-up fee of 5GHS.”
The participants answer the questionnaire with the help of enumerators. After answering the
questionnaire, participants in ‘INSURANCE’ sessions fill in the insurance form. Then they proceed
to the game, first a practice round helped by the enumerators, and then the real round by them-
selves. Once they have entered their choices for the 10 money allocation questions, the participants
randomly pick a letter that corresponds to one question. The session monitor enters the letter
in the computer to record total payment. Participants leave the room and wait to be called for
payment.
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